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NOTE ON ABBREVIATIONS
In second citations which involve the two collections 
of sources, the Patrologia Latina and the Monumenta Germaniae 
Historia, the respective standard abbreviations (P.L. and 
M.G.H.) appear. In regard to the latter work, the various 
series within the collection are represented by the following;
A.A. = Auctores Antiquissimi
Epp. = Epistolae
LL. = Leges
SB. = Scriptores in folio
SB. rer. Merov. = Scriptores rerum Merovingicarum
SB. rer. Germ. = Scriptores rerum Germanicarum
PREFACE
Provincial Aquitaine had universal appeal in late 
Roman times. Christian dogmatists and poets alike commented 
on the beauty and agricultural prosperity of the region. To 
be sure, the political and military interest that the province 
attracted from the fourth to the ninth centuries bore evidence 
that the inhabitants derived an enviable living from its soil 
and climate. Competing powers made the area a crossroad to 
invasion. For these reasons, Aquitaine attracted more than 
its share of interlopers intent on mining its wealth and under­
mining its position. Salvian, a late fourth century Christian 
author, noted that the province served as the very "marrow of 
all the Gauls."! Several scholars have attached a similar
^Salvianus, De Gubernatione Dei, vii, 2, Monumenta 
Germaniae Histories, Auctorum Antiquissimorum. ed. C. Halm,
Ï (Berlin, 1877), p. 85: "Nemini dubium est Aquitanos ac
Novempopuios medullam fere omnium Galliarum et uber totius 
fecunditatis habuisse, nec solum fecunditatis, sed, quae prae- 
poni interdum fecunditati soient, iucunditatis, pulchritudinus, 
voluptatis. Adeo illic omnis admodum regio aut intertexta 
vineis aut florulenta pratis aut distincte culturis aut con- 
dita pomis aut amoenata lucis aut inrigua fontibus aut inter­
fuse fluminibus aut crinita messibus fuit, ut vere possessores 
ac domini terrae illius non tam soli istius portionem quam 
paradisi imaginem possedisse videantur." Praise of Aquitaine 
by the poet Ausonius parallels the eulogies of Salvian. For 
his comments on her cities in particular see; Ordo Urbium 
Nobilium, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Auctorum Antiquissi­
morum, ed. C. Schenkl, V (Berlin, 1883), pp. 102-103.
VI
significance to its history.
Medievalists once agreed that the institutional his­
tory of the age represented basically a conflict between two 
forces shaping the social, economic, auid political elements 
of society. These were the mutually antagonistic influences, 
Germanitas and Romanitas. Many have found in the affairs of 
Aquitaine, the most thoroughly Romanized Gallic province of 
the empire, a classic vehicle by which to expound and advance 
arguments supporting the Romanitas viewpoint. Herein, the 
vestiges of the hallowed Roman Empire overshadow the crude 
influence of Germanic barbarians migrating into the province.
The native Gallo-Roman, equipped with a knowledge of the past, 
culturally resisted the northern onslaught and avoided the 
influences of barbarian debasement.
Recently, scholars have abandoned investigations of 
the ethnocentric origins of institutions to give attention to 
the ways in which those institutions integrate. In the fore­
front of this movement was the late Marc Bloch, who examined 
the patterns of feudal society and indebted the world of 
scholarship to his incisive mind. Instead of ascribing a nar­
row significance to Gallo-Roman, Roman, or Germanic configura­
tions within society, Bloch analyzed the concomitant workings 
of various social forces. It seems more useful to approach 
the functional aspects of medieval provincial society in this 
manner than to argue the case for either Romanitas or Germanitas.
v i i
During the era of Roman political and military decline, the 
powers contesting for supremacy in southern Gaul gave special 
attention to Aquitaine because of its agricultural produc­
tivity. The area thus became a battleground. More signifi­
cantly, its location was strategic politically, economically, 
and militarily. While Aquitaine was a bridge linking Italy 
to Spain, it also touched the Mediterranean. It gave Ger­
manic tribesmen beyond the Loire River access to Italy, a 
region whose importance transcended the ancient into the 
medieval, particularly in the religious context. Furthermore, 
as a burgeoning Islam moved into Spain in the early eighth 
century, Aquitaine achieved yet another importance. Just as 
the province had once formed a buffer between the Romans and 
their northern antagonists, it now separated the Germanic from 
the Muslim.
It remains to observe that Aquitaine did maintain a 
distinct culture throughout the period 418-781. Some scholars 
have exaggerated the importance of this independent course of 
affairs in relation to the rest of the Roman west. In the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the force of nationalism 
profoundly influenced historical scholarship, and in France 
particularly this encouraged an awareness of things French (a 
derivative of Romanitas), which resulted in a nationalistic 
self-analysis from a peculiar vantage point. Aquitaine re­
ceived attention as never before or since. Accordingly, a
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genre of nationalistic monographs, expounding an exclus!visL 
thesis, arose to explain the separatist tendency that char­
acterized the Aquitanian experience from the fifth to the 
eighth century. These denied the importance for Aquitaine 
of the barbarian invasions which generally affected the his­
tory of the rest of the Roman west in this period. The 
authors most representative of this position are Claude Devic 
and Joseph Vaissete in their monumental Histoire Générale de 
Languedoc and Jean de Jaurgain in his two volume work. La 
Vasconie. The present study takes exception to the argument 
that Aquitaine possessed a unique social and economic char­
acter in comparison to its neighbors. It also offers a dif­
ferent perspective, inasmuch as most of the scholars who have 
written about Aquitaine have come from the area itself, a 
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In the early middle ages, invasions in southern Europe 
affected the whole gamut of human affairs. Teutonic peoples 
moved from one country to the next and thereby contributed to 
the volatile political setting of the period from 418 to 781. 
From this perspective, the observation of James Bryce that the 
long line of Teutonic kings who proceeded into Italy and found 
its love more deadly than its hate^ reminds one of the situa­
tion in Aquitaine in 418.
Aquitaine had responded well to the Roman cultural 
assimilation that had steadily taken place since the days of 
Julius Caesar. More Roman than inhabitants of any other part 
of Gaul, the native Aquitanian had barbarians successively 
thrust upon him. After the Roman came the Visigoth and, even 
later, the Frank.
Although the Roman government of southern Gaul left
1James Bryce, The Holy Roman Empire (New York, 1886),
p. 52.
pbehind many vestiges, the history of Roman affairs there 
holds no interest for this study until the early part of the 
fifth century. After the devastation of Rome by the Visigoths 
in 410 A.D., the western part of the Empire staggered under 
the weight of many problems. Little remained static; Roman 
leadership, territorial integrity, and Visigothic administra­
tion all contained chaotic elements. In the same year that 
the Visigoths successfully invaded Rome, their leader, Alaric, 
died. Thereafter, and before the eventual establishment of 
the Visigoths in southern Gaul, these people were led by 
Athaulf and then Wallia. They coveted territory ranging from 
Italy to North Africa, Gaul, and Spain.3 In defeat, Roman 
leadership underwent perplexing convolutions in the years 
after 410. Within seven years, however, the Romans settled
2on this ^opic one distinguished French historian, 
Robert Latouche (Etudes Médiévales [Paris, 1966], p. 20), 
contends: "II est incontestable que, tant au point de vue
économique que culturel, la Gaule a largement profité de la 
conquête romaine et s'est progressivement latinisée. L'effort 
des Romains a été essentiellement un effort d'urbanisation.
Ils ont bâti des villes et construit des routes pour relier 
ces villes et établir des relations avec les autres parties 
de 1'Empire." The point made in Latouche's second sentence 
is quite important and will occupy hereafter the attention 
of this study.
3por a chronological treatment of these events see: 
Ludwig Schmidt, "The Visigoths in Gaul," Cambridge Medieval 
History, I, x, 277-292; André Berthelot, "Les Royaumes 
Barbares de la Gaule," Histoire Générale, I, iii, 104-114; 
and J. B. Bury, History of the Later Roman Empire: From the
Death of Theodosius I.to the Death of Justinian (2 vols.;
New York, 1958), I, pp. 194-211,
3
upon a leader who could cope successfully with the Visigothic 
threat. This was Constantius, a man who advanced from the 
post of general under the Emperor Honorius to that of Consul 
in January, 417.* The promotion was undoubtedly a consequence 
of his victories over the Visigoths in Gaul and in Spain. 
Thereafter, he managed to negotiate with the Goths, which re­
sulted in their settlement in Aquitaine in 418.
Perhaps the most important factor in the eventual con­
ciliation between the Romans and Visigoths in 418 was the 
attitude of the Goths toward the Romans. Throughout the dec­
ade, Galla Placidia, the sister of the emperor, was little 
more than a pawn in political machinations in southwestern 
Europe. First matched in marriage with the Gothic leader 
Athaulf, she later returned to the Roman side by marrying 
Constantius.
Scholars have made varying assessments of Placidia's 
role in the warming of Gothic-Roman political relations after 
her marriage to Athaulf.^ Upon consideration of her personal­
*Ernest Barker, "Italy and the West, 410-476," Cam­
bridge Medieval History, I, xiv, 404.
^One of the more interesting accounts comes from the 
pen of Ludwig Schmidt (Geschichte der deutschen Stamme bis 
zum Ausgange der Volkerwanderung [4 vols.; Berlin, 1904], I, 
p. 225) who thinks that Placidia*s positive influence grew 
to a fruition of sorts after several years (411-414) rather 
than being an original condition upon which the marriage was 
contracted: "Man wird kaum fehlgehen, wenn man diese plotz-
liche, ins andere Extrem fallende Gesinnungsanderung auf rein 
personliche Nomente, auf den Einflufs der Placidia, den auch
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ity and native talents, it appears that her influence amelio­
rated many of the differences between these antagonists. A 
contemporary historian, the Christian author Paul Orosius, 
observed that the Gothic leader Athaulf was influenced in the 
works of good government by the persuasion and advice of his 
wife, a woman of a very keen mind.®
Athaulf was assassinated in 415, but his policies 
toward Rome were continued by his successors, occasionally by 
inclination and often by necessity.^ The barbarians had wan­
dered through the Roman world from 376 to 418, and this had
Orosius hervorhebt, nicht auf politische Erwagungen des Konigs 
zurückführt; das Einlenken in romische Tendenzen ist wahr- 
scheinlich die Bedingung gewesen, an die die kluge kaiser- 
stochter ihre Zustimmung zur Vermahlung mit dem Barbaren 
gekniipft hat.”
®Paulus Orosius, Historiarum Libri Septem, vii, 43, 
Patrologiae Latina, ed. J.-P. Migne, XXXI (Paris, 1846), p.
1172; "Ob hoc abstinere a bello, ob hoc inhiare paci nitebatur, 
praecipue Placidiae uxoris suae, feminae sane ingenio acerrimae 
et religionis satis probae, ad omnia bonarum ordinationum 
opera persuasit et consilio temperatus.”
?Not only were the Visigoths in a state of discomfort 
owing to Constantius' efforts against them, but also they 
lacked grain. As early as 410, after taking Rome, their lead­
er Alaric looked toward productive North Africa to replenish 
his stock of supplies. Moreover, their migrations throughout 
Italy, Gaul, and then Spain were mainly activated by this 
quest for grain. Olympiodorus (frag. 29 through 31) discusses 
their eventual capitulation to the Romans on the basis of 
their reduction by famine. Interestingly enough, Jordanes in 
his Getica skirts the matter of their dire straits and asserts 
that the Goths pursued their enemies (the Franks, Burgundians, 
Alans, and Vandals) out of Gaul and into Spain where they 
eventually defeated them (Getica, 31) before their negotiations 
with Rome.
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impaired their agricultural productivity. Their compatibility 
with Rome was a marriage of convenience. The Romans could 
provide the food the Visigoths so badDy needed, and the Visi­
goths, as Federates, could defend the Romans against other 
barbarians. Since no evidence has survived to indicate an 
emerging hostility between Roman landowners and the new set­
tlers, the experiment must have proved successful. Besides 
fearing other Germanic tribesmen, the aristocratic element in 
Aquitaine wished to prevent a barbarian-peasant alliance and 
then bind the Visigoths closer to the aristocracy by placing 
their interests on common footing.
Wallia ascended to the Visigothic throne, and under 
his governance his people came to terms with Rome. After con­
sidering migration to North Africa, Wallia directed his efforts 
toward a series of successful campaigns against common Gothic 
and Roman enemies in Spain. His victories paved the way for 
the entente with Rome in 418. The Romans decided to reward 
the Visigoths with a home north across the Pyrenees.
The settlement of these Visigothic barbarians in 
southern Gaul has occasioned much historical comment in recent 
years. The paucity of information in contemporary sources 
leaves many points in question. The Aquitanian annalist known 
as Prosper Tiro, however, recounted what took place. The Patri­
cias Constantius, he noted, secured peaca with Wallia; there­
upon, the Second Aquitaine was given to the Goth as c dwelling
place, with certain parts of the neighboring provinces includ­
ed.® The Second Aquitaine originally contained six principal 
cities. Bordeaux stood as the métropole, or capital, of the 
province before Visigothic times,® but thereafter the new Goth­
ic settlers came to favor Toulouse (appanage to the Second 
Aquitaine in the 418 agreement) as their principal seat of 
government. In general terms, this rich province stretched 
from the Garonne River in the south to the Loire in the north. 
The Mediterranean coast and parts of Narbonne were excluded 
from the new Visigothic domain. Historians have not always 
agreed about what the Goths could expect from their newfound 
possessions for a livelihood. Contemporary accounts leave de­
tails of provisioning somewhat vague, and many authors believe 
that the Visigoths were allowed only a share of the produce of
Bprosperi Tironis Epitoma Chronicon, a. 419, Monumenta 
Germaniae Historica, Auctorum Antiquissimorum, ed. T. Mommsen,
IX (Berlin, 1892), p. 269: "Constantius patricius pacem firmat
cum Wallia data ei ad inhabitandum secunda Aquitanica et qui- 
busdam civitatibus confinium provinciarum."
®G. Bloch ("Le Gouvernement Central au IV® Siècle," 
Histoire de France: Depuis les Origines jusqu'à la Revolution,
ed. Ernest Lavisse, I, xi [1911], 276-79) attempts to clarify 
the ambiguities surrounding references to the First and Second 
Aquitaines, In part, he remarks: "L'Aquitaine, démembrée avant
Dioclétien, formait deux provinces: 1* Aquitaine, dite plus
tard Aquitaine première, métropole Bourges, 2" Novempopulanie, 
métropole Eauze." The six cities that comprised the Second 
Aquitaine were: Bordeaux, Agen, Angoulême, Saints, Poitiers,
and Périgueux. This listing, of course, refers strictly to the 
area prior to its incorporation into the Visigothic kingdom. 
Thereafter, it grew somewhat by the terms of the 418 Roman- 
Visigothic agreement.
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Aquitanian land and not a portion of the land itself.10 
Julien Havet, howèver, found the answer to this riddle in his 
examination of the Leges Visigothorum, a codification of Goth­
ic law under their later kings. He concluded that the Visi­
goths held two-thirds of this land under their own control, 
while leaving one-third of it in the hands of its former 
owners.11 If this price seems dear, it should be remembered 
that the barbarians were meant to perform a vital task. Al­
though the Goths had no legal prerogatives, they served as 
Federates, which meant that they functioned in a military 
capacity and were hospes, or guests, of the R o m a n s . 1 2
The barbarian Visigoths lived on the Roman estate side 
by side with the landowners. Although many of the technicali­
ties are obscure, it appears that one among the Visigoths 
appreciated the role and title of consors ("partner"). He be­
came a barbarian optimate among those who resided with him on 
the estates. Several political and sociological distinctions
10Julien Havet, "Du Partage es Terres entre les Romains 
et les Barbores chez les Burgondes et les Visigoths," Revue 
Historique, VI (1878), 91.
lllbid., 94. "Il faut reconnaître que c'est bien la 
terre elle-même que les Burgondes et les Visigoths ont partagée 
avec les Romains, dont ils ont pris pour eux les deux tiers, 
et dont ils n'ont laissé que le tiers aux anciens possesseurs."
12perdinand Lot deals with this subject at length in 
his article: "Du Regime de l'Hospitalité," Revue Belge de
Philologie et d'Histoire, VII (1928), 975-1011.
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characterized this peculiar relationship: (1) by law the Visi­
goth and the native Aquitanian could not i n t e r m a r r y (2) the 
Visigoths were not intended to have any control whatsoever over 
the Roman population; and (3) under the law they had special 
distinction in the routine of daily affairs. In summary then, 
the Visigoths constructed an administrative apparatus parallel 
to that of the Romans, and each accounted for the respective 
needs of the two people. Beyond this, the Romans strengthened 
the alliance so that the Visigoths could not defend themselves 
without defending the Roman landowner as well. With the politi­
cal amd military power of the Romans failing, this situation 
could not last indefinitely. The Goths asserted themselves 
later in the century and thus incurred the distrust and dis­
like of the Catholic episcopacy.
The Visigoths, of course, conquered the Spanish bar­
barians, and the question might be asked: from whom were they
now to protect the Aquitaniams? It is precisely this question
Above all else, it was this law that prevented the 
assimilation of the two people. Not until the last quarter 
of the sixth century under King Leovigild did the Visigoths 
rescind this law and permit intermarriage. In the eyes of 
both people (Visigoths and Romans), the gravity of this par­
ticular transgression merited capital punishment; hence, the 
intermarriage question received considerable attention through­
out the duration of their Aquitanian arrangement (418-507).
For comment on this question, see: K. Zeumer, "Geschichte
der westgothischen Gesetzgebung," Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft 
fur altere deutsche Geschichtskunde, XXIV, ii (1899), 477-480. 
Religious considerations influenced this issue most and, as 
noted below, the Visigoths had moved into Spain by the time of 
King Leovigild's reign.
that has most intrigued historians about the Visigoths in 
the last fifteen years. The foremost recent interpretation 
directs attention to the northern neighbors of the Aqui- 
tanians— the Armoricans. These people (more specifically 
called the Bacaudae) lived north of the Loire River and at 
this time were in a rebellious mood, threatening to move 
south into A q u i t a i n e . B e c a u s e  the Armoricans were an agri­
cultural people, the imperial government determined to pre­
serve unimpaired the productivity of Aquitaine by preventing 
the rebellion from sweeping southward. Also, the Rhine army 
depended upon Aquitanian productivity, and it was imperative
l^This is in reference to the work of Professor E. A. 
Thompson, who has virtually established his academic reputa­
tion by his numerous inquiries into various aspects of Visi- 
gothic affairs. The principal article that serves as the 
hallmark of his views on the Visigothic settlement in Aqui­
taine is: "The Settlement of the Barbarians in Southern Gaul,"
Journal of Roman Studies, XLVI (1956), 65-75. Also, see his: 
"Barbarian Kingdoms in Gaul and Spain," Nottingham Mediaeval 
Studies, VII (1963), 3-33; "Early Visigothic Christianity," 
Latomus, XXI (1962), 505-519 and 794-810; "Conversion of the 
Visigoths to Catholicism," Nottingham Mediaeval Studies, IV 
(1960), 4-35; and "The Visigoths in the Time of Ulfila," 
Nottinghcun Mediaeval Studies, V (1961), 3-32.
l^E. A. Thompson has not been without his critics, 
chief among them being Professor J. M. Wallace-Hadrill 
("Gothia and Romania," Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, 
XLIV [1961], 213-236). Thompson's interest in the Visigothic 
settlement in southern Gaul stemmed from his examination of 
the activities of these same rebels; the following article 
attests to this fact: "Peasant Revolts in Late Roman Gaul
and Spain," Past and Present, II (1952), 11-23. Herein he 
discusses the Bacaudae.
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that Rome maintain order t h e r e . I n  short, the settlement 
of the Visigoths, engineered by Constantius and enlarged by 
Aëtius, was brilliantly contrived, for it allayed the aggres­
siveness of the Goths toward Roman subjects in Aquitaine and 
made their interests s y n o n y m o u s . I n  praising the political 
and military wisdom of Constantius, E. A. Thompson presupposed 
the compatibility of the Gothic and Roman citizens in Aqui­
taine. Was it possible for the more cultivated Roman to assim­
ilate the barbarian hospites and evolve a satisfactory and 
lasting relationship with him? Indeed it was. Furthermore, 
said Thompson, the Roman yielded his land "voluntary and with­
out demur" to his "comparatively highly civilized Germanic 
hospites."18
Set against this is the contemporary account of Paulus 
Orosius describing the nature of the Visigoths. Orosius learned 
that the Gothic King Athaulf was skeptical about the potential 
of his people ever to lead Romans or to replace their institu­
tions with something Gothic. Moreover, he confided that the 
Goths, by reason of their unbridled barbarism, could in no way 
obey laws; hence, he could not aspire to transform the Roman
l^E. A. Thompson, "The Visigoths from Fritigern to 
Euric," Historia, XII (1963), 119. This particular article 
excellently summarizes Thompson's views concerning the settle­
ment of 418. See pages 118-122.
1^Thompson, Journal of Roman Studies, XLVI, 74.
18Ibid., 68.
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system into a Gothic one.19
It seems logical that the newly-arrived Visigoths 
would do their best to promote harmonious relations with the 
Aquitanians.20 Paul Orosius related that after the first 
barbarian depredations many Romans did prefer poverty and 
freedom among the barbarians to paying the troublesome trib­
ute which the empire exacted.21 Salvian went further by say­
ing that many Romans sought Roman humanity among the barbari­
ans in order to avoid barbaric inhumanity among the R o m a n s . 2 2
l^Orosius, vii, 43, P.L., p. 1172: "At ubi multa ex-
perientia probavisset, neque Gothos ullo modo parere legibus 
posse propter effrenatam barbariem, neque reipublicae inter- 
dici leges oportere, sine guibus respublica non est respublica; 
elegisse se saltem, ut gloriam sibi de restituendo in integrum, 
augendoque Romano nomine Gothorum viribus quaereret, habere- 
turque apud posteros Romanae restitutionis auctor, postquam 
esse non potuerat immutator."
20otto Seeck (Geschichte des Unterganqs der antiken 
Welt [6 vols.; Stuttgart, 1966], V, pp. 314-15) relates that 
likewise Romans conscientiously extended their friendship to 
barbarian officers of the Arian faith in earlier years: 
"Sogleich hatte er die schlimmsten Ketzergesetze seines 
Vorgangers aufgehoben, wahrscheinlich um so den arianischen 
Offizieren, vor alien dem Gainas, seine Gunst zu erweisen, 
und hatte sich auch sonst zu den Barbaren des Heeres freund- 
lich gestellt."
Zlorosius, vi, 41, P.L., p. 1168: "Quamqucim et post
hoc quoque continue Barbari, exsecrati gladios suos, ad 
aratra conversi sunt, residuosque Romanos ut socios modo et 
amicos fovent, ut inveniantur jam inter eos quidam Romani, 
qui malint inter Barbaros pauperem libertatem, quam inter 
Romanos tributariam sollicitudinem sustinere."
22galvianus, v, 21, M.G.H., A.A., p. 59: " . . .  ad
hostes fugiant, ne persecutionis publicae adflictione morian- 
tur, quaerentes scilicet apud barbaros Romanam humanitatem, 
quia apud Romanos barbaram inhumanitatem ferre non possunt." 
Salvian charges in his diatribe, however, that Rome's present
12
Salvian suggested that the Roman aristocracy in Aquitaine in­
clined toward barbarian values because of the general debase­
ment of Roman ways of life. Similarly, the Visigoths emulated 
and identified with the Aguitanian landowners. The two peo­
ples eventually became culturally compatible as a result of 
several factors; (1) Euric, the most powerful of the Visi- 
gothic kings, declared independence from Rome in 475, thus less­
ening administrative expense and simplifying the maintenance of 
the m i l i t a r y ; (2) the weakened Visigothic clans could not act 
separately, beyond the will of their king, and thus the force 
of Visigothic law proved significant in the amalgamation of 
Euric’s state; aind (3) the barbarians entered into Roman soci­
ety in Aquitaine to a considerable degree and in fact became 
a part of it. The significance of all this is borne out by 
the fact that there exists no mention of rebellion by the Gallo- 
Roman population in Aquitaine against the Visigoths.
Daily exposure to the Visigoths over a period of time 
must certainly have influenced the attitudes of many peo­
ple in Aquitaine. Orosius and Salvian both reflect the 
earlier views of the literate clergy, while the writing of
political and military plight is due to her moral depravity. 
Furthermore, the noble barbarian's position of strength con­
trasts vividly with the sinful ways of pagan Rome. His Visi­
gothic declarations do not convince emd his facts are con­
strued to tailor-fit his argument.
Z^Thompson, Nottingham Mediaeval Studies, VII, 10.
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Sidonius Apollinaris, the Bishop of Clermont, demonstrates 
the changing mood of that same class later in the fifth cen­
tury. Sidonius clearly disliked the Goths and his work reg­
isters his contempt for them. He noted their unpleasant 
appearance and drew attention to their King Euric (466-485), 
the "Old Enemy" who preyed on the sheepfolds of the Church.2* 
Other objects of his venom were two Gothic women who once 
lived near him. They were "the most quarrelsome, drunken, 
vomiting creatures the world will ever see," he c l a i m e d . 25 
Though Sidonius personally had cause to dislike Euric, his 
views were those of cui aristocrat and a churchman at that. 
That perhaps explains his position, particularly in light of 
the fact that Euric profitably utilized the Roman aristocracy 
within his own ministry. Sidonius described the last twenty- 
five years of Roman rule in southern Gaul and thus expressed 
the reactionary views of an element in society which opposed 
the prosperity of an Arian barbarian king.
The Bishop of Clermont was not alone in his distaste
2^See below p. 33.
25Apollinaris Sidonius Epistulae viii, 2, Monuments 
Germanise Histories, Auctorum Antiquxssimorum, ed. C . 
Luetjohann, VIII (Berlin, 1887), p. 127: "ad hoc, et cum me
defetigatum ab excubiis ad devorsorium crepusculascens hors 
revocaverat, vix dabatur luminibus inflexis parvula guies; 
nam fragor ilico, quern movebant vicinantes impluvio cubiculi 
mei duae quaepiam Getides anus, quibus nil umquam litigiosius 
bibacius vomacius erit." He further acknowledged in a letter 
to Philagrius (vii. 10.); "You shun barbarians because they 
are reputed bad; I shun them even if they are good,"
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for the barbarian Visigoth by the middle of the fifth century.
A similar attitude was expressed by the author of the life of 
Saint Vivian, the Bishop of Saintes, a city in the western 
part of Aquitaine. This bishop traveled to Toulouse to obtain 
compensation for aristocratic petitioners whose property was 
attached by the Goths, Vivian's biographer accuses the Visi­
goths of coveting the entire fortune of the Gallo-Roman aris­
tocracy.26 Thus, by the reign of Theoderic II (453-466), the 
Aguitanian clergy demonstrated antagonism toward Visigoths 
and openly referred to them in unfavorable t e r m s . 27
In another development in Aquitaine during this period, 
Toulouse became the focal point of Gothic interest. Contem­
porary accounts began to speak of the "realm of Toulouse" and
26vita Bibiani Vel Viviani Episcopi Santonensis, 4, 
Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores Rerum Merovingicarum, 
edr Bruno Krusch, III (Hannover, 1896), p. 96. The events 
that prompted Vivian to travel to Toulouse are described thus- 
ly: "Cumque pio moderamine plebem sibi commissam divinis
erudiret in omnibus disciplinis, accidit, ut Gothorum tempore, 
rege Theodoro dominante, Sanctonis civibus intolerabilis 
statueretur iniunctio, ita ut, amissis facultatibus, subderen- 
tur maxime statum perdere libertatis. Cumque ablatis opibus 
non solum mediocrium personarum, sed etiam cunctorum nobilium 
praesidium inhiantes, facula cupiditatis accensi, statuerunt, 
ut ad Tolosanam urbem cunctos in vinculis inmoderata praesump- 
tione pertraherent, ut cum extorsissent vitam, ambitum rapinae 
suae intolerabili praesumptione complerent et, cessantibus 
incolis, quicquid inhiaverant, barbari possiderent."
27Several articles in French deal with the various 
possible interpretations of the significance of this Vita.
In the view of the present author, the most noteworthy is that 
of Fredinand Lot ("La Vita Viviani et la Domination Visigothique 
en Aquitaine" in Melanges Paul Fournier [Paris, 1929], pp. 
467-77) .
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the King of Toulouse in reference to the Gothic establishment 
there.28 This city belonged to the Visigoths' Aguitanian do­
main, cind the newcomers adupLed the city as their permanent 
capital for the duration of their stay in Gaul. Their per­
sistence in thus maintaining it is interesting in view of 
their nomadic existence during the preceding hundred years. 
They settled elsewhere in Aquitaine, and a letter of Sidonius 
to his bishop indicates that Clermont alone remained unoccu­
pied by the barbarians.^9 From a geographical point of view, 
Toulouse did offer a number of attractions as a capital for 
the Visigoths. It was a base of operations in the most vital 
part of their kingdom. From Toulouse, the Visigoths could 
easily strike toward the Mediterranean Sea or undertake the 
conquest of Auvergne under their King E uric.Mo r e o v e r ,  the
28chronicoruin Caesaraugustanorum Reliquiae, a. 507, 
Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Auctorum Antiquissimorum, XI, 
ed. T. Mommsen (Berlin, 1894), p. 223; "Alaricus rex in 
proelio a Francis interfectus est: regnum Tolosanum destructum
est. "
^^Apollinaris Sidonius, vii, 5, M.G.H., A.A., p. 108: 
"his accedit, quod de urbibus Aquitanicae primae solum oppidum 
Arvernum Romanorum reliquum partibus bella fecerunt." The 
capital of the Arverni was Clermont-Ferrand.
^^Etienne Delaruelle, "Toulouse capitale Wisigothique," 
Annales du Midi, LXVII (1955), 214: "... mais on comprend
sans peine leur preference pour Toulouse, capitale naturelle 
du Midi wisigoth, moins excentrique que ces autres résidences, 
bases de départ idéales pour cette marche vers la Méditerranée 
qui fut une des idées maîtresses de la dynastie ou pour la 
conquête de l'Auvergne sous le régne d'Euric."
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architecture of this era well illustrates an important fact 
about the people who populated it after 418. As nomads, they 
occupied pre-existing structures without supplying something 
new. Their poverty prevented them from developing a Visigothic 
style of architecture that would glorify or distinguish the 
Gothic experience in Gaul.31
The Goths not only failed to made an artistic imprint 
in the architectural styles of southern Gaul but also contri­
buted insignificantly to the linguistic development of the 
area. The negligible Gothic contribution is surprising be­
cause of the longevity of their stay in Aquitaine (418-507). 
They did possess an original language, but nothing of it exists 
today except in proper names.
The Goths chose Latin as their medium of literary ex­
pression, and their works dealt with both law and religion. 
Little remains of Gothic script, perhaps because of the effec­
tiveness of the Orthodox Christian missionary effort. Since 
the Visigoths strongly adhered to the Arian heresy until their
31lbid., 220-21. Delaruelle concludes his interesting 
article in the following manner: "C'est 1'evidence même que
les Wisigoths, jusqu'alors nomades, n'ont pas impose, à l'in­
térieur de leur royaume, une architecture nouvelle, mais ont 
utlisé les maçons et les façons du pays conquis. C'est dire 
qu'il n'y a pas, pensons-nous, de style proprement wisigothique 
Tout au plus, pourrait-on penser que leur technique se définit 
par la pauvreté des moyens, en raison même des conditions dans 
lesquelles se trouvait alors l'empire."
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official conversion in 5 8 9 , they suffered from the general 
disapproval of the numerically superior Roman populace. The 
writing of Isidore of Seville exemplifies the Roman attitude 
that engulfed the Visigoth. An early seventh century church­
man, he reflected on their blasphemous religious views and re­
joiced in their conversion to Orthodoxy.^^
In another respect, the development of language in 
Aquitaine has received more attention than the accomplishments 
of the Visigoths. One prominent French scholar has written a 
monograph that completely ignores Gothic influence on the evo­
lution of the Aguitanian dialect. Instead, he elaborates on 
the contributions of Latin and Basque on developments in Aqui­
taine. He thus underscores the cultural unimportance of the 
Goths in this phase of Aguitanian h i s t o r y . 34
32Scholars have generally neglected the history of 
the conversion of the Visigoths from Arianism to Roman Cathol­
icism. In fact, no one has published a narrative chronicling 
these events in English since Rafael Altamire ("Spain under 
the Visigoths," Cambridge Medieval History, II, vi, 159-193) 
wrote his article in 1913 until E. A. Thompson's work (Not­
tingham Mediaeval Studies, IV, 4-35) appeared in 1960. See 
the remarks concerning this subject that preface the latter 
publication.
33isidorus, Historia Gothorum, 8, Monumenta Germaniae 
Historica, Auctorum Antiquissimorum, ed. T. Mommsen, XI (Berlin, 
1894), p. 271: "cuius blasphemiae malum per discessum temporum
regumque successum annis CCXIII tenuerunt. qui tandem remi- 
niscentes salutis suae renuntiaverunt inolitae perfidiae et 
Christi gratia ad unitatem fidei catholicae pervenerunt."
Isidore mentions that Ulfilas, the Gothic bishop, established 
the Gothic script and translated the Old and New Testaments 
into the same language.
34A. Luchaire, Les Origines Linguistiques de Aquitaine
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Because of the manner of their settlement in southern 
Gaul, perhaps it was natural for the Visigoths to utilize 
Latin in their writing but as well to borrow heavily from the 
Romans while drafting their own laws. The frequent reference 
to Roman law in the earliest written code of the Visigoths, 
prepared during the reign of King Euric, clearly attests to 
this fact.^^ In any event, a study of the legal history of 
Visigothic Gaul throws further light upon the status of the 
barbarian in Aquitaine and the degree of his influence, or 
lack of it, in the succeeding years.
Euric's Code dealt with cases involving both Goths 
and Gallo-Romans; in cases that affected only Gallo-Romans, 
recourse to Roman law was made. Since the Code of Euric so 
obviously depended upon Romem law,^® the significance of the
(Pau, 1877), p. 71; "L"invasion romaine, qui a eu pour ré­
sultats la disparition de la langue parlée par les Aquitains 
dans la plaine et dans la majeure partie des montagnes et son 
remplacement par le latin vulgaire devenu ensuite le gascon, 
s'est arrêté a 1'extrémité sud-ouest de la région aquitanique 
devant des gorges et des torrents sans doute mieux défendues 
que les autres parties de la chaîne."
35Ibid., pp. 3-32.
^^Whether or not the Visigoths lived under codified 
law before King Euric has attracted some attention. Isidore 
of Seville (33, M.G.H., A.A., p. 281) has written that they 
did not, noting that before Euric "moribus et consuetudine 
tenebantur." On the other hand, Euric's Code speaks of his 
father's (Theodoric I) laws as does a letter of Apollinaris 
Sidonius (ii, 1, M.G.H., A.A., p. 22): ". . . leges Theu-
dosianas calcans Theudoricianasque proponens veteres culpas, 
nova tribute perquirit." It seems quite probable that they 
could have had a code prior to that of Euric's.
19
Gothic contribution attracted little attention until Julius 
Picker identified its non-Roman characteristics. Euric's Code 
was the earliest barbarian code, but one should not expect it 
to reveal the influence of classical Roman law throughout.
To the contrary, it became vulgarized in its Gothic form, but 
consequently it became more accessible and serviceable to 
other peoples. For that matter, however, Roman law itself 
had changed from what it had been during the first three cen­
turies of empire, and in the process it lost its "inner con­
sistency."3? Yet, the very fact that the Goths wrote down 
their laws, and in Latin at that, demonstrates the force of 
the Roman influence. The precision and detail apparent in 
Visigothic law well depict the transition from the Roman to 
the G e r m a n i c . 38 Thus, the thoroughgoing nature of the Leges 
Visigothorum aligns it more closely to the Roman than to the 
later examples of barbarian law. Not to be neglected, of course, 
is the most important element evident in early Visigothic law: 
Romans were allowed to live by their own laws, except in deal­
ings with the Goths.
The tendencies at play throughout the Roman west, in 
jurisprudence as well as in the economy, indicate that the
37grnst Levy, "Reflections on the First 'Reception' 
of Roman Law in Germanic States," The American Historical 
Review, XLVIII (1943), 23-24.
38pioyd Seyward Lear, "The Public Law of the Visigothic 
Code," Speculum, XXVI (1951), 1.
20
barbarian and the Roman had attained something of a plane in 
their level of existence. Provincialism moved the inhabitant 
of Aquitaine to exalt the importance of local affairs and 
leaders. While the west became increasingly passive from an 
economic and industrial standpoint,the two peoples, in­
clining more toward a primitiveness, brought their laws into 
a conformity that exemplified their way of life.
Euric's Code was modified by his son and successor, 
Alaric II. The father's code was inadequate in its treatment 
of subject people in the Visigothic realm, which now extended 
over all of southern Gaul and most of Spain. As a result, 
Alaric issued his compilation at an assembly at Aire in Gas­
cony in 506.40 This code confuses those who find mention of
Archibald R. Lewis, Naval Power and Trade in the 
Mediterranean, A.D. 500-1100 (Princeton, 1951), p. 14, Eco- 
nomics and jurisprudence depict this trend better than any­
thing else at this particular time. By the middle of the 
following century, the workings of the body politic will por­
tray the same influences. As for the economic, Lewis (supra, 
p. 13) writes; " . . .  the end of the fifth century and the 
opening of the sixth saw little change in the Eastern monopoly 
of international Mediterranean trade and commerce." Also, 
Henri Pirenne (Mohammed and Charlemagne, trans. Bernard Miall 
[London, 1965], pp." 105, 109) discusses the fact that the 
west had fairs during Merovingian times but of a purely local 
variety. Likewise, he notes (p. 109): ". . . the organiza­
tion of the mints was, so to speak, decentralized. The Visi­
goth kings established mints in various different cities."
4®The Monumenta Germaniae Historica does not include 
this in their edition of Visigothic law. The standard edition 
used is that of G. Haenel, Lex Romana Visigothorum (Leipsig, 
1903).
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it. Spanish legal historians refer to it as the Breviary of 
Anianus. Anianus was the royal referendary, and all authentic 
copies of the code bore his signature. Other European schol­
ars speak of it as the Breviary of Alaric or the Roman Law of 
the Visigoths. Only these two codes accommodated the Visi­
gothic population during its stay in Aquitaine.
The proximity of the drafting of Alaric's Code to the 
Visigothic defeat by Clovis at Vouille in 507 stimulates inter­
est in the possibility of a correlation between the two events. 
Alaric II attempted to reconcile Gallo-Romans to his tottering 
rule by a new, more compatible code that affected only the 
native Roman p o p u l a t i o n . H e  lacked his father's leadership 
abilities and this complicated his efforts to maintain the 
vast holdings left him by Euric. The Franks to the north ex­
ploited his difficulties, particularly with the Gallo-Romans, 
and drove a wedge between him and the native population. While 
the Franks took the initiative in this struggle by penetrating 
deep into Visigothic territory a full decade before Vouille, 
they well may have begun settling on Aguitanian territory at
4lFelix Dahn, Westgothischen Studien (Wurzburg, 1874), 
pp. 4-5: "Eine Darstellung dxeser Duelle von nur romisch
rechtlichem Inhalt liegt nicht in unserer Absicht und Aufgabe: 
sie sollte nur fiir die Romer, nicht fur die Gothen und andere 
Barbaren, im Reiche gelten. Das tiefere politische Motiv lag 
unverkennbar in jcnem Bestreben Alarichs, seine romanischen 
Unterthanen zu versohnen und der gefahrlichen katholischmero- 
wingischen Propaganda zu begegnen, das in den Verhaltnissen 
seiner zeit und Regierung so dringend geboten war.”
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an equally early date, thus prompting the Visigothic e x o d u s .  
The Aquitanians expected to reap the fruit of their success. 
They would obtain a less obnoxious sovereign in a Frankish 
king and be done with the Visigoths, who retreated into Spain. 
Clovis represented the Orthodox Catholic cause, ridding Gaul 
of the Arian heresy that had dominated its southernmost prov­
inces for nearly a hundred years.
The most recent work on Visigothic law codes has 
emphasized the undercurrent of Gothic influence beneath the 
characteristic Roman exterior. The earliest codes exemplify 
the Roman influence more strongly, probably because of the 
long association between these two peoples. As time passed, 
Germanic tendencies emerged more and more in Gothic legisla­
tion, a fact often overlooked in the writings of many scholars 
until the late nineteenth century. It has been observed that 
the Visigoths of Spain and present-day France adopted Roman 
enactments wholesale, and it is further estimated that about 
one-third of the so-called Antigua that are attached to the
M. Wallace-Hadrill (Long-Haired Kings [London, 
1962] , pp. 173-174) gives special attention to these raids 
mentioned in Prosper's Chronicle under the years 496 and 498. 
He further observes that Frankish settlements in the area date 
from the early sixth century. As for Frankish initiative at 
Vouill^, see Gregorius Turonensis, Historiae Francorum, ii,
37, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores Rerum Merovin­
gicarum, eds. B. Krusch and W. Levison, I (Hannover, 1937), 
p. 85: "Igitur Chlodovechus rex ait suis: 'Valde molestum
fero, quod hi Arriani partem teneant Galliarum. Eamus cum 
Dei adiutorium, et superatis redegeunus terram in ditione 
nostra.'"
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Lex Visigothorum can be traced to Roman sources. Nonetheless, 
in official laws of the Visigoths, this Romanization has been 
exaggerated.
In what particular area does the Roman influence give 
way to the force of the Gothic or Germanic? Most noticeably, 
it is in the evolution of the concept of leadership among the 
Visigoths and their attitude toward treason as expressed in 
their codes. The absolutism of monarchical power exercised in 
Roman times merged with the Germanic concept during the Visi­
gothic era to produce a new atmosphere in which the power or 
authority of the king was limited by law. Quite often a Visi­
gothic king would ascend to the purple by assuring his people 
that he would refrain from certain acts prerequisite to his 
promotion. This particular phenomenon authenticates the fact 
that a proto-feudalistic society existed. This stands in con­
trast to assumptions that Aquitaine possessed a static polity 
with origins and continuing characteristics of a Roman, na­
tionalistic sort. Eventually clerical influence entered into 
these arrangements concerning ascension to power, so that dura­
ble rules evolved concerning these a f f a i r s . I n  the second 
book of Visigothic law, an interesting passage appeared that
43paul Vinogradoff, Roman Law in Medieval Europe 
(Reprinted edition; New York, 1968), pp. 29-31.
^^Fritz Kern, Kingship and the Law in the Middle Ages, 
trans. S. B. Chrimes (New York, 1970), pp. 75-76.
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deals directly with the limitations of the king's powers. 
Therein, he was to bind himself by oath to observe the stipu­
lations that affect his exercise of power. The law also 
stated that if a king were found to have acquired his position 
by plotting or by popular insurrection, he would be deprived 
of rank and secluded from the company of Christians.Solemn, 
binding promises on the part of an aspirant to the throne seem 
to have originated with the Visigoths. When the Church became 
involved in ceremonies for the inauguration of a king in the 
ninth century Frankish kingdom, these same subscribed under­
takings came into f o r c e . T h e  influence of the Frankish asso­
ciation with the Visigoths in Gaul therefore becomes clear.
Another problem existed, however, that concerned those 
who refused to give the king their oaths of allegiance if they 
disapproved of him. Authority in the later Visigothic state 
was based on a reciprocal contractual agreement. If the sub­
ject failed to extend his oath, he did not feel personally 
indebted to his sovereign in times of strife.Therefore,
^^Leges Visigothorum, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, 
Legum, Sectio I, I, ed. K. Zeumer (Hannover, 1902), pp. 51-52; 
"Quemcumgue vero aut per turoultuosas plebes aut per absconsa 
dignitati publice macinamenta adeptum esse constiterit regni 
fastigia, mox idem cum omnibus tarn nefarie sibi consentientibus 
et anathema fiat et christianorum communionem amittat, tam dire 
percussionis ultione conlisus, ut omnis divini ordinis cultor, 
qui illi communicare presumserit, simili cum ipso damnations 
dispersât et pena tabescat."
^®Kern, Kingship and the Law in the Middle Ages, p. 76.
^^Lear, Speculum, XXVI, 5.
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a section of the Lex Visigothorum stipulated the penalty for 
those refusing the king their oaths. Under such circumstances, 
the injured king possessed the right of disposing of the guilty 
party's person as well as his p r o p e r t y . T h i s  approach to 
fidelity was alien to the Roman spirit of allegiance. It char­
acterized the Germanic, and if the king initially was not law 
unto himself, he certainly had recourse under the law if his 
will was ignored by his subjects.
Chronology was important in these developments in Visi­
gothic legislation. The non-Roman traits did not surface in 
these codes until after the Goths moved into Spain. Perhaps 
the defeat of the Visigoths in Aquitaine helped to account for 
this. As a result of their defeat in 507, they took the oppor­
tunity to develop after their own fashion.
To what extent have various legal authorities appreci­
ated the Visigothic law codes over the centuries? Montesquieu 
spoke skeptically of Visigothic law, but in so doing he re­
ferred to the later codes of Kings Chindasvindus and Reccessvin- 
dus. He wrote more sympathetically, however, about the earlier 
Gothic efforts, observing that both the Burgundians and Visi­
goths endeavored to conciliate the ancient inhabitants of their
_   ̂ Lex Visigothorum, M.G.H., L.L., I, pp. 53: " . . .  quic­
quid de eo vel de omnibus rebus suis principalis auctoritas 
facere vel iudicare voluerit, sui sit incunctanter arbitrii."
26
provinces by giving them the most impartial civil laws.^^ 
Savigny, Gibbon, and Guizot all freely admired Visigothic 
compilations of law in light of the age in which they were 
composed, while recognizing Montesquieu's reservations.50 
François Guizot summarized his impressions on the subject by 
commenting that Visigothic law bore a wise, systematic, and 
social character which evinced the influence of the clergy.51 
Just as the law codes reflected the barbarian influ­
ence in Aquitaine so does archaeology admit several worth­
while observations on the Visigoth settlement in the province. 
Although much concerning this topic yet remains veiled in 
ambiguity, it appears that the Visigoths possessed a low 
standard of living as evidenced by their cemeteries.52
Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, trans. 
Thomas Nugent (New York, 1901), pp. 93-94.
50priedrich Carl von Savigny, Geschichte des romischen 
Rechts im Mittelalter (7 vols.; Heidelberg, 1834), II, pp.
72-73 and Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall 
of the Roman Empire, ed. J. B. Bury (7 vols.; London, 1925),
IV, p. 143-44.
5lFrançois P. W. Guizot, History of Civilization in 
Europe, trans. William Hazlitt (New York, 1901), pp. 48-49. 
Moreover, Jordanes (Getica, 5, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, 
Auctorum Antiquissimorum, ed. T. Mommsen, V[Berlin, 1882], p. 
64) compares the Goths quite favorably to all other barbarians 
by noting that they were less cruel in war and more prudent in 
council: "unde et pene omnibus barbaris Gothi sapientiores
semper extiterunt Grecisque pene consimiles, ut refert Dio, 
qui histories eorum annalesque Greco stilo composait."
c n / . ̂ ^^Edouard Salin, La Civilisation Mérovingienne, D'Apres 
les Sepultures, les Textes et le Laboratoire (4 vols.; Paris,
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Funereal furniture was scant; Gothic weapons were therein 
noticeably absent, characteristic of Visigothic countries, 
and mainly Gallo-Romans repose in those sites assumed to be 
Visigothic.Weaponry which has been exhumed from these 
graves is more Frankish than Visigothic. The scramasax of 
the Franks prevails to the exception of the preferred spear 
and javelin of the Vi s i g o t h . O u t s i d e  of Septimania, 
archaeological evidence contributes to the conclusion that 
southern Gaul experienced a decided mingling of the barbar­
ian and Gallo-Roman.^^ In this, the burial sites of the
1950), I, p. 388; "II n'en est pas moins certain que 
l'apport visigothique en matière de peuplement a dû demeurer 
très faible."
^^Ibid.; "Dans ces divers cimetières, le mobilier 
funéraire est le plus souvent peu abondant; . . . 1'absence 
d'armes— caractéristique en pays visigot— s'accorde bien, 
d'ailleurs, avec la coutume gallo-romaine. Et ce sont des 
Gallo-Romains qui, en très grande majorité, reposent dans la 
plupart de ces cimetières." The work of Barriere-Flavy 
(Études sur les sépultures barbares du Midi et de L'Ouest 
de la France [Toulouse, 1892]) attests to the existence of 
114 of these Visigothic burial sites. This figure is un­
doubtedly overstated, 80 being a closer estimate. Barriere- 
Flavy 's work possesses admirable qualities but often has to 
be used with discretion.
54Ibid., pp. 395-396; " . . .  — à 1'exception du
scramasax cité plus haut— les armes font entièrement défaut, 
ce qui témoigne qu'il s'agit de Visigots." As for the dif­
ferent weapons that the early Germanic tribes preferred, 
see: E. A. Thompson, "Early Geirmanic Warfare," Past and
Present, XIV (1958), 2-29.
^^The situation in Septimania deserves an explana­
tory note. The Visigoths managed to maintain their hold on 
this southeastern corner of Gaul even though the Franks suc­
cessively tried to wrest it from them in 585, 589, and 673.
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two peoples confuse almost as much as clarify. Owing to 
Christian influences » the Gallo-Roman population by circa 
A.D. 400 had begun to abandon the practice of interring 
goods with the deceased; however, with the advent of the 
Goth and later still the Frank, the custom occurred as it 
had under barbarian auspices. While barbarian graves can­
not as yet be strictly discerned from those of Christians 
through grave goods, scholars believe that the distinction 
may eventually be made. It appears that a deterioration of 
old customs had taken place by late fifth century because 
of the influx of outsiders into Aquitaine and that new stand­
ards of life generally favored simplicity as well as mili­
tarism.
Since the days of Pope Leo the Great, Roman civil 
administration in the west had devolved by precedent upon 
ecclesiastical officials for execution. In actual practice, 
the municipal bishop had civil, financial, and even military 
responsibilities. If this were not enough, the bishop's 
vision of his role transcended that of his narrower municipal 
concern through the medium of Rome and the emerging monastic 
movement. He conceived of his functions as surpassing the 
limited parochialism of his civilian predecessor in the 
Roman west. The bishop felt he could perform the greatest 
good by attempting to create a society in which the salvation
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of men's souls would take p l a c e . C o m p a r e d  to the petty 
Arianism of the Visigoths in Aquitaine and their short-sighted 
political ambitions, this objective enlarged the designs of 
the Gallo-Roman episcopate and the nobility from which it had 
sprung.
Episcopal independence indicates much about the pre­
vailing political and religious situation in Visigothic Gaul. 
Bishops felt secure in their positions as civil servants of 
the barbarian overlord. Representing the native Gallo-Roman 
populace, they mirrored the Roman influence in all that they 
did. Conversely, the Gothic kings relied upon these church­
men for many services. Necessity dictated this reliance in 
light of the nobility's inability to serve in this capacity. 
The crude aristocrat, whether Gallo-Roman or Visigoth, oper­
ated in a subsistence agricultural economy and yielded in­
creasingly to conformity in a proto-feudal society. In this 
decentralized political atmosphere, power devolved upon an 
urban, literate episcopacy.
^J. B. Russell (A History of Medieval Christianity: 
Prophecy and Order [New York, 1968], p . 37-41) describes in 
general terms the new attitude and participation of the Church 
in civil administration throughout the fifth century. On 
the monastic front, see the recent works on John Cassian and 
his influence by Owen Chadwick (John Cassian [Cambridge,
19681) and Peter Munz ("John Cassian," The Journal of 
Ecclesiastical History, XI [1960], 1-22). In part, the latter 
says (p. 19) that Cassian "was, among other things, a reformer 
of society." Also, what his monastic movement represented 
"was an attempt to replace natural society by a social life in 
the framework of which the struggle for redemption could begin."
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The bishop, however, possessed a certain confidence 
in his time-honored status as an ecclesiastic. Roman law, 
as transmitted to Visigothic Gaul, strengthened his authority 
as well as that of the Orthodox Church. Beginning with the 
Theodosian Code, the Roman state had taken note of their po­
sition in society. Although the Goth was not religiously 
compatible with Rome, he still allowed the Church to preserve 
and perpetuate the Roman legal heritage within his r e a l m . 5? 
The bishop did not always have the freedom of action that 
allowed him to exercise his will regardless of the concerns 
of the state. In later times, the Visigoths stipulated in 
their law codes that Orthodox bishops should employ them­
selves in the defense of the state; in consequence of a de­
feat without their help, they had to remunerate the state
c pfor its losses.
^^Some legal historians write that the rules of the 
Visigothic Code reflect the attempts of churchmen to get 
their moral ideals on the statute book. See Monroe Smith,
The Development of European Law (New York, 1928), p. 100.
^^Lex Visigothorum, M.G.H., LL., I, p. 371: ”. . .
vel quocumque modo ad suam cognitionem pervenerit, et ad 
defensionem gentis vel patrie nostre prestus cum omn: 
virtute sua, qua valuerit, non fuerit et quibuslibet subtilita- 
tibus vel requisitis occasionibus alibi se transferre vel
excusare voluerit, ................ Hec sola sententia in
episcopis, presbiteris et diaconibus observanda est." Zeumer 
devoted considerable attention to the development of Visigothic 
law in his Praefatio to the above work (pp. xi-xxviii). While 
this answers many of the basic questions concerning the code, 
Zeumer also took the occasion to expand his commentary on the 
topic in a series of excellent but incomplete articles: 
"Geschichte der westgothischen Gesetzgebung," Neues Archiv
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Gothic efforts to secure an Aguitanian kingdom culmi­
nated during the reign of Euric (466-484). This Visigothic 
king reigned simultaneously with Odovacar in Italy and Gaiseric 
in North Africa in 476, at the time of the deposition of 
Romulus Augustulus. His character was in keeping with that 
of his better-known contemporaries, and his independent stance 
vis a vis Rome actually preceded that of Odovacar. In French 
political history, Euric receives special attention because 
he freed the Visigoths in Gaul from Roman political control. 
Furthermore, he seized all southern Gaul in the Visigothic 
name on the basis of jure suo and, in so doing, increased the 
Gothic holding to include the expanse of land from the Atlantic 
Ocean east to the Rhone and to the Loire in the n o r t h . I n  
the south, Euric had captured all of Spain by his death in 
484, except for the territory of present-day Portugal, then
der Gesellschaft fur altere deutsche Geschichtskunde, XXIII, 
ii (1898), 419-516; XXIV, i (1899), 39-122; XXIV, ii (1899), 
571-630; XXVI, i (1901), 91-149. Also, see the short, but 
excellent, article on Visigothic law by Christian Pfister, 
"Early Germanic Law," Encyclopaedia Britannica (11th ed.) XI 
(1910), 775-76.
^^Paul Viollet, Histoire des Institutions Politiques 
et Administratives de la France (3 vols.; Paris, 1890), I, 
p. 172-73. Viollet cites Jordanes as his source here and 
further observes that the first Visigothic kings were not in­
dependent and it is only with Euric that the trend is re­
versed: "Théoriquement, les premiers rois wisigoths n'étaient
pas réputés rois indépendants: au dire de Jordanes, c'es
Euric (466-484), ce prince conspirateur et conquérant, qui 
s'^affranchit le premier de toute sujétion, et occupa la Gaule 
méridionale en souverain, jure suo. Cet Euric promulgua le 
premier un code de lois dont M. Gaudenzi a peut-être retrouvé 
tout récemment quelques fragments."
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held by the Suevians.
Euric's administration was a topic of controversy 
in the writings of his contemporaries. Certainly it did 
evoke strong reaction from those who experienced its force­
fulness. It must be remembered, however, that Euric waged 
war almost incessantly during his reign and either threatened 
or conquered many neighboring kingdoms. Also, the disdain 
that the Roman Catholic episcopacy felt toward Visigoths, 
while due in part to cultural bias, was as well a response 
to the threat Euric posed as a powerful barbarian monarch com­
mitted to heresy and the advancement of his own interests. 
Euric rose to power through the expedient of fratricide.^®
He quickly accepted the responsibilities that his office de­
manded of him. Two French historians, in surveying his lead­
ership and that of his son, observe that the government of 
these kings "was the more often gentle and w i s e . "61
Euric soon asserted his independence from Rome. He
6®Jordanes fails to detail the events surrounding the 
death of Euric's brother, the former emperor Theodoric II. 
Isidore of Seville does, though, and in the process, repro­
duces the account of the Chronical of Idatius, a Spanish 
bishop who continued the Chronicle of Prosper of Aquitaine 
to the year 468. In the Historia Gothorum, he (Isidorus, 33, 
P.L., p. 281) relates: "Sallanem quoque legatum denuo Theu-
dericus mittit ad Remismundum: qui reversus ad Gallias
Theudericum ab Eurico fratre suo repperit interfectum."
61charles Bemont and G. Monod, Medieval Europe, From 
395 to 1270, trans. Mary Sloan (New York, 1902), pp. 63-64.
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sent a succession of emissaries to neighboring kingdoms, in­
cluding one to the eastern emperor, ostensibly to gain recog­
nition of his a u t o n o m y . A s  his various military endeavors 
began to prosper, his court grew to become a meeting place 
for foreign dignitaries. So impressive was his court that 
even his enemies spoke of its brilliance. Apollinaris Sidonius 
stated that one could gather information there about the whole 
world's a f f a i r s . sidonius criticized the king on almost 
every other count, having been imprisoned by Euric for support­
ing the unsuccessful struggle of the Gallo-Romans to secure 
the independence of the city of Auvergne.Sidonius paid for 
his opposition and never forgot to mention Euric unkindly in 
his literary pursuits. Often he castigated the king unfairly, 
and his pen has influenced the thoughts of many later writers 
on the quality and motivation of Visigothic leadership in 
southern Gaul.
®^Both Hydatius (Continuatio Chronicorum Hieronymiano- 
rum, 238) and Isidore of Seville (34, M.G.H., A.A., p. 281) 
tell of this embassy. In the words of the latter: "in qui
honore provectus et crimine statim legatos ad Leonem impera- 
torem dirigit . . . ."
^^Apollinaris Sidonius, iv, 22, M.G.H., A.A., p. 73: 
"cotidie namque per potentissimi consilia regis totius sollici 
tus orbis pariter negotia et iura, foedera et bella, loca 
spatia mérita cognoscis."
Thomas Hodgkins (Italy and Her Invaders [8 vols.; 
Oxford, 1897-18991, II, pp. 313-316) devotes considerable 
attention to this. He feels that momentarily Sidonius the 
courtier and rhetorician was lost in the patriot; consequent­
ly, ". . . his life rose into real grandeur."
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In particular, Sidonius found fault with Euric*s 
treatment of the Orthodox Church in Gaul. To vent his pent- 
up antagonisms against the Gothic king, he wrote a letter to 
Basilius of Aix, a fellow b i s h o p . T h e  western Roman Emperor, 
Julius Nepos, had designated Basilius as one of four bishops 
to represent the Gallo-Romans in negotiations with Euric. 
Sidonius expected to turn the bishop against the Goth. The 
letter contains much invective that historians have accepted 
to a greater or lesser d e g r e e . O n l y  one charge against 
Euric actually merits acceptance. In the king's efforts to 
promote his state and Arianism, he had allowed certain Ortho­
dox bishoprics to go unfilled after the deaths of their incum­
bents.®^ The situation convinced Sidonius that his people 
were "scorched in a Babylonian furnace."®® Other information 
illuminates the situation. Euric's chief ministers, Leo and
®5Apollinaris Sidonius, vii, 6, M.G.H., A.A., pp.
108-110.
®®It is difficult to agree with J. B. Bury (History 
of the Later Roman Empire, I, p. 341) who writes that Euric 
". . . was a fanatical Arian." His remarks exemplify those 
of an historian who takes Sidonius' letter too literally.
®^Apollinaris Sidonius, vii, M.G.H., A.A., p. 109: 
"Burdigala, Petrogorii, Ruteni, Lemovices, Gabalitani, Helusani, 
Vasates, Convenae, Auscenses, Multoque iam maior numerus civi- 
tatum summis sacerdotibus ipsorum morte truncatus nec ullis 
deinceps episcopis in defunctorum officia suffectis, per quos 
utique minorum ordinum ministeria subrogabantur, latum spiri- 
talis ruinae limitem traxit."
^®Ibid.
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Victorius, belonged to the Orthodox Church. Moreover, as 
Euric unfolded his plans to expand the Gothic kingdom, the 
attitude of the Gallo-Roman clergy changed from benevolence 
to hostility.Sidonius' letters clearly reflect the fears 
of the clergy concerning their own future.
If Sidonius portrayed Visigothic treatment of the 
Church in exaggerated terms, how did the reality of the situ­
ation differ from his comments to Basilius? The Goths at 
times persecuted Catholics, but Catholics fought valiantly 
for their Arian sovereign against the Franks.^® Euric did 
act out of political and military necessity, and persecution 
may be the wrong term to use in describing his actions.
^̂ Trtie article of Georges Yver ("Euric, Roi des Wisi­
goths" in Etudes d*Histoire du Moyen Age dédiées a Gabriel 
Monod [Paris, 1896], pp. 11-46) has clarified many of the 
historical misapprehensions about this reign. He draws this 
conclusion: "Mais 1'attitude de clergé, conciliante et presque
bienveillante durant les premières années de l'occupation, 
s'était transformée en une hostilité déclarée, a mesure 
qu'apparaissait plus clairement chez les rois de Toulouse, 
chez Euric en particulier, l'intention de substituer leur 
propre puissance a l'autorité romaine." Also, see the book 
by K. Stroheker (Eurich, Konig der Westgoten [Stuttgart,
19371).
7®See the published doctoral dissertation of Aloysius 
K. Ziegler (Church and State in Visigothic Spain [Washington, 
D.C., 1930], p. 201. Ziegler emphasizes the civic responsi­
bilities of Catholic bishops in their resistance to the spread 
of the Gothic kingdom in Aquitaine.
^^Thompson, Nottingham Mediaeval Studies, IV, 9. 
Thompson thinks that the Goths were remarkably tolerant, 
especially when compared to the attitude of Catholic kings 
toward the Arian Church.
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His son and successor, Alaric II (484-507), attempted to 
appease the Orthodox Church by being tolerant, but the policy 
was attributed to his weakness. The truth of Alaric's lib­
eralism is attested to in the praise accorded by Catholic 
bishops on several o c c a s i o n s . ^2 Moreover, it is worthwhile 
to remember that these same bishops came from the Gallo-Roman 
nobility. This was the case with Sidonius, who educated him­
self in theology after his appointment. Some have argued 
that it was the nobility that allied itself against the Visi­
gothic cause in A q u i t a i n e ; 73 however, their discontent must 
surely have been motivated by the Aguitanian episcopacy.
When the Salian Franks turned their attention toward southern 
Gaul, it was the bishop, instead of the aristocrat, who took 
the initiative in rallying Aquitaine to Clovis' s t a n d a r d . 74
72por a case in point see: J. D. Mansi, Concilii
Agathensis Praefatio in Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima 
Collectio, VIII (Paris, 1901), p. 325.
73The recent work by Eugen Ewig ("L'Aquitaine et les 
Pays Rhénans au haut moyen âge," Cahiers de Civilisation 
Médiéval, I [1958] , 49) notes that it was basically this class 
that checked the aspirations of the Visigoths in Aquitaine.
"Au début du Vie siecle, les Mérovingiens s'étaient alliés 
avec la noblesse sénatoriale gallo-romaine contre les Wisi­
goths et peut-être même contre les Burgondes."
74?he reader should not necessarily associate nation­
alism with the independent attitude of the bishops nor with 
the Arianism of the Visigoths. Historians who incline in this 
direction (see above fn. 64) "retroject" into the past the 
sentiments of the present age. A. H. M. Jones ("Were Ancient 
Heresies National or Social Movements in Disguise?," The 
Journal of Theological Studies, X [1959], 295) argues "the
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The Visigothic experience in Gaul failed to leave an 
enduring impression. Originally entrenched there to protect 
Aquitaine from its northern neighbors, the Visigoths were de­
feated by those northerners, in league with the native popu­
lation. While their settlement postponed the invasion of 
northern barbarians, they were unable to harmonize or con­
tribute in a positive fashion to the betterment of Gallo- 
Roman society on a long-term basis. The Visigoths patterned 
their culture on the Roman model, particularly in the areas 
of jurisprudence, architecture, and politics. Politically, 
they depended almost slavishly upon the decadent Roman exam­
ple, which not only failed but also turned against them as 
their state grew in size. This became most noticeable when 
Euric expanded Visigothic holdings and thereupon threatened 
the established prerogatives of the episcopacy. Furthermore, 
the heterodox religious views of the Visigoths weakened their 
efforts to secure themselves in Aquitaine, While Goths de­
pended upon the clergy in the municipal administration of 
government and also in the formulation of their legal codes, 
their Arianism could hardly further promote clerical co-opera­
tion. On the other hand, the aspersions of Sidonius about
evidence for nationalism of any kind in the later Roman Empire 
is tenuous in the extreme." The maintenance of the unimpaired 
prerogatives of the Orthodox bishops as well as the religious 
sincerity of the Arians both play their parts in the course 
that this struggle takes.
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Euric*S persecution of the Orthodox Church carry little 
weight. The bishops, especially those literateurs of Sidonius* 
brand, represented their own peculiar interests in their oppo­
sition to the last three Visigothic kings, more than they 
represented the Gallo-Roman aristocracy. In short, they were 
the last of their kind, men who only grudgingly yielded to 
the Gothic overlord. The fact that the Church in Aquitaine 
emerged unscathed from the Visigothic experience speaks for 
the effectiveness of the bishops* efforts to protect them­
selves. This fact, however, indicates the inclinations of 
only a segment of society. If the separatist tendencies in 
Aquitaine in the eighth century are to be explained, the broad­
er spectrum of society must receive attention. Indeed, from 
the third to the early sixth centuries, Aquitanian society 
underwent change that produced a semi-barbarized, agrarian, 
subsistence economy that utilized a semi-feudal polity and 
social organization. A kind of leveling process occurred with­
in society that brought Goths and Gallo-Romans to a point at 
which they were indistinguishable. With the coming of the 
Merovingians, more discernable outlines of the separatist 
movement came into focus.
CHAPTER II
MEROVINGIAN AQUITAINE
The Franks, like so many other Germanic peoples, moved 
about considerably throughout the fifth century. While many of 
the details concerning their migrations during this century 
remain conjecture, recent studies verify several basic observa­
tions. Most interesting is the fact that the Franks existed as 
a comparatively obscure people; then, toward the end of the 
fifth century, they emerged into a position of political mas­
tery in western Europe. Perhaps the best, as well as the most 
obvious, explanation for this stems from their military dor­
mancy at a time while other tribes became involved in warfare 
that left them decimated and debilitated.^
The Franks established themselves first in Belgium and 
northern France. This did not occur before the middle of the 
fifth century.^ Then, as they began to expand south to encom­
pass the Loire River valley, confrontation with the Visigoths 
in Aquitaine became necessary. Only in this fashion could
^Charles Verlinden, "Frankish Colonization: A New
Approach," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th 




they ensure the permanence and security of their new acquisi­
tions to the north. In particular, the peace of the new 
Frankish domain beyond the Seine, a belt of land bordered on 
the extreme south by the Loire, depended upon the mastery of 
the Loire River valley.3 Involvement there necessitated 
Frankish intervention along the Atlantic seacoast of Aqui­
taine and eventually in the whole province. In the early 
eighth century, a Saracenic enemy of the Franks would also 
become militarily committed along the Aquitanian coast-
For several years prior to 507 the Visigoths and the 
Franks had waged a desultory war along their frontier. In 
the continuation of Prosper's Chronicle, mention is made of 
skirmishes taking place as early as 496 and 498. In the lat­
ter year, the Franks advanced to Bordeaux, deep in Aquitanian 
territory.* As the tempo of Franco-Gothic differences increased, 
the difficulties of Alaric II in keeping his own kingdom in 
order also mounted. In particular, the root of his problem 
lay with the activities of Frankish sympathizers within the 
Gallo-Roman episcopacy. The more discontent among these church­
men provoked Alaric to the point that they required his atten­
tion. Gregory of Tours remarked that Alaric took the initiative
^Wallace-Hadrill, The Long-Haired Kings, p. 173.
*Continuatio Hauniensis Prosper!, a. 498, M.G.H., A.A., 
p. 331; "Alarici Franci Burdigalam obtinuerunt et a potestate 
Gothorum in possessionem sui redegerunt capto Suatrio Gothorum 
duce."
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in negotiating with Clovis, the King of the Franks, but even 
by that time many among the Gauls desired the Franks as over­
lords.5 Gregory cited the case of Quintian, the Bishop of 
Rodez, as an example of one who felt accordingly and was thus 
driven from his city,^ Reference occurs in other sources to 
two bishops who, as allies of the Franks, plotted against the 
Visigothic cause. These bishops, Ruricius of Limoges and 
Caesarius of Arles, were discovered and sent into exile to 
Bordeaux in 505.^ In another case, the reaction of the Gothic 
king toward episcopal infidelity to his cause was even more
cGregorius Turonensis, Historiae Francorum, ii, 35,
M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 84: "Quod Chlodovechus non
respuens, ad eum venit. Coniunctique in insula Ligeris, quae 
erat iuxta vicum Ambaciensim terreturium urbis Toronicae, simul 
locuti, comedentes pariter ac bibentes, promisse sibi amicitia, 
pacifici discesserunt. Multi iam tunc ex Galleis habere Francos 
dominos summo desiderio cupiebant,"
^Ibid., 36: "Unde factum est, ut Quintianus Rutenorum
episcopus per hoc odium ab urbe depelleretur." Gregory also 
cites two other examples of episcopal conspiracy in somewhat 
less detail at the bishopric of Tours. Bishops Volusianus 
(ex genere senatorio) and Verus suffered exile too and died in 
this circumstance before obtaining their freedom (x, 7-8, 
p. 531).
^Vitae Caesarii Episcopi Arelatensis Libri Duo, i, 21, 
Monuments Germaniae Histories, Scrxptores Rerum Meroyingicarum, 
ed. Bruno Krusch, ill (Hannover, 1896), p. 465: **Ig 1 tur insti-
gatione praesentium nec innocentiae fides adtenditur, nec accusa- 
tionibus condempnatus, cum ab Arelato fuisset abstractus, in 
Burdigalensem civitatem est quasi in exilio religatus." Insofar 
as Ruricius is concerned, see the remarks of Bruno Krusch in 
the Praefatio in Ruricium, ed. B. Krusch, Monuments Germaniae 
Histories, Auctorum Antiquissimorum, VIII, p. LXIV: "Burdi-
galae Caesarius cum Ruricio convenit."
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severe. He punished Galactorius, the Bishop of Benarn (today 
Lescar), by death.® The inescapable conclusion is that the 
bishops appear in the available sources as the only real oppo­
nent of the Goths. Episcopal control over municipal admin­
istration allowed bishops to exert their will in an effective, 
pervasive manner that facilitated the Frankish advance and 
thwarted what remained of the Gothic hegemony in Aquitaine.
An additional factor in the bishops' effectiveness concerned 
Alaric II*s difficulties in administering his father's realm. 
The cumulative results gave the Franks the edge, both militar­
ily and politically, over the Visigoths.
Traditionally, the religious motivation that spurred 
Clovis in 507 has received more attention than anything else 
to explain his successful conquest of Aquitaine. He fought 
the battle of Vouille as an Orthodox Catholic, experiencing 
conversion to Christianity by baptism at Rheims, most probably 
in 496. Gregory of Tours attributed paramount importance to 
this.® Although the religious element certainly had a profound
®Godefroid Kurth (Clovis (2 vols.; Paris, 1901], II 
pp. 84-85) discusses the events surrounding the death of 
Galactorius whom the Church later canonized. He remarks;
"Les textes nous disent, il est vrai, qui'il périt pour avoir 
refusé d'abjurer la foi catholique; mais que peut-on croire 
d'une telle assertion? . . . .  Si donc on peut se fier au 
récit en cause, il est probable qu'ils auront voulu, en fai­
sant périr Galactorius, le châtier de sa rébellion plutôt que 
de sa religion."
®See above, chapter one, fn. 46. Also, a longstanding 
academic debate has raged in respect to where Clovis was bap­
tized. Bruno Krusch, the editor of Gregory of Tours in the
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impact upon the nature of the conflict, Gregory exaggerated 
by giving it his singular attention as the reason for the 
fighting. Religion may have played a more decisive role after 
the conflict than it did before, as the Bishop of Tours sug­
gested. As the champion of orthodoxy, Clovis was not above 
obtaining the help of Arians to fight Arians. The Arian Bur­
gundians assisted the Catholic Franks against the Arian Visi­
goths.^® In particular, Gondebaud, the Burgundian king, had 
rendered the Franks valuable assistance during the Visigothic 
c a m p a i g n . H e n c e ,  the position of the Aquitanian bishops
M.G.H. series, denies the truth of the bishop's remarks con­
cerning Rheims as the baptism site. Since Krusch also edited 
the Vita S. Remigii in the same series, a document that sub­
stantiates Gregory's statement, an interesting problem arises. 
For a perceptive analysis of the question, as well as a dis­
cussion of the reliability of the latter work, see A. H. M. 
Jones, P. Grierson, and J. A. Crook, "The Authenticity of the 
'Testamentum S. Remigii,'" Revue Beige de Philologie et d'His­
toire, XXXV (1957), 356-373.
^®Reference is made to this alliance in the Vita S. 
Caesarii (i, 28, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 467): "Etenim,
obsidentibus Francis ac Burgundionibus civitatem iam enim 
Alarico rege a victoriosissimo rege Chlodoveo in certamine 
perempto, Theudericus Italiae rex Provineiam istem, ducibus 
missis, intraverat." Also, an entry in the Chronica Gallica 
(a. DXI, 689, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Auctorum Anti­
quissimorum, ed. T. Mommsen, IX [Berlin, 1892), p. 665) simi­
larly takes note of the entente: "Tolosa a Francis et Bur­
gundionibus incensa [690] et Barcinona a Gundefade rege Bur- 
gundionum capta."
l^An analysis of the effects of this alliance appears 
in Cl. Devic and J. Vaissete, Histoire Générale de Languedoc 
(15 vols.; Toulouse, 1872-1892), I, p. 537: "Nous avons déjà
dit que Clovis avoit eu soin de se liguer avec Gondebaud, leur 
roi, contre les Visigoths. Les Bourguignons le secoururent 
puissamment durant cette guerre, & ils avoient déjà fait en 
sa faveur ...."
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who detested the Arian Goth but yet would receive help from 
an Arian Burgundian has an inconsistent ring to it, especially 
in view of Gregory's remarks.
The Burgundians interested the Frank in other ways 
than as allies. Having campaigned against them in 500, Clovis 
came to terms with them before Vouille. The successors of the 
Frankish king, however, would later cast covetous eyes in the 
direction of Burgundy and succeed in subjecting the area to 
their will. Thus, Aquitaine geographically offered the Franks 
a lucrative front from which to launch offensives against their 
new neighbor to the east.
The mere fact that Clovis belonged to the Orthodox 
faith did not win all the Roman Catholic aristocrats over to 
his side. It is true that the higher clergy supported his 
cause, but even the Bishop of Tours told of a group of lay 
aristocrats, senators among them, who fought and died in great 
numbers for the Arian Visigoth at Vouille. Notably, this con­
tingent came from the Aquitanian city of Auvergne and was led 
by Appolinaris, the son of the poet S i d o n i u s . I n  this con­
text, one remembers that the recalcitrants whom Alaric repri­
manded for their disloyalty were solely from the episcopacy, at
l^Gregorius Turonensis, Historiae Francorum, ii, 37, 
M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 88: "Maximus ibi tunc~Arvernorum
populus, qui cum Apollinare venerat, et primi qui erant ex 
senatoribus corruerunt." Oddly enough, the son supported the 
Arian Goths, whereas the father disliked them exceedingly.
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least in those cases reported in the sources. Therefore, it 
appears that the prerogatives of this particular class were 
more threatened by the Visigothic hegemony in Aquitaine than 
were those of the aristocracy as a whole. Consequently, 
when Clovis achieved success, his first political debt would be 
to these bishops.
The southward territorial expansion of the Franks to 
the Loire river accounts for this conflict, but so does the 
status of the Visigothic state. Indeed, both states had recently 
over-extended themselves geographically, the Visigoths having 
just done so in Spain under Euric. In consideration of their 
hostile relationship, the growth of both kingdoms to an admin­
istratively awkward size contributed decidedly to the precip­
itation of hostilities. Moreover, aroused suspicions and 
a rash of incidents between the two powers prior to 507 brought 
about war. Another factor somewhat more difficult to document 
is the Gallic interest of the Ostrogothic leader, Theodoric
13A good, reliable account of this struggle is that 
of Ernest Stein, Histoire du Bas-Empire (2 vols.; Amsterdam, 
1968), II, pp. 145-151. On tenuous grounds, E. A. Thompson 
(Nottingham Mediaeval Studies, IV, 6) suggests that the 
Roman landowners as a class had not been dissatisfied with 
barbarian rule and tended to support Alaric II in 507.
While this is not so illogical, he continues by risking the 
observation that the poor, on the other hand, had grown tired 
of Visigothic rule and hence remained neutral.
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14the Great, then the master of Italy. The Franks later 
accused Theodoric of fostering discord and rivalry between 
the political and military powers of Gaul.^^ The resulting 
chaos would be to his advantage, if no strong power emerged 
from the conflict. This is what happened, and it sheds light 
on the strained relations between Clovis and Theodoric in the 
post beHum period. Theodoric meant to secure his Italian 
frontiers by a series of alliances with the Germanic Arian 
kingdoms of the west. By creating and preserving a balance 
of power among these rulers, Theodoric could coordinate their 
stances in the face of Constantinople. To accomplish this, 
he concluded a number of marital alliances (capped by his own 
marriage to Clovis' sister) and consequently not only assured 
his own usefulness to the emperor but also resisted the 
possibility of future expansion of the Frank in the west.
A successful Clovis at Vouille would completely upset this
Most authorities, however, accept the validity of 
Theodoric*s intentions to preserve peace, as his three letters 
written before the outbreak of hostilities to Alaric, Gondebaud, 
and Clovis indicate. These letters are preserved in Cassiodorus, 
Variae, iii, 1, 2, 4.
^^Kurth, Clovis, II, pp. 57-58: "La tradition populaire
des Francs, consignee dans une^legende, est d 'accord avec la 
correspondance politique de Theodoric le Grand pour attribuer 
le discord à ces rivalités entre les deux puissance de la 
Gaule." Kurth observes in a footnote that this account comes 
from obscure barbarian legend. Furthermore, this interpretation 
attributes blame to the Visigothic king and vindicates the 
Frank. Kurth continues by saying that this story particularly 
attracts attention to barbaric custom and, therefore, is quite 
noteworthy.
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d e s i g n - I n  the final analysis, however, as Gregory of Tours
well elucidated, the Visigoths attempted to avoid war by
conciliation, while the Franks assumed the initiative and
succeeded in waging war and winning it on Aquitanian soil.
In retaliation, Theodoric struck against the Frankish-Burgundian
coalition and took the coastal area of the Riviera, thus
I7giving succor to the threatened Visigoths.
In the aftermath of Vouille, Clovis indicated by 
his actions what his interest and plans were for Aquitaine.
He spent the winter at Bordeaux and collected Alaric's treasure 
that had been stored at Toulouse. Undeterred in accomplishing 
this, he had yet to contend with isolated garrisons of Visigothic 
adherents between his winter quarters and the Loire River to 
the north. He proceeded that spring to Angoulême, fearing 
that the Ostrogoths might take advantage of that city's
See the discussion of H. St. L. B. Moss (The Birth 
of the Middle Ages, 395-814 [Hew York, 1964], pp. 71-72, 76) 
concerning the statecraft of Theodoric.
^^Lucien Musset (Les Invasions; Las Vagues Germaniques 
["'Nouvelle Clio,' L'Histoire et ses problèmes," No. 12;
Paris, 1965], p. 88) observes that after Vouille in 507:
"Le peuple visigot fut sauve par 1'intervention des Ostrogots, 
au nom de la solidarité qui unissait les deux rameaux.
Pendant une generation, The^odoric et ses lieutenants prirent  ̂
en main les destinées des vaincus. Ce sauvetage ne fut assure 
qu'au prix d'une transformation radicale: le royaume de
Toulouse, essentiellement gaulois et largement ouvert sur 1'ex­
térieur , devint le royaume de Tolède, presque uniquement es­
pagnol et jalousement fermé sur lui-même; mais ses institutions 
fondamentales— arianisme, modus vivendi avec les Romains, 
structure de l'Etat— furent préservées."
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1ftopposition to him, and reduced it. After driving out the 
Goths, Clovis traveled north to the Loire and crossed to the 
city of Tours. There he delivered gifts to the Church of St. 
Martin, the saint to whom the Franks felt they owed their 
victory.
By leaving Aquitaine for Paris, Clovis displayed a 
disinterest in the domestic affairs of southern Gaul and a 
preference for the north. Two formidable powers contested 
for the control of Mediterranean Europe, and his concern nat­
urally inclined toward the region of his birth rather than 
that of the south. Since he now had the Loire River area 
secured, Clovis leisurely attended to the conduct of affairs 
in Aquitaine after 507. He did not tamper with the social 
and cultural structure of southern Gaul but left the episco­
pacy, presumably in league with the aristocracy, to carry on
19in most of the Aquitanian cities.
1ftGregory of Tours (Historiae Fr^corum ii, 37, M.G.H,, 
SS, rer, Merov,, p, 88) writes that Clovis experienced consid­
erable ease in taking Angoul&ne through the miraculous collapse 
of the city's walls as he gazed upon them. Relatively to the 
Ostrogothic threat, Devic and Vaissete (Histoire Centrale de 
Languedoc, I, p, 543) discuss this; mais, craignant qu'en
laissant au milieu de l'Aquitaine un poste aussi important, 
il ne prit envie aux Ostrogoths de porter leurs arms dans cette 
province, il se présenta, chemin faisant, devant cette place 
&, à son approche, une partie des murailles ayant croule comme 
par miracle, il s'en empara aussitôt & fit passer tous les 
Visigoths au fil de l'épée,"
l^Ewig, Cahiers de Civilisation Médiévale, I, 49: Ils
ne portèrent donc pas atteinte à la structure sociale et cul­
turelle de la Gaule merodionale. La vieille noblesse gallo- 
romaine continuait de gouverner bon nombre de cités aquitaines.
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The degree to which the Merovingian dynasty (as initi­
ated by Clovis) ever controlled Aquitaine is in doubt. For 
some years, the Gothic threat there poses innumerable problems 
for the Franks, and until 511 the land could hardly be looked 
on as a Frankish possession because of the indecisive foothold 
of the conqueror.^® Not only was Merovingian power uncertain 
in Aquitaine, but so it was as well in the ancestral lands of 
the Franks. The importance of a developing feudalism, in addi­
tion to a lapse into anarchy after 511, made Frankish control 
dubious at home. The growth of bodies of armed retainers and 
the quest for security on a local level helped to prevent the 
accumulation of centralized p o w e r . B y  the middle of the sixth
provençales et même lyonnaises. Elle fusionna enfin avec la 
noblesse franque et burgonde. Ses traces se perdent vers 700." 
Ewig relies upon the nationalistic arguments of the nineteenth 
century historians who expound the exclusivist theory (e.g.,
"la vieille noblesse gallo-romaine"). Furthermore, his suppo­
sitions relative to the coalescence of the nobility would 
appear the more logical if predated to the last generation of 
the Visigothic experience in Aquitaine.
^®Eugen Ewig, "Die frankischen Teilungen und Teilreiche, 
511-613," Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, IX 
(1952), 66Ï1 *'Dafiir gibt es nur eine Erklarung: Aquitanien
konnte in seiner Gesamtheit 511 noch nichte als gesicherter 
frankischer Besitz angesehen werden, weil die endgültigen Grenz- 
en zwischen Franken und Goten noch nicht feststanden." Various 
studies have recently dealt with the Frankish struggle for 
Aquitaine, the most prominent being those that have come from 
the pen of Eugen Ewig.
2lsee F. L. Ganshof's (Feudalism, trans. Philip Grierson 
[New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964], pp. 3-12) dis­
cussion of the origins of feudalism in the Frankish kingdom of 
the Merovingians.
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century, however, a rapprochement of sorts had been worked out 
between the Franks and the A q u i t c i n i a n s . 2 2  The effects of this 
particular union were largely wasted, though, in consequence 
of the disorder that had come to the Merovingian-Prankish state. 
Dissension among the sons of Clovis prevented the creation of 
a unified front to cope with governmental a f f a i r s . 2 3  Further­
more, Aquitaine and northern Gaul were more closely aligned, 
but factional differences among the Merovingians hampered ef­
forts to create an effective administration for the whole
realm.24
While Clovis paid his debt to St. Martin at Tours, he 
received an embassy from the eastern emperor Anastasius. The 
emperor bestowed upon Clovis the title of consul and, according 
to the Bishop of Tours, the Frankish leader was henceforth 
called either "consul" or "Augustus."25 The value of the title
22perdinand Lot, "La Conquête de Pays d'entre Seine-et- 
Loire par les Francs," Revue Historique, CLXV (1930), 2 4 4 ;  "Si 
le royaume des Francs était si redoutable, c'est parce que, dès 
le milieu du Vie siècle, un rapprochement intime, sinon la fusion, 
s'était opéré entre les envahisseurs et les Gallo-Romains."
23Ewig, Cahiers de Civilization Médiévale, I, 42: "Mais
le royaume mérovingien n'était pas un état unitaire. L'Aus- 
trasie, la Neustrie et la Bourgogne, issues des partages de la 
dynastie, étaient en fait des royaumes largement autonomes."
24James Bryce (The Holy Roman Empire, p. 48) well char­
acterizes the resulting situation when remarking that the Mero­
vingian empire was a congeries of principalities rather than 
a united kingdom.
25Gregorius Turonensis, Historiae Francorum, ii, 38, 
M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 89; **. I . et ab ea die tamquam
consul aut augustus est vocitatus."
51
at that time was not to be taken lightly. A sixth century 
author spoke of the consulship as "the greatest good and the 
foremost distinction to be decreed in the world." Further­
more, the appointment came at a very opportune moment. It 
emphasized the breadth and importance of his recent accomplish­
ment, and it raised his esteem in the minds of the Gallo-Roman 
populace, who especially valued a title in the old Roman empire 
context.27 Clovis took note of his new responsibility in 
Aquitaine and acted accordingly.28
28Jordanie, Getica, 57, M.G.H., A.A., p. 132: " . . .
factusque consul ordinarius, quod summum bonum primumque in 
mundo decus edicitur."
27a  balanced account of Clovis* acquisition of the 
title of consul and the significance of the occasion appears 
in J. M. Wallace-Hadrill, The Long-haired Kings, pp. 175-176.
On the other hand, Pierre Courcelle (Histoire Littéraire des 
Grandes Invasions Germaniques [Paris, 19485 , p.̂  204) writes:
"Un jour viendra, ou les Byzantins auront lâché pied en Occi­
dent: le roi des Francs se fera tout de bon proclamer auguste
et couronner empereur des Romains. On peut se demander si 
cette décision n'a pas été lentement mûrie dans les milieux 
ecclésiastiques de Tours, depuis le temps de Clovis. Car 
c'est Alcuin, abbé de Saint-Martin de Tours, qui lance en 799 
l'idée de faire couronner Charlemagne empereur."
28The importance of the title should be viewed in its 
correct perspective, however. An interpretational trend has 
recently appeared that attaches utmost importance to the 
title "Augustus." This school of thought advances the notion 
that Anastasius delegated, and therefore divided, supreme 
jurisdictional powers in the west to Clovis on a coequal basis. 
Nothing of the sort was implied in the conferment of the title 
See Pierre Levell ("Le consulat de Clovis à Tours," in Etudes 
Mérovingiennes, Actes des Journées de Poitiers [Paris, 19531 , 
p. 190) who thusly concludes his article: "Grégoire se fait
l'écho d 'acclamations populaires; il n'affirme en aucune façon 
qu'Anastase ait songe a partager juridiquement avec le roi 
franc le titre suprême d' 'auguste'. Fustel de Coulanges
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If Clovis depended upon the episcopal ranks for support 
in his venture into Aquitaine, he continued to do so in victory.
In consideration of this assistance, Clovis called a national 
council at Orleans in 511, the year of his death. The Aqui­
tanian episcopacy figured largely in the affairs of this coun­
cil, and one from their number. Bishop Cyprian of Bordeaux, 
presided over the meeting of thirty-two bishops. The purpose 
of the council was to clarify the essential points which governed 
the relationship between the Church and the king. The fruit of 
its work rested in thirty-one canons which were adopted and 
sent to Clovis for his approval.^9 The council expressed much 
respect for the rights of individuals and mirrored the influence 
of the Frankish leader who suggested topics for discussion.
In particular, the council dealt with such matters as
3 Athe treatment of guilty persons who sought refuge in the Church. 
Also of note was the division of offerings to the Church be­
tween the bishop and his c l e r g y . O f  special interest to 
Aquitanians, the tenth canon provided for the treatment of
l'avait parfaitement compris de la sorte et l'on s'étonne que 
des études plus récentes aient continué à se gausser de 1' 
évêque de Tours faisant de Clovis un empereur."
^^Concilium Aurelianense, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, 





heretical clerics who remained with the Goths and desired con­
formity to o r t h o d o x y . I n  addition, the bishops limited 
their own authority (canon 8) in the ordination of slaves.
The council prohibited this act without the master's expressed 
consent.
The work of the council represented an affirmation of 
the close ties between Church and state at that point in Frank­
ish history. The adulatory remarks of the council directed 
to Clovis, "the most renowned son of the Catholic Church," 
exemplified this. Furthermore, this cooperation, as well as 
Clovis' conquests, demonstrated what potential existed for the 
advancement of both when they coordinated their efforts.
At the death of Clovis in 511, the history of Aquitaine 
acquired new dimensions. The geographical holdings that Clovis 
had assembled passed on to his heirs in shares divided as near­
ly equally as possible. The regnum Francorum thus had four 
kings instead of one, and in a sense the 511 settlement gave
^^Ibid., p. 5. Carlo de Clercq (La Legislation 
Religieuse Franque de Clovis a Charlemagne [Paris, 19361, p. 13) 
notes that this council took a patronizing view of the Arian 
clerics of the old Visigothic realm in southern Gaul. Simul­
taneously, the council failed to deliver an attack against 
paganism, which had troubled northern Gaul for a long time. 
Hence, de Clercq observes: "Ces deux dernières conclusions
s'expliquent sans doute par le fait que les évêques des anciens 
territoires wisigothiques étaient venus très nombreux au con­




Frankish-Merovingian history some degree of continuity down 
to 561 when another such agreement revamped Gaul. Clovis' 
sons, Theodoric (Thierry), Clodomir, Childebert, and Clotaire, 
divided the kingdom, and Clotaire and Theodoric both received 
the bulk of southern Gaul. Clotaire inherited roughly the 
western half (including Toulouse) and Theodoric the eastern. 
Although the Franks managed to secure Aquitaine from the Visi­
goths in the sixth century, they nonetheless lacked the abil­
ity to partition the area in the manner of those lands to the 
north which Clovis had held more f i r m l y . H e n c e ,  Merovingian 
power in the area existed on a qualified basis.
For an account of the events following the 511 distri­
bution, one must depend upon the history of the Bishop of Tours, 
who chronicled the incessant fratricidal fighting of the Mero­
vingians in the sixth century. He reflected the values of his 
times, the power of the episcopacy, and most of all, the
O Cchanging character of a Gaul governed by the Franks. Gregory
^^Wallace-Hadrill, The Long-Haired Kings, p. 186.
M. Dalton (The History of the Franks by Gregory 
of Tours [2 vols.; Oxford, 19271, I, pp. 3-44) discusses 
Gregory as a man, a writer, and an authority. He also sur­
veys the existing manuscripts and editions of the Historiae 
Francorum. For an interesting evaluation of him as an his­
torian and how his work compares with that of his immediate suc­
cessors, see Siegmund Hellmann, "Studien zur mittelalterlichen 
Geschichtschreibung: Gregor von Tours," Historische Zeit-
schrift, CVII (1911), 1-43. In part, Hellmann notes (pp.
21-22): "So wenig wie der kunstlose, ist Gregor der treuher-
zige und naive Barbar, als den man ihn am Ursprung der mittel­
alterlichen Geschichtschreibung stehen lasst. Dass dieser
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projected in his writing the importance of cities in southern 
Gaul as opposed to the significance of provinces or nations.
In this respect, the influence of the Roman domination of 
Gaul made itself felt.^® Indeed, of those cities in Gaul the 
largest ones, as in the days of the Roman Empire, were located 
south of the L o i r e . T h e  immediate future held dim prospects 
for the city, however. Just as the economic order of Mero­
vingian Gaul found its basis on agricultural foundations, like­
wise the coming feudalism gave decreasing importance to the 
city as an institution.
In Aquitaine, the distribution of the realm among the 
sons of Clovis^® resulted in an era of political instability. 
Several factors contributed to the intensity and longevity of
iHerodot des Mittelalters' nicht ganz so objektiv ist, wie es
scheinen will, hat die Kritik wohl von jeher bemerkt.........
Wer mit solchem Temperament Satze hervorsprudelt, die, schein- 
bar wirr, sich doch zu einera dunklen Gasamtbild zusammenfiigen, 
wie Gregor bei der Charakteristik Chilperichs), besitzt 
Leidenschaft.”
André Berthelot, Histoire Générale, I, 131: "La
Bourgogne, le pays des Saliens, celui des Ripuaires et de 
l'Est, étaient devenues des individualités historiques carac­
térisées; le reste, non. Quatre cents ans de domination ro­
maine y avaient effacé tout caractère national politique."
Henri Pirenne, Medieval Cities: Their Origins and
the Revival of Trade, trans. Frank D. Halsey (Garden City, New 
York, 1956), pp. 9, 12.
3®Grcgorius Turonensis, Historiae Francorum, iii, 1, 
M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 97: "Defuncto igitur Chlodovecho
regi, quattuor filii eius, id est Theudoricus, Chlodomeris, 
Childeberthus atque Chlothacharius, regnum eius accipiunt et 
inter se aequa lantia dividunt."
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this situation. Basically, however, the core of the post-511 
problem in Aquitaine related to the attitude of Clovis' heirs 
toward their new possessions in southern Gaul. They all estab­
lished their capitals north of the Loire River in that part of 
the Frankish realm which seemed most comfortable to them. 
Theodoric chose Rheims; Clodomir, Orleans; Childebert, Paris; 
and Clotaire, Soissons. Consequently, Aquitaine acquired the 
status of a militarily occupied zone from which the brothers 
appropriated as many spoils as p o s s i b l e . N o t  only did this 
area interest the Merovingian kings in a military context, it 
attracted them as well for its agricultural production. The 
rich countryside could supply them with choice produce, such 
as grapes for wine, and could, therefore, complement their hold­
ings to the n o r t h . A s  the Frankish social structure tended 
more and more in the direction of feudalism, and given the ab­
sence of the Visigoths and the northward orientation of the
39 M. Prou, La Gaule Mérovingienne (Paris, n.d.), p. 29; 
"L'Aquitaine, récemment annexee, était considérée comme un 
territoire occupé militairement d'où il s'agissait de tirer 
le plus de richesses possible."
Jules Tardif (Etudes sur les Institutions Politiques 
et Administratives de laFrance, Vol. I: Période Mérovingienne
(3 vois.; Paris, 1881], pp. 24-25) comments on this specific 
interest of Clovis' successors in Aquitaine: "Les contrées
situées au delà de la Loire furent divisées en autant de parts 
que le reste du royaume. Le pays étant riche en productions 
particulières et recherchées, surtout en vin, chacun des héri­
tiers voulut, à ce qu'il semble, avoir sa part de la terre 
méridionale, comme complément de ses domaines du Nord."
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Merovingians, political conditions in Aquitaine allowed the 
local aristocracy to develop its own power. Without question, 
this last influence had greater impact on subsequent events 
than any other factor in the late sixth century.
Another recurrent theme in sixth century Aquitanian 
history that contributed to political instability was the 
tendency of the Frankish kings to try to despoil their brothers 
of their rightful share of the kingdom. Initially, however, 
the continual partitioning of the kingdom (still considered 
basically a whole as the regnum Francorum) from generation to 
generation disastrously weakened the power of the Merovingian 
dynasty. In addition, the brothers remained dissatisfied with 
their shares and in turn either concentrated their attentions 
in depriving each other of their portions or in wresting shares 
from their nephews when a death occurred in the family.
Nothing undercut the power of the Merovingians more than this 
incessant a c t i v i t y T h e  natural wealth of Aquitaine aroused
^^Nothing illustrates this generalization better than 
the events following the death of Clodomir in 524. Clodomir's 
portion of the kingdom encompassed all of northern Aquitaine 
and, upon his death, both Childebert and Clotaire desired to 
share his portion equally between themselves. Since their 
widowed mother, Clotilda, still lived and showed special atten­
tion to Clodomir's three sons, this too, necessitated, to their 
way of thinking, the execution or tonsure of his heirs. Con­
sequently, they killed two of the boys, one ten years old and 
the other seven, while the third escaped and voluntarily became 
a cleric. See Gregory of Tours (iii. 18),
^^Almost all commentaries on Merovingian history, 
whether or not in reference to Aquitaine, mention this as the 
foremost divisive element in sixth century Gaul. M. Prou
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Merovingian interests in this context. Because of its lucra­
tive natural wealth, it became a pawn in family machinations.
The deaths of Clodomir in 524 and Theodoric in 534 
signaled the beginning of these customary upheavals. As the 
two surviving brothers struggled for ascendency after 534, 
southern Gaul experienced arbitrary taxation and systematic 
p i l l a g i n g . A  notable case in point was the attempt by 
Clotaire to tax excessively the Church in his part of the 
kingdom around the year 545. Since he held most of western 
Aquitaine within his realm, the larger municipal areas experi­
enced the effects of his decision. It must be conceded, how­
ever, that perpetual Frankish interest in Church wealth stim­
ulated the clergy to adopt a protectionist attitude. When
(La Gaule Mérovingienne, p. 31), for one, neatly summarizes 
the whole problem: "— Rien ne contribua plus a l'affaiblisse­
ment du pouvoir des Mérovingiens que cette coutume des partages. 
Ce fut une source de guerres civiles. Il était rare qu'un 
prince se contentât du lot que le sort lui avait assigné, 
outre qu'à chaque fois qu'un roi mourait, ses frères cher­
chaient à s'emparer de son royaume au détriment de leurs neveux."
^^Ludovic Drapeyron, "Essai sur le Charactère de la 
Lutte de l'Aquitaine et de l'Austrasie sous les Mérovingiens 
et les Carolingiens," Revue des Travaux de 1'Académie des 
Sciences Morales et Politiques, CIV (1875), 812-813: "La Gaule
méridionale était mise horsla loi. Impôts arbitraires et 
pillages systématiques: tel était le régime qui pesait sur
elle. Partagée entre quatre rois (511 et 561), qui ne cessaient 
de se jalouser et de se combattre, elle souffrait cruellement." 
Drapeyron enlarged his study of this question by publishing 
two further articles in the same periodical. These succes­
sively appeared in volumes 105 and 106 in the following year 
(1876). Also, the three articles were brought together into 
book form in 1877 and published under the identical title by 
Thorin of Paris.
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the Merovingians challenged the security of their possessions, 
literate churchmen reacted strongly in a manner that bordered 
on hysteria. In this instance, Clotaire demanded that all 
the Churches in his kingdom pay a third of their revenues into 
his t r e a s u r y . A f t e r  all but one of the involved bishops 
agreed, one, Injuriosus of Tours, scorned and eventually 
shamed the king into rescinding the a c t i o n . T h u s ,  a reso­
lute bishop saved the Aquitanian Church considerable expense 
and helped all the inhabitants of the area. Southern Gaul 
did not always experience such a favorable outcome in her con­
flicts with the Merovingians,
Shortly before the death of Theodoric, the people of 
Auvergne received a false report of his death in a battle in 
Thuringia. The Aquitanians, seeking a more equalitarian rule 
than that which they had formerly experienced, appealed to 
Childebert to take them into his governmental household. He 
responded favorably and thus brought down Theodoric's wrath 
upon the Auvergnians when he returned very much alive. Accord­
ing to the Bishop of Tours, the king assuaged his grievance 
by pillaging and laying waste the whole region.
^^Gregorius Turonensis, Historiae Francorum, iv, 2, 
M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 136: "Denique Chlothacharius rex
indixerat, ut omnes eclesiae regni sui tertiam partem fructuum 
fisco dissolverent."
45Ibid.
^®Ibid., iii, 12, p. 108: "Theudoricus vero cum exer-
citu Arverno veniens, totam regionem devastat ac preterit.”
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Even though the Aquitanians revolted on many occasions 
against the Merovingians, their protests cannot be termed "na­
tional insurrections."^^ In fact, one should not speak at all 
of a national movement throughout this whole era, even though 
separatism created the illusion of one. More specifically, in 
this proto-feudal society, the local aristocracy moved in a 
centrifugal context that has often been confused with non- 
feudal nationalism.
Often the Aquitanians suffered, not through any of 
their own misdeeds, but simply through circumstance and aris­
tocratic folly. The exploits of the Merovingian prince, Chramn, 
are a case in point. Chramn's ambitions and impatience got 
the better of him, and he desired to usurp the prerogatives 
of his father, Clotaire. He excited a rebellion in Auvergne, 
a center of Prankish discontent, and it eventually spread to 
a number of provinces beyond the Loire River. The Bishop of 
Tours denounced the character of Chramn and remarked that
^^C. Perroud, Des Origines du Premier Duchë d'Aquitaine 
(Paris, 1881), p. 14: "Ce n'étaient pas des insurrections
nationales, au sens propre du mot; nous ne voyons nulle part 
que les Gallo-Romains du midi eussent de l'aversion pour les 
Francs, en tant que Francs. Mais ils trouvaient leur gouverne­
ment détestable et, dans des accès de désespoir, essayaient 
de s'y soustraire (émeute de Limoges, 580)." Perroud's care­
ful delineation between Gallo-Romans and Franks demonstrates 
the overconcern of many nineteenth century historians in 
ethnology rather than the actual workings of feudal institu­
tions.
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the people reviled Nonetheless, he secured a following
in Auvergne as well as in the Breton p e n i n s u l a . C h r a m n  also 
journeyed to Poitiers and entered into an agreement with his 
only surviving uncle. King Childebert, and thereupon assumed 
authority over part of his father's kingdom.50 Defeat followed 
in 560. Clotaire, after capturing his son, executed him— an 
act for which he later felt remorse. Aquitaine, however, again 
suffered. Gregory of Tours, possibly speaking allegorically, 
noted that two hosts of locusts passed through Auvergne and 
Limousin prior to a battle on the plain of Romagnac (near 
Clermont) in which great destruction occurred. Owing to the
^®Gregorius Turonensis, Historiae Francorum, iv, 13, 
M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 144: "Chramnus vero his diebus
apud Arvernus resedebat. Multae enim causae tunc per eum 
inrationabiliter gerebantur, et ob hoc acceleratus est de mun­
do; multum enim maledicebatur a populo. Nullum autem hominem 
diligebat, a quo consilium bonum utilemque possit accipere, 
nisi collectis vilibus personis aetate iuvenele fluctuantibus, 
eosdem tantummodo diligebat, eorumque consilium audiens, ita 
ut filias senatorum, datis praeceptionibus, eisdem vi detrahi 
iuberet."
Loth (L*Emigration Bretonne en Armorique, du Ve 
au v u e  Siècle de notr¥ Ere [Rennes, 1883] , pp. 177, 2ÏQ0j 
discusses the military and political situation in Brittany in 
the context of Chramn's rebellion. In Brittany, Chramn depend­
ed upon the services of Chonoober, Count of the Bretons, to 
whom Gregory of Tours refers (iv, 20). This count advised 
Chramn to allow him to lodge a night attack on Clotaire but 
the latter forbade this. During the battle on the following 
day, Chonoober fled and lost his life in the process.
SOcregorius Turonensis, Histori^ Francorum, iv, 16, 
M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., pp. 147-150. When Chramn needed the 
material assistance of King Childebert, he could not obtain 
it. His uncle had fallen ill and died at Paris in 558 before 
the issue was decided in battle in Brittany.
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widespread disorder, the city of Tours had been consumed by 
fire the preceding year, he wrote, and many churches in it 
were left desolate.
The grandsons of C l o v i s , 5 1  who divided the regnum 
Francorum again in 561 as their fathers had done in 511, main­
tained all their seats of government north of the Loire River. 
As in the 511 settlement, the Frankish kings still gravitated 
to the north, considering Aquitaine a dependent state sub­
sidiary to their principal interests. In the south. Gothic 
affairs continued to affect the society of Gaul, even though 
these people had retreated into Spain following Vouille. At 
the time of Clovis' death, it appears that the two people had 
failed to establish clearly a boundary line between their 
respective p o s s e s s i o n s . 52 Moreover, shortly after 511, the
51only the sons of Clotaire survived to divide the 
kingdom in 561. In this distribution, Charibert, Gunthram, 
Chilperic, and Sigibert respectively took the following cities 
as their capitals: Paris, Orleans, Boissons, and Rheims. See
Gregory of Tours, iv, 22. As in the earlier division, the 
heirs squabbled incessantly over each others' portion of the 
kingdom. Upon the death of the first of the brothers, Charibert, 
in 561, a new round of conflicts began. An historian of Poitiers 
(Marcel Garaud, "Note sur la Cite de Poitiers a 1'Epoque Méro­
vingienne" in Histoire du Moyen Âge dédiés a Mémoire Louis 
Halphen [Paris, 1951] , p. 275) during the Merovingian age dis­
cusses the import of these rivalries in northwestern Aquitaine: 
"Après la disparition de Charibert, son souverain, en 567, 
Poitiers devint un enjeu de la rivalité des rois qui se dis­
putaient le territoire de la Gaule."
52Ewig, Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur,
IX, 661: "Dafür gibt es nur eine Erklârung: Aquitanien
konnte in seiner Gesamtheit 511 noch nicht als gesicherter 
frânkischer Besitz angesehen werden, well die endgültigen 
Grenzen zwischen Franken und Goten noch nicht feststanden."
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Goths made headway in reducing the size of the territorial 
holdings that Clovis had won.^^
If religious strife first brought the Franks into 
conflict with the Goths, as many historians contend, it had 
no such influence during the rest of the century. It is true 
that hostilities occurred from time to time, but the casus 
belli was not r e l i g i o u s . 54 Family loyalty counted in a pri­
mary sense as a motivating factor. On several occasions in 
the sixth century, the Merovingians intermarried with Visi- 
gothic royalty. Quite often these unions came to a sad end 
which resulted in war. Such was the case in 531 and 585 when 
the two powers came to blows over a familial tie. In 531, 
King Childebert invaded Spain in order to avenge the ill- 
treatment that the Visigothic king, Amalaric, had meted out 
to his sister, C l o t i l d a . S u c c e s s  followed the Frankish 
effort momentarily, but upon the defeat and death of Amalaric 
later that same year, the Goths found a leader equal to the
Ibid.: "Dass die Goten gleich nach dem Tode Chlod-
wigs einige Civitates der Grenzzone zuriickeroberten, ist 
allgemein bekannt."
^4Thompson (Nottingham Mediaeval Studies, IV, 15) 
discusses the conversion of the Visigoths to Catholicism 
which occurred late in the sixth century. He specifies:
. .no one expected at any time, so far as we know, that 
the Franks would invade Spain from religious motives."
^^Gregorius Turonensis, Historiae Francorum, iii, 10, 
M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 106: "Quod certissime Childeberthus
cognoscens, ab Arverno rediit et Hispaniam propter sororem suam 
Chlotchildem dirigit."
64
task of ejecting the Franks from their territory. King 
Theudis accomplished this, and according to Isidore of Seville, 
the Franks finally escaped Spain, which they had penetrated 
as far as the province of Aragon, by judiciously bribing their 
enemy.
Later in the same century, Visigothic abuse of a 
Frankish princess by the name of Ingundis resulted in further 
attempts by a Merovingian king to invade Gothic territory. 
Ingundis married a Visigothic prince and because of a civil 
war in Spain, she came to a pitiful end. The Franks under 
King Guntram, taking offense at this, advanced toward Spain 
in 585, intending to cross the Pyrennes, but they accomplished 
nothing. A peasant rebellion in southern Gaul diverted the 
king's attention. The net result of this uprising was wide­
spread destruction in Aquitaine. Principally, the men of the 
cities of Bourges, Saintes, Perigueux, and Angouleme took part 
in the onslaught which initially had been meant for the
SGisidorus, Historia Gothorum, 41, P.L., p. 284: "dux
idem prece atque ingenti pecunia sibi oblata viam fugae hosti- 
bus residuis unius diei noctisque spatio praebuit: cetera
infelicium turba, cui transitus conlati temperis non occurrit, 
Gothorum perempta gladio concidit."
5?Her husband Hermenegild met defeat in war prior to 
his imprisonment and execution at the hands of his father 
Leovigild. Ingundis escaped Spain through the help of the 
"Greeks" (emissaries of the eastern emperor) and died at 
Carthage en route to Constantinople.
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Visigoths.58 The following year (586) the Goths sent envoys 
to King Guntram to sue for peace but received evasive answers. 
They responded by invading Septimania, but with little suc­
cess.59
How did Frankish-Gothic fighting throughout the sixth 
century affect Aquitaine? A French historian believes that 
the Merovingian effort there always came at the expense of 
Aquitaine.80 The 585 episode certainly substantiates that 
view. Furthermore, on many other occasions the Franks dis­
played little sensitivity to Aquitaine or its problems.
58visigothic territory around Nxmes in Septimania 
particularly suffered, as did Toulouse, from the Frankish 
attack but so did Aquitaine. Gregory of Tours (Historiae 
Francorum, viii, 30, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 394) writes: 
"Tunc, accepte consilio, unusquisque ad propria est regressus. 
Tantaque per viam scelera, homicidia, praedas, direptiones 
per regionem propriam gesserunt, ut ea usquequaque memorare 
perlongum sit." Furthermore, the bishop concludes his account 
of the rebellion by observing that five thousand perished in 
these disasters. Also, not even churches were exempt from 
despoliation. The rebels killed bishops as well as other 
clergy and stripped the churches of their movable wealth.
For example, the churches of Auvergne lost all their plate 
to thievery. What accounted for the uprising? According to 
Gregory (Ibid.) the leaders of the rebellious army reported 
to King Guntram afterward that the whole people had fallen 
into corruption and all took joy in doing iniquity. Beyond 
this, he advances no other explanation.
59Ibid., viii, 38, p. 405: "Richaredus autem, filius
Leuvichilde, usque Narbonam venit et infra terminum Galliarum 
praedas egit et clam regressus est."
8®Drapeyron, Revue des Travaux de l'Académie des 
Sciences Morales et Politiques, CIV, 813: "Les guerres
entreprises contre les Goths se faisaient aux frais de 
l'Aquitaine."
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According to Gregory of Tours, they usually reacted in a heavy- 
handed fashion that must have offended more often than not.
To reach Spain the Franks necessarily had to move across Aqui­
taine. Hence, southern Gaul became a pawn in north-south re­
lations, both militarily and religiously. In light of this 
phase of Aquitanian history, it appears that the Merovingians 
conceived southern Gaul to be little more than a buffer state. 
It would cushion Gothic aggression and serve as a source of 
revenue through produce and plunder. In the years immediately 
ahead (early seventh century), Aquitaine would also serve as 
a source of land for Merovingians to parcel out to reward 
loyal nobles. This activity added a new dimension to the im­
portance of the area, fostering both the spread of feudalism 
and a Francicized population.
As the sixth century progressed, the Franks began to 
divide their realm into three major areas, each of which 
encompassed several provincial areas. The Franks first called 
two of these territories by the characteristic names of Aus- 
trasia and Neustria. Scholarship has determined that Austrasia 
was created before Neustria. Later still, the Franks added, 
by conquest, a third division under the designation of Bur- 
gundia.Gl In 534, the heirs of Clovis successfully completed
G^Ewig, i^ademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, 
IX, 693-694: "Ein seltsames Geschick hat es gefugt, dass die
frankischen Teilreiche sowohl nach 511 wie nach 561 durch den 
Tod eines der Konige von vier auf drei reduziert wurden. Ein
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their assault against Burgundy and thereby won her over not 
only to the Frankish state but to the fold of Orthodox Cathol­
icism as well.
Although these divisions within the realm figure large­
ly in the politics of Gaul in the last half of the sixth cen­
tury, the respective boundaries of territories were extremely 
fluid. The complicated political setting in the Merovingian 
state in regard to succession further clouds any analysis 
that contains permanence. Aquitaine in particular had various 
masters and alternately found it (or parts of itself) attached 
to one territory or the other. In 584, in fact, Neustria, 
Austrasia, and Burgundia each had a part of Aquitaine within 
their h o l d i n g s . ^2 Thereafter, although Gaul was split through 
the efforts of Brunhild (the Queen Mother) to spread her in­
fluence,^^ only Austrasia and Burgundia had control periodi­
cally over Aquitaine. In 613, however, Clotaire II cruelly
Zeichen fur die Festigung der drei Teilreiche ist das Auftre- 
ten der drei fiir das 7. und 8. Jh. charakteristischen Lander- 
namen Austrasien, Neustrien und Burgund. Steinbach hat darauf 
hingewiesen, dass die Bezeichnung Austria-Austrasii fruher 
begegnet als der Name Neustria-Neustrasii. Wir fiigen hinzu, 
dass auch die Bezeichnung Burgund fur das frankische Teilreich 
Orleans jiingeren Datums ist.”
GZperroud, Des Origines du Premier Duché d'Aquitaine, 
p. 24: "En 584, les trois royaumes francs: Neustrie, Aus-
trasie, Burgondie, avaient chacun une part de l'Aquitaine."
G^The efforts of her opponents, who eventually succeed­
ed in toppling her from power, were equally divisive.
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executed Brunhild and once again Gaul, rather uncertainly, 
owed its allegiance to one man.^^
Upon Clotaire II‘s assumption of power, Burgundia 
alone came to acquire the bulk of Aquitaine as the spoils of 
the victor in the civil wars that had ravaged the regnum 
Francorum for the last twenty-five y e a r s . 65 Neustria contin­
ued to be denied its old possessions south of the Loire River, 
just as Austrasia now unsuccessfully laid claim to its former 
provinces in the same a r e a . 66 as for the latter, it consid­
ered refusals for Aquitanian territory particularly distress­
ing. The Austrasian nobility had immense domains in Aquitaine, 
and they habitually pursued a policy of matrimonial alliances 
which made Aquitaine increasingly important to them. One 
scholar, who has given this issue considerable attention, takes 
note of these particular alliances on the basis of extensive
6^François Chamard ("L'Aquitaine sous les Derniers 
Mérovingiens, aux Vile et Ville sifecles," Revue des Questions 
Historiques, XXXV [1884], 5-9) discusses the complicated web 
of Merovingian intrigue and partitioning as it concerns Aqui­
taine from the Treaty of Andelot in 587 to the accession of 
Clotaire II.
66perroud, Des Origines du Premier Duché d'Aquitaine, 
p. 25: "La réponse ne saurait être douteuse: 1 'Aquitaine
fut annexée au royaume vainqueur, à la Burgondie, et soumise 
a l'administration burgonde."
66ibid.: "Clotaire II, ... , paraît n'avoir rien
changé aux limites et a l'organisation des trois royaumes; on 
ne voit nulle part qu'il ait rien rendu à la Neustrie de ses 
anciennes possessions au sud de la Loire; quant a l'Austrasie, 
il lui dénia constamment les provinces méridionales qu'elle 
aurait pu revendiquer, ...."
69
research into hagiology. Through this means, he has dis­
cerned eleven such aristocratic unions contracted during the 
seventh century.G? Carrying the matter of Austrasian posses­
sions in Aquitaine a step further, a logical question arises 
as to whether or not the Franks ever maintained lands there 
in the royal fisc. To the Franks, the fisc possessed a two­
fold purpose for existing: (1) the kings lived to a great
extent from the produce from these royal domains, and (2) a 
fiscus also had its uses in keeping certain districts under 
c o n t r o l . T h o s e  regions in the northwest of France provided 
the later-day Franks with a majority of their royal domains; 
and generally speaking, the border kingdoms and duchies had 
few (with the exception of Bavaria). Aquitaine supplied the
G^Chamard, Revue des Questions Historiques, XXXV, 9:
"Ce refus fut particulièrement pénible aux chefs austrasiens 
qui, en réclamant 1'autonomie administrative pour l'Austrasie, 
avaient espéré que cette faveur s'étendrait a tout le terri­
toire de l'ancien royaume de ce nom. Les intérêts politiques 
n'étaient pas seuls en jeu dans cette revendication. Les plus 
illustres familles austrasiennes possédaient d'immenses do­
maines en Aquitaine, grâce surtout aux alliances matrimoniales 
qu'ils aimaient a y contracter." Chamard takes note of the 
fact that even St. Itta, the wife of Pepin of Landen, was from 
Aquitaine.
®®Two books of F. L. Ganshof contain excellent dis­
cussions of the significance of the royal fisc in Frankish 
history. See his Frankish Institutions under Charlemagne 
(trans. Bryce and Mary Lyon [Providence, R.I., 1968], pp. 34- 
37) and The Carolingians and the Frankish Monarchy (trans.
Janet Sondheimer [Ithaca, N.Y., pp, 96-97, 131, 296).
For the best, most comprehensive discussion of the topic dur­
ing Carolingien times, consult Wolfgang Metz, Das Karolingische 
Reichsgut (Berlin, 1960).
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Frankish state with only a very limited number of these do­
mains, even at the height of Carolingien fo rt unes,and  
possibly none in the seventh century. This seems odd in light 
of Aquitaine's natural resources, but then again, it substan­
tiates the fact that to a considerable degree Frankish kings 
were disinterested in the area, particularly because of its 
troublesomeness, and when Aquitaine did spark the monarch's 
interest, it arose in consideration of rewarding either the 
Church or the nobility for faithful service.
Before many years passed, the fortunes of Clotaire II 
waned. In 622, he was forced to elevate his son, Dagobert, 
to the position of king of Austrasia. Later yet, in 625, 
Clotaire returned to Austrasia most of its old frontiers, tak­
ing care, however, to retain both Aquitaine and Provence under 
his own administration.70 While Clotaire maintained himself
O^Thegani Vita Hludowici Imperatoris, Monumenta Ger- 
maniae Historica, Scriptores, ed. G. H. Pertz, II (Hannover, 
1829), pp. 610-611 mentions the existence of four of these 
domains in Aquitaine at the end of the eighth century: "Nam
ordinavit qualiter in quatour locis hiberna transigeret, ut 
tribus annis exactis, quarto demum anno hiematurum se quisque 
eorum susciperet locus, Theotuadum scilicet palatium, Cassi- 
nogilum, Andiacum et Eurogilum." For an interesting monographi- 
cal discussion concerning the most famous of these, Cassi- 
nogilum, first referred to in Carolingien annals in 778, see 
Camille Jullian, "Le Palais Carolingien de Cassinogilum,"
Etudes d'Histoire du Moyen Age dédises a Gabriel Monod (Paris, 
1896), 89-94.
7Ochronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici, iv, 
53, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores Rerum Merovingi- 
carum, ed. Bruno Krusch, II (Hannover, 1888), p. 147:
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in power for several more years, the guarded position of Bur­
gundia allowed it to become the most prosperous and powerful 
of the Frankish territories.
The northern part of the kingdom still retained some 
of its former influence in Aquitaine. It did so through sub­
stantial episcopal holdings south of the Loire River. A note­
worthy example of this is the case of the church of Rheims 
which had possessions in Marseille, Rennes, Gevaudan, Auvergne, 
Limousin, Poitou, and Touraine.^^ If one seeks a similar 
situation, in which churches of the south owned property north 
of the Loire, he would do so in vain.?^ in brief, Aquitaine 
experienced a partitioning between the bishops of Neustria and 
of Austrasia in the seventh century.
"Reddensque ei soledatum quod aspexerat ad regnum Austrasiorum, 
hoc tantum exinde, quod citra Legere vel Provinciae partibus 
situm erat, suae dicione retenait."
^^Flodoard, Historiae Ecclesiae Remensis Libri Quatuor, 
ii, 9, Patrologiae Latina, ed. J.-P. Migne, CXXXV (Paris,
1879), p. 114: ". . . omnes ipsius sanctae Dei ecclesiae res,
tarn in Campania, et infra urbem, vel suburbanis, quam in Aus­
trasia, seu Neustria, vel Burgundia, seu partibus Massiliae, 
in Rodonico, eticim, Gavalitano, Arvernico, Turonico, Pictavico, 
Lemovicino, . . . ."
^^Drapeyron, Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, 
CV, 262: "... il faudrait montrerque les évéchés de Marseille,
de Toulouse avaient eux-mêmes des domaines et des rentes en 
Bourgogne, en Austrasie et en Neustrie. Nous en trouvons rien 
de semblable."
^^Ibid., 260: Le Vile siècle vit une chose plus extra­
ordinaire et qu'on n'a^pas encore signalée, le partage de 
l'Aquitaine entre les Évêques de la Neustrie et de l'Austrasie. 
Citons quelques exemples."
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The involvement of the Frankish episcopacy in Aquitaine, 
and indeed the expansion of its holdings, was of considerable 
importance. The mere mechanics of administering this property 
meant the influx of a corps of Frankish officials. The immu­
nities that ecclesiastical wealth enjoyed precluded the partici­
pation of local officers in Church affairs. Hence, the Aus­
trasian episcopacy could delegate their own tax collectors and 
special judges to serve their needs in Aquitaine regardless 
of the desires of the local populace.Furthermore, the Mero­
vingian monarchy came gradually to have an influence in epis­
copal elections and, indeed, even to confer the office them­
selves. Consequently, after the death of Dagobert, the Frank­
ish Church fell into profound decadence, to the extent that 
eventually many bishops and abbots, appointees and favorites 
of the Merovingians, wore martial instead of clerical vest­
ments.^5 Church property dissipated at an alarming rate, in
Ibid., 263; " . . .  les juges et les percepteurs
ordinaires n'avaient sur eux aucune autorité (1); les églises 
du Nord déléguaient des percepteurs et des juges spéciaux. 
C'est ce qu'on appelait 4:1a juridiction des églises franques (2).&
a concise, yet excellent, discussion of this 
topic see Christian Pfister, "Gaul under the Merovingian 
Franks: Institutions," Cambridge Medieval History, II, v,
142-146. Concerning the practicalities of Merovingian lay 
investiture, Jules Tardif (Etudes sur les Institutions Poli­
tiques et Administratives de la France, I, p. 139) has sum­
marized rather well its ramifications: "En conférant l'épis-
copat à leurs serviteurs et k leurs favoris, les rois trou­
vaient un moyen de les récompenser et de nommer des évêques 
dévoués à leurs intérêts."
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fact more extensively than ever before. It is therefore no 
surprise that an extension of Frankish influence in the Aqui­
tanian Church took place and that a thoroughgoing Frankish 
penetration of the region came about, particularly through 
the ecclesiastical avenue. The proof of this resides in the 
fact that an increasing number of episcopal vacancies in 
Aquitaine fell to men of Germanic e x t r a c t i o n . T h i s  practice 
allowed the Frankish monarchy to spread its influence and its 
favors in Aquitaine in a convenient fashion. Thus, the stratum 
of the Frankish aristocracy in Aquitaine was expanded.
While the neighbors of Aquitaine to the north and the 
east persisted in exploiting the region for their own ends, 
a double-edged threat existed to the south. The Goths of 
Septimania and the Gascons of Novempopulana viewed southern 
Gaul as a bountiful spoil of which they could take advantage. 
The tumultuous politics which made Frankish Aquitaine more 
vulnerable further jeopardized its standing with both the 
Goths and the Gascons. Knowing this, Dagobert installed his 
brother Charibert in Aquitaine and gave him command of five
^^Consult the listing of the holders of these epis­
copal seats in Aquitaine throughout the seventh century in 
P. B. Gams, Series Episcoporum Ecclesiae Catholicae (Graz, 
1957), pp. 479-638. Herein a noticeable increase appears in 
the names of those bishops who have a Germanic "rt" ending 
to their names. This stands in contrast to the more pecu­
liarly Roman names of the fifth and sixth centuries.
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c a ntons.Charibert obtained the cantons of Toulouse, 
Cahors, Agen, Perigueux, and Saintes.78 He made Toulouse 
his capital and in effect, until his death in 632, he domi­
nated a marche rather than a realm.79 By sending Charibert
^Much controversy surrounds this whole episode in 
Merovingian history (see below, fn. 79). Past treatment of 
Aquitaine by the Franks, as well as the family difficulties 
pertaining to ascendency, both suggest that the Merovingians 
created a buffer zone in setting up Charibert in Aquitaine. 
Drapeyron (Ibid., 264) correctly summarizes this by observ­
ing: "... II commandait, en réalité, non a un royaume, mais
à une marche franque."
^^Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici, 
iv, 57, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 149: "Cumque regnum
Chlothariae tam Neptreco quam Burgundias ad Dagobertum fuisset 
preoccupatura, captis thinsauris et suae dicione redactis, 
tandem miserecordia mutus, consilio sapientibus usus, citra 
Legere et limitem Spaniae quod ponitur, partibus Wasconiae 
seu et mentis Parenei pagus et civitates, quod fratri suo 
Cairiberto ad transagendum ad instar private habeto cum viven- 
dum potuisset sufficere, nuscetur concessisse: pagum Tholosa-
num, Cathorcinum, Agenninsem, Petrocorecum et Santonecum, vel 
quod ab his versus mentis Pereneos excludetur. Hoc tantum 
Chairiberto regendum concessit, quod et per pactiones vinculum 
estrinxit, ut amplius Airibertus nulle tempore adversus 
Dagobertum de regno patris repetire presumerit. Airibertus 
sedem Tholosa aeliens, régnât in partem provinciae Aquetaniae."
79charibert's installation in Aquitaine has occasioned 
an interesting academic debate. Perroud (Des Origines du 
Premier Duché d'Aquitaine, p. 33) sees in this event the found­
ing of two distinct realms within the Aquitanian kingdom. 
Furthermore, he believes, although in this instance mistaken­
ly, that Charibert's realm had been created prior to 628 
through the good graces of his father Clotaire II (p. 28). 
Building on this supposition, Perroud devotes a whole chapter 
(pp. 33-40) to this subject which he entitles "Le Royaume de 
Toulouse (628-630)." For a refutation of this view, see the 
remarks of François Chamard in Revue des Questions Historique, 
XXXV, 10-11. Chamard points out that a more careful reading 
of Fredegar indicates that Dagobert was Charibert*s benefactor 
and not the father.
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into Aquitaine, Dagobert may have paved the way for the estab­
lishment of a ducal house. While this development lay in the 
very near future, the Gallo-Romans with Charibert became con­
ditioned to a Frankish overlord close at hand, as opposed to 
the more distant Austrasian north of the Seine.
Later events proved the validity of Dagobert's fears 
of invasion through the Pyrenees. After the death of his 
brother Charibert, the Gascons took up arms and crossed over 
into the Frankish kingdom (presumably Aquitaine) and took much 
plunder.®® Dagobert countered this by sending ten Frankish 
dukes, placed under the orders of the Referendarius Chadoinde, 
against the Gascons. The Franks were victorious, but lost the 
flower of their army under Duke Arimbertus.®^
®®Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici, 
iv, 78, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., pp. 159-160: "Anno quarto
decimo rigni Dagoberti, cum Wascones forteter revellarent et 
multas predas in regno Francorum, quod Charibertus tenuerat, 
facerint, Dagobertus de universum regnum Burgundiae exercitum 
promovere iobet, statuens eis capud exercitus nomeni Chadoin- 
dun referendarium, qui temporebus Theuderici quondam regis 
multis prilies probatur strenuos. Quod cum decem docis cum 
exercetebus, id est Arinbertus, Amalgarius, Leudebertus, 
Wandalmarus, Waldericus, Ermeno, Barontus, Chairaardus ex 
genere Francorum, Chramnelenus ex genere Romano, Willibadus 
patricius genere Burgundiontim, Aigyna genere Saxsonum, excep- 
tis comitebus plurimis, qui docem super se non habebant, in 
Wasconia cum exercito perrixsissent, et totam Wasconiae patriam 
ab exercito Burgundiae fuissit repleta, Wascones deinter 
moncium rupes aegressi, ad bellum properant."
®^Ibid., p. 160: "Feliciter haec exercitus absque
ulla lesionem ad patriam fuerunt repedati, se Arnebertum 
docem maxime cum seniores et nobiliores exercitus sui per 
negliencia a Wasconebus in valle Subola non fuissit inter- 
fectus."
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Historians consider Dagobert (629-639) the best ruler 
of the Merovingian lino after the victor of Vouillc. Although 
his morality left something to be desired, he interested him­
self in the arts, established abbeys, and promoted missionary 
works. Furthermore, he checked momentarily particularism in 
Merovingian politics and imposed a settlement in Aquitaine 
that ensured her integrity in the face of a threat from the 
south. Besides appointing a member of his own family to accom­
plish the former (something that Charles the Great duplicates 
in the eighth century by setting a member of his own family 
over the duchy), Dagobert's comparatively powerful military 
machine also helped to prevent the realization of the duchy's 
instinct to free itself of Merovingian control during the king's 
lifetime.®^ As for the rest of his family, he sent his first 
son, Sigebert, to Austrasia to be reared (by Saint Chunibert, 
the Duke of Adalgisele and Bishop of Cologne) and to become 
the representative of Austrasian interests in Frankish state­
craft. By another of the three wives which he simultaneously 
kept,®® he had a son named Clovis in 634. Since this son's
82The recent work by Bernard S. Bachrach (Merovingian 
Military Organization, 481-751 [Minneapolis, 1972], pp. 85,
108) substantiates the fact that Dagobert developed the Mero­
vingian army to a greater degree than his predecessors.
®®Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici, iv, 
60, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 151: ". . . luxoriam super
modum deditus, tres habebat maxime ad instar reginas et pluremas 
concupinas. Reginae vero haec fuerunt; Nantechildis, Vulfe- 
gundis et Berchildis. Nomina concubinarum, eo quod plures 
fuissent, increvit huius chronica inseri."
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mother, Nantechildis, was Neustrian, she successfully pushed 
for a division of the realm, with her child quite logically 
receiving the land of her birth, as well as Burgundia, as his 
share of the kingdom.®^ Undoubtedly, this important decision, 
solemnized in an impressive convocation of all the nobility 
of the realm, shattered the early hopes of the Australians 
to enforce their predominance over the rest of the kingdom 
through Dagobert's initial selection of a single heir. Also, 
the fact that Dagobert had convened the nobility and exacted 
their signatures on a document to this effect gave permanence 
to the arrangement after his death in 639.®^
This settlement had important ramifications for Aqui­
taine. It was now attached, not to Burgundia, but to Austrasia, 
to which it had formerly been given by the treaty of Andelot.®^
®^Ibid., p. 159; "Cumque anno duodecemo regni 
Dagoberti eidem filius nomen Chlodoveos de Nanthilde regina 
natus fuissit, consilio Neustrasiorum eorumque admonicione per 
pactiones vincolum cum Sigybertum, filium suum, firmasse 
dinuscetur, . . . ."
®^Ibid.: ". . .et Austrasiorum omnes primati,
pontevecis citirique leudis Sigyberti manus eorum ponentes 
insuper, sacramentis firmaverunt, ut Neptreco et Burgundia 
soledato ordene ad regnum Chlodoviae post Dagoberti discessum 
aspecerit; Aoster vero idemque ordine soledato, eo quod et 
de populo et de spacium terre esset quoaequans, ad regnum 
Digyberti idemque in integretate deberit aspecere; et quic- 
quid ad regnum Aostrasiorum iam olem pertenerat, hoc Sigybertus 
rex suae dicione rigendum recipere et perpetuo dominandum 
haberit, excepto docato Dentilini, quod ab Austrasius iniqui- 
ter abtultus fuerat, iterum ad Neustrasius subiungeretur et 
Chlodoveo regimene subgiceretur."
®®Gregory of Tours, Historiae Francorum, ix, 20,
M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., pp. 434-439.
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By thus having its allegiance again involuntarily transferred, 
Aquitaine's ultimate loyalty to the Franks was weakened. 
Aquitaine struggled to obtain the status of an independent 
duchy, and, just as the Austrasian Mayors of the Palace were 
to slough off the shrouds of Merovingian scrutiny, so did 
Aquitaine succeed in coming of age politically.
The Austrasians utilized Aquitaine when conditions 
were favorable, but they maintained their principal interests 
in the north. The area proved convenient, but the Austrasian 
hierarchy at home lacked the power to become involved there, 
even if it was so inclined. Although a Prankish aristocratic 
element had migrated into Aquitaine through ecclesiastical 
channels and a series of well-chosen marriages, the exact 
degree of their infiltration cannot be ascertained. The 
degeneration of the Church after Dagobert coincided with the 
growth of the separatist instinct in Aquitaine. As the for­
tunes of the Church took a turn for the worse, the secular 
aristocracy in Gaul grew in stature and had far more power in 
administrative affairs of the kingdom than in the preceding 
century. All of this was emphasized by the fact that the 
Church failed to convene a council for eighty years in the 
late seventh and early eighth centuries. During this era, a 
continuation of feudal, local particularism occurred that 
paralleled the extension of the mayors' influence in Austrasia. 
If these same royal officials could subvert the political
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power of the Merovingian king, what prevented the Frankish 
aristocracy settled in Aquitaine from emulating their feat 
on a lower level south of the Loire? Moreover, in the semi- 
feudal society that existed there, why should the transplanted 
Franks even offer their patronage to these mayors and their 
institutions when they so patently lacked legitimacy? The 
example of the Frankish prince Charibert suggested the direc­
tion of things to come for the province in the seventh cen­
tury: he was an Austrasian aristocrat struggling to unify
the bases of his power in a decentralized setting that depend­
ed upon agriculture to sustain itself against the threat of 
neighboring military pressure.
CHAPTER III
THE RISE OF AN INDEPENDENT 
AQUITANIAN DUCHY
During the course of the seventh century, Aquitaine 
strove to obtain its independence. It succeeded, but not in 
one bold stroke. Its fortunes vacillated to the extent that 
the province briefly experienced an era of freedom from out­
side involvement in domestic affairs from roughly 613 to 628 ;  ̂
then with the advent of Dagobert's ascendency, the Merovin­
gians checked its particularistic aspirations. After his 
death, the Aquitanian aristocrats resumed their efforts to 
create a duchy independent of outside control. To this end, 
they consciously proceeded in a piecemeal fashion to sever the 
links that bound the province to the Franks. It took much 
time after 638 to realize completely this objective. Indeed, 
between 638 and 718, the aristocrats detached the province bit 
by bit from the Frankish empire, so that by Carolingian times 
they had virtually won their independence.^ Thus, the separa-
Chamard, Revue des Questions Historiques, XXXV, 9: 
"Durant les quinze ans qu'il v^cut encore (613-628), nos prov­
inces aquitaniques reconnurent sans conteste son autorité souveraine."
2Perroud, Des Origines du Premier Duché d'Aquitaine, 
p. 74: "... nous essaierons de surprendre le travail, tantôt
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tist movement in Aquitaine fully realized its goal.
By what means, generally speaking, did the Aquitanians 
achieve their separatist ends after 638? The ties that bound 
the northern Austrasians and the Aquitanians together were 
quite flimsy. Indeed, the Frankish aristocracy that had mi­
grated into the area utilized its holding of rich lands to 
expand and appropriate to itself the particularistic sentiment 
inherent in the socio-economic scene. In this sense the Frank­
ish enclaves in the province assumed a leadership in Aquitanian 
affairs and derived benefit from the weakness of the Mero­
vingian administrative system. Consequently, elevating one 
from their number with special perquisites, the Aquitanian 
aristocracy, led by the local Frankish Austrasian element, 
capitalized upon authority specifically delegated to them by 
Merovingian leadership to expand their own power. The Frankish 
aristocrats in the province began to drift away under their 
own guidance rather than consummating and building upon the 
foundations of the northern Austrasian power in the province. 
Moreover, in this semi-feudal, barbarized society, little more 
could actually have been expected of them.
The seventh century was an extremely significant period 
in Aquitaine's history, but from a literary point of view it
visible, tantôt à demi-caché ou même tout-à-fait mystérieux, 
qui, entre 638 et 718, a détaché l'Aquitaine de 1'empire franc 
lambeau par lambeau; ...."
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was an equally obscure one. Regrettably, there exists no color­
ful or informative text like that of Gregory of Tours, who wrote 
of the sixth century. Although the Chronicle of Fredegar sup­
plies students of French history with a continuation of the 
History of the Franks, this dry narrative ends with a discussion 
of the events of 640.3 Thereafter, attempts were made to pro­
ceed with an historical compilation describing developments in 
the Frankish state, but these efforts were decidedly meager.
The Liber Historiae Francorum, written at the abbey of St. Denis 
in 727, represented an effort in this category. For Aquitaine, 
however, formularies, hagiography, and annalistic sources pro­
vide a patchwork of information from which a reasonably cohesive 
and reliable account may be drawn.
By the end of Dagobert's reign, the Aquitanians had begun 
to rely more heavily upon the authority of their local dukes.
At the death of Charibert in 632, Dagobert had allowed his broth­
er's prerogatives in the province to descend into the hands of 
a powerful duke by the name of Barontus. This duke enjoyed 
great authority in Aquitaine and exercised all the important
3Robert Latouche (Caesar to Charlemagne; the Beginnings 
of France, trans. Jennifer Nicholson [New York, 1968], p. 307) 
has an informative discussion of seventh century historical 
documents. Of note is his observation concerning the chronicler 
popularly known as Fredegar. Writers of the sixteenth century 
misnamed him "Fredegar" and out of force of habit he continues 
to be so referred to. For further details on the topic, see 
the introductory remarks of Bruno Krusch in his edition of 
"Fredegar" in the M.G.H. series (pp. 16-18).
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functions of a semi-independent ducal leader.  ̂ His primary 
responsibility was to serve in a military role. Although the 
manner in which his special elevation came is unclear, he was 
born in Anjou to aristocratic parents (hence the landed class) 
enjoyed the favor of Dagobert, and received delegated authority 
from the Austrasians. Several items attest to the prestige of 
Barontus throughout these years. Fredegar mentioned his name 
among those ten Frankish dukes who were sent in 636 to punish 
the insolence of the Gascons.® Not always did his actions stand 
in the good favor of Dagobert, however. When Charibert died, 
Dagobert joined his brother's realm with that of his own and 
entrusted Barontus with the task of guarding Charibert's treas­
ury. Demonstrating his independent attitude in this capacity, 
Barontus made off with the fortune and betrayed the king's 
good faith.^ Most interesting is the fact that this occurred
Francois Chamard (Revue des Questions Historiques,
XXXV, 13-14) mentions that Barontus residence was at Poitiers, 
not at Toulouse as had been Charibert's. Also, his authority 
extended over the neighboring cities, including Cahors and 
Clermont.
®lbid.
6see above, chapter two, fn. 80.
^Gesta Dagoberti I. Regis Francorum 25, Monumenta 
Germaniae Historica, Scriptores Rerum Merovingicarum, ed. B. 
Krusch, II (Hannover, 1888), p. 410: "Omneque regnum Hairberti
una cum Wasconia Dagobertus rex protinus suae dicioni redegit.
Ad adducendos quoque thesauros Hairberti et sibi praesentandos 
Barontum quendam ducem direxit. Barontus autem grave dispendium 
fecisse dinoscitur, infideliter una cum thesaurariis furtum 
faciens, nimiumque exinde fraudulenter subtraxit." The Chronicle 
of Fredegar (iv, 67) similarly tells of these events.
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several years before Dagobert sent him on the Gascon expedition. 
Barontus exercised enough power to thwart Dagobert, and that 
was an indication of his strength. The separatist inclination 
in Aquitaine had considerable distance to go in order to reach 
maturity, but with Barontus, the province made much progress 
in that direction.
Not many years passed until the efforts of men like 
Barontus came to fruition. Aquitaine seemed to be moving 
in the direction of separatism, but conditions within the 
Frankish state as a whole had to be ripe before this became 
a reality. First, a decentralization of Merovingian authority 
had to arise. This occurred as a result of impotent kings. 
Second, the cities of southern Gaul experienced an isolation
Othat stimulated their desire to achieve independence.” By 
this time the political leverage of the Gallic city was 
lessened by slackening trade. After Dagobert, the aristocracy 
largely usurped the decision-making power which the urban 
bishop had formerly held. Thus, the locally oriented trend 
in Aquitanian politics was accompanied by a secularization, 
but still within the municipal context.
D yPerroud, Des Origines du Premier Duché d*Aquitaine, 
p. 108; "Si l'ambition de fonder un Etat dans la Gaule 
méridionale dut naître quelque part, — au moment où 1'impuissance 
des rois et surtout les progrès de la désorganisation admin­
istrative rendaient les cites du midi a cet isolement municipal 
que plusieurs avaient deja connu au cours du Ve siècle, ...."
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mounta ins .Al tho ugh  of uncertain lineage, ho had a feudal 
domain which stretched far enough south to encompass the Gas­
cons. Felix appreciated the title "most noble patrician," 
and upon his death his succession went to the young Lupus, 
to whom ascendency was granted, not by the Merovingian king, 
but by the favor of the regional aristocracy and by the support 
of some Burgundian exiles then in Aquitaine.
As for the significance of Felix's title of "patri­
cian," it bore a connotation virtually synonymous with that of 
" d u k e . I n  a more specific context, the title of "patrician" 
conveyed an honorific implication that was not necessarily 
associated with that of "duke." Conversely, the latter
Ex Miraculis S. Martialis, Episcopi Lemovicensis, 
Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores, ed. O. Holder- 
Egger, XV, pars I (Hannover, 1887), P- 281: "Quodam tempore,
cum Ebroinus comes palatii, maior domus Francorum regni, in 
aula regis adesset et omnes neguitias seu iniquitates, quae 
in universa terra fiebant, superbos et iniquos homines super 
eorum facinus viriliter subpremebat, et pax per omnem terram 
plena et perhacta adrisit. Tunc surrexit puer unus nomine 
Lupus, qui et auctor nominis sui adesse voluit, ad Felecem, 
nobilissimum et inclitum patrieium ex urbe Tholosanensium, qui 
et principatum super omnes civitates usque montes Pireneos, 
super gentem nequissimam Wascorum obtinebat."
^^Ibid.; "Eo defuncto, antedictum Luponem principem 
super se omnes statuerunt, et omnes vagi profugique ad eum 
adeserunt, . . . ."
^^Formulae Merowingici et Karolini Aevi, Monumenta Ger­
maniae Historica, Legum, Sectio V , I, ed. K. Zeumer (Hannover, 
1886), pp. 47-48: "̂ Ergo dum et fidem et utilitatem tuam vide- 
mur habere conpertam, ideo tibi accionem comitiae, ducatus aut 
patriciatus in pago illo, quem antecessor tuos illi usquae nunc 
visus est egisse, tibi ad agendum regendumque commissemus, . . ,
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indicated military c o m m a n d . E v e n  though Felix's power ex­
tended over a considerable curea, the force of his command 
applied only to the city of Toulouse. Thus, he was commonly 
referred to as the "Duke of Toulouse" rather than as the "Duke 
of Aquitaine."
The brief, sporadic references to both Felix and Lupus 
leave many important questions unanswered. Particularly is 
this the case in light of their relationship to their fellow 
aristocrats. It appears most logical, however, to assume that 
their power stemmed from the holding of land; in the evolution 
of a titular position, they traced their power to a nucleus 
of one or more municipalities.
At what date does one read of an independent duke over 
all of Aquitaine and not the more narrow municipal duchy? This 
occurs with the ascension to power of Lupus. Genealogical 
tables of Aquitanian and Gascon dukes often begin by listing 
Lupus as the first of the line.^^ Although Felix attracts 
noteworthy attention, he nonetheless does so as a transitional
l*Chamard, Revue des Questions Historiques, XXXV, 16: 
"On a fait de Félix un duc de Toulouse. Cependant, le titre 
de patrice, bien que synonyme, en certain sens, de celui de 
duc, est le plus souvent simplement honorifique et n'exprime 
pas le commandement." Also see the remarks of F. L. Ganshof 
(Frankish Institutions under Charlemagne, pp. 31-33) contrast- 
ing thé authority and functions oi the duke (dux) with that of 
the count (comes).
1 C^"'Jean de Jaurgain, La Vasconie (2 vols. ; Pau, 1902), 
II, pp. 1-2.
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figure who marks an important stage in the progress of Aquitaine 
from a subject to an autonomous duchy.
For all purposes Aquitaine was an independent duchy dur­
ing the lifetime of Felix. However, with the election of Lupus 
to an autonomous ducal position, a man with a Frankish back­
ground must surely have come to power in Aquitaine. In contrast
to the case of Barontus and his Angevin origins, nothing is
known about Lupus* birthplace. He had a Latin name, but the 
probability of a Gallo-Roman with the name of Wolf (i.e.. Lupus) 
seems slight indeed. This name sounds far more Germanic and 
suggests that Lupus was an indigenous German who ascended to 
high office in the province.
Since the career of Ebroin spanned twenty-two years, 
at what point did Felix die and allow the duchy to pass on to
Lupus? This question possesses merit for two reasons: (1) be­
cause of the significance of the first Aquitanian duke, per se, 
and (2) because of the date at which autonomy came to the area. 
The date of Felix's death roughly determines the answer to 
both questions. To resolve this matter, however, an oblique 
approach must be taken. A contemporary Spanish source indicates 
that by 673, the year in which Ebroin regained power after 
three years imprisonment. Lupus had acceded to the office of 
duke in A q u i t a i n e . Hence, if Felix enjoyed power simultane­
ously with Ebroin, it must have been before 670 when the
Julian of Toledo, Historis Rebellionis Pauli Adversus
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latter was expelled from the mayoralty. Thus, Aquitaine ac­
quired its independence before 670, most probably between the 
years 6 6 0-6 7 0 . Furthermore, the province first asserted 
its autonomous prerogatives in the succeeding decade under 
Lupus.
As affairs in Aquitaine took a new direction in the 
670's, so did the Frankish kingdom to the north undergo a 
transformation. This decade marked the termination of the 
decisive struggle for mastery in the Frankish state between 
Ebroin and Leodegar, the Bishop of Autun. Ebroin emerged the 
winner but found that he had won a Pyrrhic victory. Of the 
three subdivisions within the regnum Francorum, he kept 
command of two. Burgundy and Neustria, while a new rival, 
Pepin, arose in the third area, Austrasia, which stubbornly 
resisted his will to rule. Ebroin eventually executed 
Leodegar, whom he had held in captivity, and, in consequence, 
a reaction set in that resulted in the bishop's canonization.
Wambam Gothorum Regem, 27, Patrologiae Latina, ed. J.-P.
Migne, XCVI (Paris, 1862), p. 793. On occasion, the book.
Des Origines du Premier Duché d'Aquitaine, by Cl. Perroud has 
to be used with care. He advances the notion (p. 127) that 
Lupus existed as only one from a number of dukes of southern 
Gaul. This interpretation stems from a misreading of Julian 
of Toledo who writes (p. 793); "unum e ducibus Franciae nomine 
Lupum." This analysis of Perroud conveniently squares with 
his mistaken belief that Eudes and not Lupus first held the 
title of "Duke of Aquitaine." For further comment on this topic 
see: Chamard, Revue des Questions Historiques, XXXV, p. 24.
l^perroud. Des Origines du Premier Duché d'Aquitaine, 
pp. 110: "... nous ne croyons pas errer en plagant entre
660 et 670 l'apparition du nouvel état."
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In 681, Ebroin met his death at the hands of an assassin. Af­
ter the death of the mayor, the political affairs of Francia 
continued to remain askew. While this promoted even further 
the development of an independent Aguitemian duchy, the former 
competitor of Ebroin, Pepin (II), managed to consolidate his 
authority by defeating his current rival, the Mayor Berthar of 
Neustria, in the battle of Tertry in 687. These seventeen years 
(670-687) of civil disorder in Francia were undoubtedly of 
great benefit to Aquitaine. A preoccupied Francia could not 
look beyond her own internal problems to extend her wavering 
influence abroad. In fact, a veritable revolution within the 
regnum Francorum raged throughout these years; furthermore, 
Pepin's victory in 687 did not immediately bring peace. A con­
temporary annalist depicted the internal strife in Francia, and 
the new order of things politically as well, in his entry of 
688. The "lazy" Merovingian king and domestic dissension were 
both credited with the responsibility for the chaotic plight of 
the Frankish s t a t e . B u t  beyond this, the ties of dependency
^ Annales Mettenses Priores, a. 688, Monumenta Germaniae 
Historica, Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum, X, ed, B. de Simson 
(Hannover, 1905), pp. 4-5: "Hae enim gentes olim et aliae 
plurimae multis sudoribus adguisitae Francorum summo obtem- 
perabant imperio. Sed propter desidiam regum et domesticas 
dissensiones et bella civilia, quae in multas partes divisi 
regni ingruerant, legitimam dominationem deserentes, singuli 
in proprio solo armis libertatem moliebantur defendere." In 
this instance, Heinrich Bonnell (Die Anfange des karolingischen 
Hauses ["Jahrbiicher der deutschen Geschichte"; Berlin, 1866], 
p. 129) evaluates the Annales Mettenses: "Die A. M. [Annales
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that the Merovingians had built up in Aquitaine must have rest­
ed upon personal bases. Granting that this was the case, then 
how firm could the connection have been between the new mayors 
and the provincial aristocracy to the south? Obviously the 
mayors (Ebroin and his immediate successors) could not readily 
transfer from one to the other these personal bonds that legit­
imate Merovingian kings had created. So the successors of 
Ebroin, whether he had assumed these ties himself or not, would 
only with extreme difficulty exact the obedience of the Aqui- 
tanians. The next mayor, Pepin II, began the line that became 
known as the Carolingian. The importance of this fact is like­
wise observed by an annalist after the Battle of Tertry in 
687.19 Thus, while Aquitaine became increasingly self-reliant 
throughout these years, political turmoil north of the Loire 
moved Francia ever closer to a new unification under strong 
Carolingian leadership.
Mettenses], welche ein Zuscunmentreffen Peppins mit Radbod un- 
mittelbar nach der Schlacht bei Tertry und die Bewaltigung des 
letztern beim ersten Anlauf Pippins geschehen lassen, stimmen 
nicht mit den Angaben anderer Berichterstatter. Wir müssen 
deshalb die Richtigkeit dieser Angabe, so lange sie nicht 
anderweitig beglaubigt ist, in zweifel ziehen, und begnugen 
uns mit der Auskunft unsrer sonstigen Duellen, nach mannich- 
fachen Irrungen und Kampfen sei es endlich . . .
l^Ibid., a. 687, p. 1: "Anno ab incarnations domini
nostri lesu Christi DCLXXXVIII. Pippinus filius Ansegisili 
nobilissimi quondam Francorum principis post plurima prelia 
magnosque triumphos a Deo sibi concessos orientalium Francorum 
glorioso genitori feliciter succedens suscepit principatum."
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Other factors contributed to strengthen the position 
of Aquitaine at the beginning of Lupus' ascendency. The Visi­
goths in Spain elected a new leader in the person of Wamba in 
672. A bellicose individual, he immediately engaged the Gas­
cons in a successful war that in turn prompted them to move 
north and come into the service of Duke Lupus. Moreover, the 
heavy-handed rule of the Mayor Ebroin caused a considerable 
element of disaffected Franks to seek refuge in Aquitaine.20 
In the eyes of these exiles, the mayor had unrightfully arro­
gated power to himself, and the hospitality of the Aquitanian 
duke appealed to them. As for the disposition of the arrange­
ment between Lupus and these Franks, the particulars are un­
known. Certainly an affiliation on a personal basis played 
a part in the alliance, but it is impossible to say whether 
or not the extension of land entered into the bargain. With 
these combined forces. Lupus established a formidable power 
with which the Merovingians now had to reckon. In the final 
analysis, however, no single catalyst provoked the creation 
of an independent duchy. The Gascons provided the Aquitanian 
duke with new strength while the divisiveness of the Austra- 
sian and Neustrian struggle eroded Frankish opposition to 
Aquitanian separatism. In addition, the subversion of Mero­
vingian prerogatives (however incompetently administered) by
eum adeserunt
2®See above, fn. 12: ", . , omnes vagi profugique ad
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the mayors encouraged centrifugal tendencies by abbreviating 
the personal ties between the Franks on either side of the 
Loire. Although the seeds of later Frankish greatness lie 
in the efforts of Pepin II, this factor contributed negligi­
bly at the time due to the infancy of the movement.
Not all commentaries on Merovingian Aquitaine agree 
that Lupus served as the first independent duke of a united 
duchy. Some prefer to cite Eudes, his successor, as the 
first of the line.22 A church council, that of Bordeaux 
(663-675), suggested the contrary, however, and testified to 
the elevated station to which Lupus had risen shortly after 
his election to office. In the record of the council's pro­
ceedings, the convened churchmen referred to Lupus as a vir 
inluster, a title of nearly royal significance, and, in addi­
tion, as dux.23 Conversely, Felix did not enjoy the same
2lLudovic Drapeyron (Revue des Travaux de l'Académie 
des Sciences Morales et Politiques, CV, 265) aptly observes: 
"Coincidence instructive! la campagne de Wamba qui détermina 
une immigration basque si considérable en Gaule, la lutte 
d*Ebroin et de saint Léger qui brisa, en quelque sorte, les 
liens qui unissaient les différentes parties de la domination 
franque, la bataille de Testry qui soumit la Neustrie à l'Aus- 
trasie, mais creusa, pour de longues années, un abîme entre 
l'Austrasie et l'Aquitaine, correspondent à la^fondation d'un 
duché gallo-romain sous une dynastie qui prit a sa solde les 
Basques."
22Ibid., 266: "Plusieurs hypothèses, recueillies par 
Alteserra, ont été émises touchant l'origine d'Eudes, premier 
duc indépendant d'Aquitaine." Also, see above, fn. 16.
23concilium Burdeqalense, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, 
Legim, Sectio III, Concilia, ed. F. Maassen, I (Hannover, 1893), 
p. 2Ï6.
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a c c o l a d e . 24 Also of note is the fact that the council ex­
pressed the wish that the Merovingian king, Childeric II, 
enjoin Duke Lupus to oversee the execution of its decisions 
in his d u c h y . 25 Since the council met in Aquitaine, the po­
sition of the duke relative to the Merovingian crown surely 
influenced its statement to this effect. Indeed, this request 
of the council emphasizes the fact that the duke deferred in 
a politic way to the overlordship of the Merovingian king. 
Certainly such a statement would not have originated at the 
instance of the assembled bishops alone, who, coming princi­
pally from Aquitanian cities, acknowledged Lupus as their 
secular lord.^G Thus, as in later times, the dukes of Aqui-
24See the evaluation of Perroud (Des Origines du 
Premier Duché d'Aquitaine, pp. 139-140) who remarks: "Mais
il portait d^jâ le titreroyal ou presque royal de vir in- 
luster, et vers 674 (plus tôt peut-être?) nous le voyons agir 
en souverain, exiger des cités d ’Aquitaine le serment de 
fidélité qui ne se prêtait qu'aux rois."
2^The commentary of Carlo de Clercq (La Legislation 
Religieuse Franque de Clovis a Charlemagne, p. 70) on the 
affairs of this council mentions this point. Of those items 
that attracted the council's attention, he evaluates the fol­
lowing as the more important of their concerns: "Les évêques
s'engagent à donner à leur clergé l'exemple d'une vie droite, 
conformément aux préceptes de saint Paul et de saint Jérôme 
(c. 4). Il est interdit aux clercs de porter l'habit sécu­
lier, de posséder des armes (c. 1). de rechercher le patronage 
des grands sans permission de l'évêque (c. 2), de cohabiter 
avec des femmes étrangères (c. 3)."
2^The question of the ethnie background of Lupus 
aroused considerable consternation among nineteenth century 
French authors. To them, it meant a great deal of difference 
as to whether Lupus was of Germanic or Gallo-Roman extraction. 
An excellent case in point to illustrate this concern of
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taine arrogated sovereignty in their duchy to themselves but 
recognized, in a nominal fashion, the ultimate suzerainty of 
the Merovingian king. The accession of Lupus to the ducal 
position came through election by his fellow aristocrats and 
not through appointment by the Merovingian king. Hence, like 
the mayors. Lupus lacked a legitimate foundation for his 
p o w e r . A l s o ,  it appears dubious as to whether the nobility 
supported the Aquitanian duke wholeheartedly or extended 
loyalty to him in the same fashion as the duke himself did to 
the Austrasians. In this proto-feudal, agricultural society, 
in which state formation existed tentatively, the latter
these authors appears in the writing of Jean de Jaurgain (La 
Vasconie, I, p. 44). In fact, the question of nationalism 
has broader implications than just this isolated example.
Quite often, the matter obscures historical interpretation of 
events by European authors in general and among nineteenth 
century historians in particular. As a result, statements 
such as the following one of Ludovic Drapeyron "Revue des 
Travaux de 1*Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, CIV, 
829) depicts a specific prejudice: "oh'oubliait trop aisément,
toutefois, que les Francs, a la difference des Vandales, des 
(^ths orientaux et occidentaux, des Suèves et des Burgondes, 
étaient restés en communication directe avec la Germanie dont 
le Rhin seul les séparait, et que leurs bandes guerrières se 
recrutaient sains fin ni trêve." In short, through their asso­
ciations, the Franks possessed basically a Germanic ethos— some­
thing to which, in its context, Drapeyron pinned significance.
^^An analogous situation characterized the later rela­
tionships of the great national duchies of Bavaria and Ale- 
mannia to the Carolingiens of the eighth century. Likewise, 
the dukes of Aquitaine maintained this same stance themselves 
into the eighth century.
28Supra, fn. 10,
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situation must certainly have been the case. Thus, the duke 
lacked binding ties with those aristocrats beneath him and 
also needed an adequate revenue or supply of men to assure a 
preponderance of power in his own province.
Regrettably, Lupus had no chronicle to describe sys­
tematically the events of his ducal tenure. The information 
available concerning him pertains almost exclusively to his 
acquisition of the duchy as Felix's successor and, broadly, 
to his existence in the decade of the 670's as the Duke of 
Aquitaine. Lupus took pains to extend his influence through­
out Aquitaine during this decade, and he undercut the failing 
Merovingian influence wherever he could by expanding his own 
power to the exclusion of that of the Austrasians. Shortly 
after his election, he appeared before the city of L i m o g e s . 2 9  
His purpose in journeying there was to extort the fidelity of 
the inhabitants by oaths of allegiance. In the process of 
executing this plan, he got more than he bargained for from 
the townsmen. After receiving the homage of these people, he 
went to the sanctuary of the patron of the city. Saint Martial. 
While admiring the precious objects therein, he attempted to 
confiscate an ornament for himself. At this point, an inhabit­
ant of the city, whose name was Proculus, seized his sword and
OQ Ex Miraculis S. Martialis, Episcopi Lemovicensis, 
M.G.H., SS., p .  281.
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dealt Lupus a blow to the head.30 Rather mysteriously, the 
source for this story does not carry it to its logical con­
clusion. Whether or not he died of the wound remains a matter 
of speculation. The importance of the incident is clear, for 
if he was assassinated, the individual usually cited as his 
successor, Eudes, most probably did not immediately follow 
him.
Scholars have reacted variously to this information. 
Although details survive in a sketchy outline, the notion has 
been advanced that Lupus did indeed perish as a result of his 
wound at L i m o g e s . 31 if so, when did this transpire? It appears, 
although on the basis of supposition, that it occurred in late 
673 or 674. By this reckoning. Lupus remained in power only
3®Ibid.; "Advenit et pontificem ex ipsa urbe [Lemovi- 
censi] et omnes concives ad se adunare iussit, ut fidem eorum 
extorqueret et eos ad suum regimen perstringeret. Cum vero in 
cubiculum, ubi sanctus Marcialis sepultura meruit tumulari, 
fuisset ingressus, cepit perspicere eius sepulcrum. Quod cer- 
nens, vidit ibi lumbare aureum cum preciosis gemmis ornatum et 
eum exinde cogitavit auferre. Sed cum ingressus ad limen 
ostii ipsius speluncae esset, sic iubente Domino et inter- 
cedente beato Marciale, quidam homunculus ex ipsa civitate 
nomen Proculus arripuit gladium et eum in cerebrum eius defix- 
it."
31perroud, Des Origines du Premier Duché d'Aquitaine, 
p. 136; "Mais il semble que Lupus ait péri à Limoges même." 
Thus, Perroud (p. 164) contends that intermediately the suc­
cession to the duchy fell to an individual (or individuals) 
of whom record is lost: "... nous ignorons mêtae le nom de ses
princes, car il nous semble qu'il dut y avoir entre Lupus et 
Eudes un ou plusieurs ducs de Toulouse dont les noms mâne ont 
péri."
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32a few years. While these views are not those commonly ad­
vanced, they are nonetheless noteworthy, for the customary 
date given for the demise of Lupus is circa 710.
It seems more logical to accept the 710 date, for if 
an intermediary duke filled the post prior to Eudes, no men­
tion of him exists. As for Lupus* power, he failed to have 
a "constitutional" basis upon which either to justify or to 
broaden it. While this same situation epitomized the succes­
sion of later dukes, it deepened the cleavage of separatism 
and largely explains later hostilities between the province 
and the northern Franks.
Beyond the decade of the 670*s, documentary informa­
tion concerning the history of Aquitaine fades from view. It 
is not until 718 that reliable information again surfaces in
32ibid., p. 138. Another authority (C. Fauriel, His­
toire de la Gaule Méridionale sous la Domination des Con­
quérants Germains [4 vols.; Paris, 1836],III, p. 32), who 
likewise sees an early death for Lupus but does not necessar­
ily connect it to the incident at Limoges, remarks: "On ig­
nore I'epoque precise de la mort de Lupus; on peut seulement 
présumer qu'elle est de peu postérieure à 681 ...." Fauriel 
also discusses the conquest of Limoges by Lupus but believes 
that it took place in the neighborhood (voisine) of 675.
33Jaurgain, La Vasconie, II, p. 1. On several counts, 
it appears illogical that Lupus died within five years of 
acquiring his duchy. While whatever is said amounts to con­
jecture, it seems logical that if Lupus committed (or attempted 
to commit) sacrilege at St. Martial's tomb and died in the 
effort, the author of Martial's life would surely have wanted 
posterity to Icnow that Lupus' just reward was death. Thus, he 
would have implicitly informed his readers of Lupus' deserving 
end and not let the issue hang as he does.
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contemporary records. Fortunately, the affairs of southern 
Gaul then emerge into a daylight that leaves little question 
about the direction of events. By that time, Duke Eudes had 
acquired control of Aquitaine, and he remained at the helm 
until his death in 735. As for the previous era, 674-718, 
those who attempt to construct a chronology of events hypoth­
esize throughout,in consideration of this void in the his­
tory of the province. Deductions, if attempted, have to be 
based upon the preceding events in Aquitanian history and 
those of the post-718 period. No cataclysmic break appears to 
have occurred throughout these years. The separatist tenden­
cies which Lupus promoted evidently continued unabated to the 
extent that upon the advent of Eudes' career, Aquitaine had
Perroud (Des Origines du Premier Duché d'Aquitaine, 
p. 165) summarizes this problem confronting students of seventh 
century Aquitaine: ”... nous allons nous trouver en présence
d'une effrayante lacune, car le premier duc d'Aquitaine que^ 
nomment les documents après Lupus est Eudes, et il n'apparait 
avec certitude qu'en 718, pour ne mourir qu'en 735. Voilà donc 
un espace de trente-sept ans (681-718), probablement même de 
quarante-quatre (674-718), absolument vide. C'est comme un 
trou dans l'histoire." Although this breach exists in Aqui­
tanian history, some have incorrectly imagined it to be of a 
more extensive nature than actually characterizes the situa­
tion. Hence, E. A. Freeman (Western Europe in the Eighth Cen­
tury and Onward: An Aftermath [London, 19041,pp. 16-17) re^
marks : "For eïÿity-six years (633-719), for fifty-nine years
from the time that we have now reached, we know absolutely 
nothing of one of the great divisions [Aquitaine] of Gaul. It 
then appears as a powerful and united state, under a prince of 
its own, practically, perhaps formally, independent. Of the 
progress of this change we can say nothing; but, whatever were 
its details, it must have been busily at work during all these 
years."
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arrived at an extremely independent position, which explains 
its willingness to confront the Franks under Charles Martel. 
In short, the ducal prerogatives founded by Lupus apparently 
grew apace throughout those years and in turn contributed 
greatly to the establishment of a powerful duchy to which 
Eudes fell heir.^^ The means by which these dukes obligated 
the aristocracy to serve them militarily remains lost in the 
sparse accounts pertaining to their accession and wielding of 
power. Presumably, ties of vassalage brought them together, 
but under what circumstances, it is impossible to say.
Just as the nature and date of Lupus* death remain 
questionable, likewise the obscurities of the early eighth 
century confuse scholarship concerning Eudes* origins.
35lbid., p. 166: "... de 1*autre, la puissance
militaire fondée par Lupus dut contribuer grandement au main­
tien du nouvel état."
36see the article on Eudes by Jean-François Blade 
("Eudes, Duc d*Aquitaine," Annales du Midi, IV [1892], 145- 
197), which represents the sole monographical contribution to 
scholarship on the topic. The traditional approach to the 
succession question in Aquitanian history has been to make 
Eudes a son of Lupus while the latter was preceded by Felix. 
Blade, however, observes (pp. 145-146): "Plusieurs annalistes
des seizième et dix-septième siècles font d*Eudes un fils de 
Lupus, duc d*Aquitaine après Felix. Mais cette portion de 
leur doctrine n*est appuyée d'aucun texte." The matter does 
not end here, however. Blade summarized (p. 157) the main 
points involved in the history of Eudes* career, assuming that 
the duke did indeed follow Lupus, although, without offering 
his own original theory for the obvious documentary reasons: 
"Mettons qu*Eudes n'eût que vingt ans à l'époque de son avène­
ment. C'était bien peu, dans ces époques troublées, pour ex­
ercer utilement l'autorité. A ce compte, le duc d'Aquitaine 
serait né vers 680. A vingt ans, il aurait donc lutté avec
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Spanish chroniclers, however, thought Eudes a Frank, and he
undoubtedly proceeded to usurp the remaining Merovingian author-
37ity in Aquitaine. Certainly, his name has the Germanic ring 
to it. Whatever his parentage and date of accession, Eudes 
came to loggerheads with Charles Martel shortly after Martel 
rose to mastery as the Australian Mayor of the Palace. Of 
this little doubt exists and, because of this antagonism, Aqui­
tanian history becomes something more than a matter of conjec­
ture.
As the illegitimate son of Pepin II, Charles ambitiously 
cleared the chaotic field of competitors to become mayor after 
his father's death in 714. To accomplish this, he had to win 
a series of battles that culminated in his victory over the 
Neustrians at Vincy (Vinchy) in late 717. Charles' success 
here well depicts the irregularity of the Carolingian advent 
to power. Neither the mayor nor the Aquitanian duke could
grand succès contre un homme tel que Pépin d'Heristal, et se 
serait emparé du Berry; et a cinquante-six ans, il aurait en­
core combattu contre les Francs de Charles Martel (732) et les 
Sarrasins d'Abdérame. Ainsi, nous aurions au moins, pour Eudes, 
quarante années de fonctions ducales. Quarante années de fonc­
tions ducales, cela est-il vraisemblable? Et sur ç[uoi repose 
cette supposition si téméraire? Sur le simple rapprochement de 
deux legendes: sur le récit des miracles de saint Austrégisile,
partiellement appuyé par la légende de saint Bonet.
Heureusement, je n'ai pas besoin de discuter celle'ci."
37 Rerum Aquitanicarum Libri Quinque, ed. Antoine 
Alteserra, VII (Tolosae, 1657), p. 127; "Nonne probabilius 
est Eudonem fuisse unum e Francis qui regibus nostris in soporem 
lapsis, rerum suarum gerendarum occasionem nactus?"
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claim titular security by way of time-honored, hereditary suc­
cession. Vincy worked to the discomfort of the Merovingian
38king, Chilperic II, and his Mayor of the Palace, Ragenfroy.
In turn, this situation set the stage for the conflict between 
the Franks and the Aquitanian duke, because the logical courts 
of appeal for the dejected Merovingian king were the independ­
ently oriented duchies on the fringe of the Frankish state.
The relative prosperity of Aquitaine, ministered by astute 
leadership, assured the Merovingian that he could expect redress, 
In 718 an appeal for help went out to Eudes from Chil­
peric II and his mayor, R a g e n f r o y . T h e  Merovingian king and 
his minister tempted the duke with gifts and promises of the 
kingdom, undoubtedly proposing to let him rule as Charles'
38 French scholars prefer to spell his name thusly, or 
as Raganfred, while in the Latin it appears as Ragamfredus.
In the context of Charles' accession to power in 714, Heinrich 
E. Bonnell (Die Anfange des karolingischen Hauses, p. 131) 
comments on the status of Aquitaine relative to the rest of 
the Frankish state: "Das eigentlich frankische Land, Auster,
Neuster und Burgund, stand jest kaum anders denn als ein 
Erbgut zu seiner Verfugund, und hatte er auch im Siidwesten, 
in Aquitanien, bisher noch dulden müssen, das ein eignes 
herzogsgeschlecht sich daselbst unabhangig von dem Gebieter 
des Frankenreiches geberdete, . . . ."
^^Liber Historiae Francorum, 53, Monumenta Germaniae 
Historica, Scriptores rerum Merdvlngicarum, ed. Bruno Krusch, 
TÏ (Hannover, 1888), p. 327: '‘Chilpericus itaque vel Regam-
fredus Eudonem ducem expetunt in auxilio." Also see: Chroni-
con Universale (Annalibus Maximinianis) a. 717, Monumenta Ger­
maniae Historica, Scriptores, ed. G. Waitz, XIII (Hannover, 
1881), p. 19.
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successor in the event of a victory.^® The offer surely tan­
talized Eudes by giving his ducal position the prospect of a 
lawful air of respectability through Merovingian associations. 
While the duke gave a favorcd)le reply to this request, Charles 
set up in the meantime another Merovingian to supplant the de­
feated Chilperic. This phantom king, Clotaire IV, reigned 
only shortly before d y i n g . E a r l y  in the following year the 
Aquitanians took the initiative and moved their army north 
under the leadership of Duke Eudes. After having crossed the 
Loire, Eudes advanced on Paris, ostensibly to rally the defeated 
army of Chilperic and Ragenfroy. With the Austrasian Franks 
nearby under Martel's command, the two forces ultimately joined 
battle to the northeast of Paris, not far from Soissons. The 
two sides hotly contested the issue, but the force of Charles' 
attack proved too much for the Aquitanians, who had to retire 
from the field, but not without slaughtering many Franks.
^^Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici, 
iv, 10, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 174: "Chilpericus itaque
et Ragamfredus legationem ad Eodonem dirigunt, eius auxilium 
postulantes rogant, regnum et munera tradunt."
^^Liber Historiae Francorum, 53, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., 
p. 327. Relative to this obscure Merovingian claimant to the 
throne, see T. Breysig (Jahrbiicher des frankischen Reiches:
Die Zeit Karl Martells, 714-741 T"*J^hr^ der deutschen
Geschichte", Leipzig, 1869], pp. 119-120): "Von Chlothar ist 
kein Diplom, das er selbst ausgestellt hatte, bekannt. Pardes­
sus theilt mehrere Schenkungsakten, von Privatleuten fur das 
Kloster Weissenburg im Gau von Speier ausgestellt, mit, in 
welchen nach den Jahren Chlothars gezahlt wird."
^^Annales Nazariani, a. 719, Monumenta Germaniae His- 
torica, Scriptores, ed. G. H. Pertz, I (Hannover, 1826), p. 25:
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Eudes fell back on the city of Paris after suffering his defeat, 
in preparation to withdraw his whole army south beyond the 
Loire.
In victory, Charles bided his time, concerned himself 
with a rebellious Saxony, and then sent an embassy to the 
Aquitanian duke the following year (720). The Frank's pro­
posal contained two demands prerequisite to his friendship. 
Conditional upon Charles' good will, the duke had to hand over 
King Chilperic and the royal treasury. Hardly in a position 
to reject this proposition, Eudes agreed, relinquishing most 
of the treasury but apparently not all of it.** The king did 
not long survive the consummation of the trade, but for the 
Aquitanian duke other matters began to generate a pressure 
that required his attention. The Saracens to the south moved
"occisio Francorum ad Suessionis civitate et mors Ratboti."
*^Chronicon Moissiacense, a. 717, Monumenta Germaniae 
Historica, Scriptores, ed. G. H. Pertz, I (Hannover, 1826), 
p. 291: "At ille constanter occurrit ei intrepidus. Sed
Eudo fugiens Parisius civitate regressus, Chilpericum regem 
cum thesauris regalibus sublatum, ultra Ligerim recessit."
44Liber Historiae Francorum, 53, M.G.H., SS. rer.
Merov., pp. 327-328: "Carlus eum persecutus, non repperit. 
Chlotharius quidem memoratus rex eo anno obiit, Carlusque anno 
insecuto legationem ad Eudonem dirigens amicitiasque cum eo 
faciens. Ille vero Chilperico rege cum multis muneribus red­
didit, sed non diu in regno resedit." Also see Chronicon 
Moissiacense, a. 717, M.G.H., SS., p. 291. Eudes fared 
exceptionally well in his contest with Charles, considering the 
fact that he took the offensive against him and then lost. 
Perhaps the best explanation for this is the preoccupation of 
Charles, as well as the skill of Eudes in effecting his retreat,
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into Aquitaine to challenge the duke on his home front.
In 711, the Saracens had crossed the Straits of Gi­
braltar and established a foothold in Spain. With startling 
rapidity, they expanded their holdings at the cost of the weak­
ened Visigoths, who were then experiencing the twilight of 
their history. By 714, the invaders had won virtually the 
whole Spanish peninsula^^ and thereupon broadened their range 
of vision to encompass southern Gaul. First, they attacked 
the old Visigothic state of Septimania, taking Narbonne in the 
process. As a Christian chronicle, written at Moissac, re­
ports, the Saracens slaughtered the men of Narbonne and led 
the women and children captive into Spain, all of this taking 
place nine years after passing over the S t r a i t s . N e x t ,  
they proceeded into Aquitaine by advancing upon the capital of 
Duke Eudes, the city of Toulouse. Besieging the city, they 
soon found themselves confronted by an army of Aquitanians
45i,ucien Musset, Les Invasions; Le Second Assaut 
Contre l'Europe Chrétienne (Paris, 1965), p. 148: "On sait
avec quelle fulgurante rapidité l'Etat visigotique, rongé de 
dissensions intestines, fut balayé par les conquérants après 
leur victoire du rio Guadalete (juillet 711). En août Tariq 
est à Cordoue, en novembre il atteint Tolède, la capitale.
Des 714 sans doute, toute la péninsule est occupée, sauf un 
infime noyau de résistance dans la zone la plus inaccessible 
des Asturies, tandis que les chefs des principaux clans 
gotiques vont faire leur soumission a Damas."
^^Chronicon Moissiacense, M.G.H., SS., p. 290: "Sema,
rex Sarracenorum, post nono anno quam in Spania ingressi sunt 
Sarraceni, Narbonam obsidet, obsessamque capit, virosque civi- 
tatis illius gladio perimi iussit; mulieres vero vel parvulos 
captivos in Spaniam ducunt."
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and Franks led by Eudes. The duke had been at Bordeaux when 
the enemy struck and, summoning a powerful force, he attacked 
the foe. On this occasion, Eudes enjoyed complete s u c c e s s .
He killed the governor of Spain, Al-Samh, who commanded the 
Saracenic host and decimated his army in the process. His 
victory was so overwhelming that the duke could not resist 
exulting about it to the papacy. Perhaps his recent embarrass­
ment at the hands of Martel had injured his vanity to the ex­
tent that it needed salving. Whatever the case, he promptly 
notified Pope Gregory II of his success and took the opportu­
nity to embroider the details. The biography of this particu­
lar pope relates the account of the victory that was relayed to 
Rome. By his own reckoning, Eudes had destroyed no less than 
375,000 of the infidels at the expense of 1,500 of the Franks.^®
^^Ibid.; "Et in ipso anno mense tertio ad obsidendam 
Tolosam pergunt. Quam dum obsiderent, exiit obviam eis Eudo, 
princeps Aquitaniae, cum exercitu Aguitanorum vel Francorum, 
et commisit cum eis proelium; et dum proeliare coepissent, 
terga versus est exercitus Sarracenorum, maximaque pars ibi 
cecidit gladio."
4®Vita Gregorius II, Liber Pontificalis, ed. L. Duchesne 
(3 vols.; Paris, 1886), I, 401: "Eodem tempore nec dicenda
Agarenorum gens a loco qui Septem dicitur transfretantes,
Spaniam ingressi, maximam occiserunt partem cum eorum rege; 
reliquos omnes subdiderunt cum suis bonis et ita eandem pro- 
vinciam annis possiderunt decern. Undecimo vero anno generalis 
facta Francorum motio contra Sarracenos circumdantes interem- 
erunt. Trecenta enim septuaginta quinque milia uno sunt die 
interfecti, ut Francorum missa pontificis epistola continebat; 
mille tantum quingentos ex Francis fuisse mortuos in eodem 
bello dixerunt, quod anno praemisso in benedictione a praedicto 
viro eis directis tribus spongiis quibus ad usum mense pontifi­
ais apponuntur, intra qua helium committebatur, Eodo, Aquitanie
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In spite of his qross exaqcjoration, the' clukc undoubtedly marked 
the apex of his fortunes in this battle. But the Islamic threat 
failed to subside, and the succeeding years proved that his 
success had been only temporary. Significantly, contemporary 
sources mention the Aquitanian army synonymously with the 
Franks. Hence, the provincial aristocracy and the migrated 
Franks had mutually participated in Aquitanian affairs to the 
extent that by this time they were referred to collectively as 
Franks.
Following their defeat at Toulouse, the Saracens fell 
back and regrouped their forces. A lieutenant of the dead 
Al-Samh, Anbessa-ben-Sohim, who had remained in Spain, assumed 
the leadership of Islamic forces. Determined to avenge the 
death of his former captain and to lead a holy war (jihad), 
Anbessa-ben-Sohim resumed the initiative in 725 against the 
Christians in Gaul. He took Carcassonne, located between 
Toulouse and Narbonne, and conquered almost all of Septimania. 
Generally speaking, however, he skirted the province of Aqui­
taine, perhaps remembering the misfortune of four years before. 
Elsewhere, he pressed on into Provence, crossing the Rhone 
with an Arab army for the first time. Certain annalists of 
the period even insisted that the city of Rodez fell victim to
princeps, populo suo per modicas partes tribuens ad sumendum, 
ex eis ne unus vulneratus est nec mortuus ex his qui partici- 
pati sunt."
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the onslaught; however, more confusion surrounds the campaign 
of 725 than any other phase of the Christxan-Islamic conflict 
of the decade.49
With the appearance of the Saracen in southern Gaul, 
the scope and meaning of Aquitaine as a Frankish buffer state 
changed. Clovis had crossed into the province in order to pro­
tect and secure his acquisitions between the Seine and the 
Loire, but no longer would the Loire serve as a defensible 
barrier to ward off the attacks of a southern enemy. Indeed, 
a stronger Aquitanian duke, in addition to the aggressions of 
a powerful Saracenic host, necessitated the reassessment of 
Frankish frontiers. Now the Franks had to attach an impor­
tance to the Pyrenees in order to continue the maintenance of 
their possessions immediately north of the Loire. Henceforth, 
the mountain remge figured predominantly into Frankish strategic 
thinking. The Austrasians thereafter showed a greater concern 
in the Aquitanian duchy as a whole, and their involvement there 
came en masse rather than incidentally.
One chronicle, that of Moissac— which is unusually
49giade (Annales du Midi, IV, 173) discusses the clouded 
atmosphere relative to the different accounts of the Islamic 
campaign of 725 by noting: "Mais ces assertions sommaires
auraient grand besoin d'etre confirmees." If indeed the Sara­
cens took the city of Rodez in 725, it seems quite illogical 
that mention of it does not appear in the Chronicle of Moissac 
in the entry for that year. If they had, this would have put 
them considerably less than a hundred miles from Moissac, a situ­
ation that would have undoubtedly alarmed the author of the 
chronicle.
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concerned about the Islamic invasions into Christian Gaul and 
generally quite trustworthy— took note of the fact that the 
Saracens advanced northward along the Rhone into Burgundia. 
Indeed, in the entry for the year 725, the chronicler observed 
that the city of Autun fell to the aggressors, at which time 
they took much booty and then returned to Spain.
After 725, a change of leadership once again came to 
the Spanish Moslem state. The Caliph appointed Abdurrahman, 
later the opponent of Charles Martel, to the governor-general- 
ship of Spain. Under his guidance, a renewed offensive against 
the Christians in southern Gaul was launched. In this instance, 
however, the attack came through provocation. The Saracen 
commander, Munuza, who had been entrusted with the defense of 
the frontier region of the Pyrenees (both Septimania and 
Catalonia), abandoned the Islamic cause by negotiating a trea­
ty between himself and Duke Eudes of Aquitaine. Being an am­
bitious man,^^ he aspired toward the establishment of an inde­
pendent Moorish state between Spain and Christian Aquitaine.
^^Chronicon Moissiacense, a. 725, M.G.H., SS., p. 291: 
"Anno 725. Sarraceni Augustudunum [Autun] civitatem des- 
truxerunt 4. feria, 11. Calendas Septembris, thesaurumque 
civitatis illius capientes, cum praeda magna Spania redeunt."
^^Although a Moslem, Munuza was not an Arab. He came 
from North Africa, which could therefore explain his indepen­
dence from the Caliph. Also, his name is variously spelled: 
Munuz, Munniz, Muzuu, or Abi-Ness^.
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He sealed his compact with Duke Eudes by marrying his daugh­
ter. Even though the arrang^ent concluded a strange alli­
ance between a Christian and a Moslem, the politics of the 
moment had cast both men into quite similar roles. It must 
have appeared that each needed the other to survive in the 
face of a common danger looming close at hand. Nevertheless, 
the alliance fared badly.
When Abdurrahman learned of the treachery of his sub­
ordinate, he mobilized his troops and moved against him. Uti­
lizing the element of surprise, he quickly put an end to the 
rebellion. Munuza attempted to escape with his wife but, over­
taken by Abdurrahman's force, he committed suicide by leaping 
from a p r e c i p i c e . H i s  wife was captured and eventually sent 
to the Caliph at Damascus for his seraglio.
C ̂ Isidori Pacensis Chronicon, 58, Patrologiae Latina, 
ed. J.-P. Migne, XCVI (Paris, 1862), p. 1270: "Et quia filiam
suam dux Francorum nomine Eudo causa foederis ei in conjugio 
copulandam ob persecutionem Arabum differendam jam olim tradi- 
derat ad suos libitus inclinandam, . . . ."
^^Ibid., pp. 1270-71: ". . . dum earn tarditat de manu
persequentium liberandam, suam morti debitam praeparat animam: 
sicque dum eum publica manus insequitur, sese in scissuris 
petrarum ab alto pinnaculo jam vulneratus cavillando praecipi- 
tat, atque ne vivus comprehenderetur animam exhalat: cujus
caput statim ubi eum jacentem repererunt, trucidant, et régi 
una cum filia Eudonis memorati ducis praesentant: quam ille
maria transvectans sublimi principi procurât honorifice des- 
tinandam."
S^This is a topic to which French authors in particular 
have directed attention. See the lengthy, and rather romantic, 
account of this by F. Guizot (The History of France; From the 
Earliest Times to the Year 1789, trans. Robert Black [8 vols.;
Ill
The defeat of Munuza heralded the coming conflict 
between Eudes and Abdurrahman. The Duke of Aquitaine, not 
sitting idle, had had to cope with his own difficulties while 
Abdurrahman beset his son-in-law. In fact, when his newly 
formed alliance to the south was put to the test, Eudes could 
not respond positively because of a Frankish invasion of 
Aquitaine. Not only had the Munuza-Eudes compact promoted an 
internecine struggle among the Saracens but, as well, it 
precipitated hostilities to the north. Charles Martel must 
have viewed the alliance with alarm and decided that his own 
well-being required intervention of a retributive sort. Thus, 
the mayor accused Eudes of having broken his pledge of friend­
ship of a dozen years before and crossed the Loire with an 
army. Once again, he put the Duke of Aquitaine to flight, laid 
waste his country, and returned home with much joy and plunder.
London, 1893], I, pp. 182-184). A more serious analysis of 
the political and military ramifications of this marriage 
appears in Devic and Vaissete (Histoire Generale de Languedoc,
I, pp. 793-795). About the misfortunes of Eudes* daughter,  ̂
the latter work (p. 794) concludes; "Tel fut le sort infortune 
de cette princesse d'Aquitaine, suite funeste d'un mariage où 
1'intérêt du duc, son père, avoit eu sans doute plus de part 
que son inclination."
^^Annales Mettenses Priores, a. 731, M.G.H., SS. rer. 
Germ., pp. 26-27: " . . .  Eodo dux Aquitaniorum a iure federis,
quod Carolo principi promiserat, recessit. Quo comperto Carolus 
princeps exercitum congregans Ligerem fluvium transiit. Eodone- 
que fugato bis eodem anno Aquitaniam populatus est. Multisque 
thesauris sublatis an proprias sedes principatus sui cum gaudio remeavit."
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In truth, however, neither the Franks nor the Saracens desired 
a strong middle kingdom between them that would hamper the real­
ization of their ambitions in Aquitaine. Although a certain 
degree of prejudice began to creep into contemporary chronicles 
and a n n a l s , t h e  combined efforts of Abdurrahman and Charles 
Martel served to weaken the provincial buffer state that had 
formerly isolated the two powers. Ironically, Charles did much 
to break down the duchy himself, but perhaps Eudes lacked the 
strength to match forces with Abdurrahman, regardless of his 
731 campaign against the Franks. At any rate, the famous 732 
engagement (in the fall of the year) at Tours between Martel 
and Abdurrahman was preceded by the campaign of earlier 732 be­
tween Eudes and the Saracenic chieftain in Aquitaine which pre­
pared the way for the later forays of the Muslim northward.
Driven on not only by the flush of success but also by 
the desire to punish Eudes for his alliance with the traitor
^^The authors of the Histoire Générale de Languedoc 
(Cl. Devic and J. Vaissete) contend that the then contemporary 
Austrasian authors cast a shadow on the Duke of Aquitaine and 
abuse him for the difficulties of the Franks in order to 
heighten the prestige of Martel and his line. To Devic and 
Vaissete (Vol. I, pp. 792-93, 797) both the Annales Mettenses 
and the continuations of the Chronicle of Fredegar exemplify 
this slant in their accounts of these events. While both of 
these works do come down hard on Eudes, the latter had con­
trived his Islamic alliance with Charles Martel obviously in 
mind. The interpretation of Devic and Vaissete, so implicitly 
stated, demonstrates the fact that the separatist element in 
southern Gaul never did die out. Indeed, it penetrates the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
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Munuza, Abdurrahman moved his army into Aquitaine in early 732. 
Proceeding to Bordeaux, he laid siege to the city while Duke 
Eudes collected a force to meet him. The two armies clashed 
some distance above the Garonne in the vicinity of the Dor­
dogne. The Saracen wrought a terrible vengeance upon the duke 
and his army. Such a thorough-going decimation occurred 
that Eudes had no hope of continuing the struggle against the 
invader alone. In fact, a chronicler of the day observed that 
so many of Eudes' followers were slain that only God knew the 
number. The victory allowed the Saracens then to turn their 
fury upon the countryside. They burned churches and slew the 
inhabitants of the area as they proceeded northward.^9
In quick succession, during a two-year period of time.
5?Chronicon Moissiacense, a. 732, M.G.H., SS., p. 291: 
"Abderaman, rex Spaniae, cum exercitu magno Saracenorum per 
Pampelonam et montes Pireneos transiens, Burdigalem civitatem 
obsidet. Tunc Eudo, princeps Aquitaniae, collecto exercitu 
obviam eis exiit in praelium super Garonna fluvium, sed inito 
praelio, Sarraceni victores existant, Eudo vero fugiens maxi- 
mam partem exercitus sui perdidit, et ita demum Sarraceni Aqui- 
taniam depraedare coeperunt."
^^Isidori Pacensis Chronicon, 59, P.L., p. 1271:
". . . ut praelio ab Eudone ultra fluvios nomine Garonnam vel 
Dornomiam praeparato, et in fugam dilapso, solus Deus numerum 
morientium vel pereuntium recognoscat."
^^Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici 
Continuationes, 108, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 175 and Annales 
Mettenses Priores, a. 732, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 27. The 
latter remarks: "Ibique ecclesiis Dei igne concrematis pluri-
busque Christianis interfectis, usque ad Pictaven urbem pro- 
fecti sunt. Basilicaque sancti Hilarii igne concremata, ad 
beatissimi Martini ecclesiam subvertendam summo conamine pro- 
fisisci contendunt."
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both the Franks and the Saracens had ravaged Aquitaine. Even 
though Eudes maintained his prerogatives, he nonetheless had 
to ask for the assistance of Charles to blunt the invasion and 
to recapture his duchy. Hence, he dutifully approached the 
Austrasian to beseech his help. The mayor, fully aware of the 
delicate situation into which Eudes had fallen, agreed to come 
to his aid, but he probably did so at a price.^0 The possibil­
ity remains open that Eudes might have ceded land to the Frank­
ish mayor for his deliverance. Austrasian sources decline, how­
ever, to indicate at what cost, if any, the duke received help, 
thereby maintaining Martel's reputation for generosity. What­
ever the case, Charles gathered an army, crossed the Loire, and 
gave succor to the Aquitanian duke in his own territory. Al­
though the resulting battle between Abdurrahman and Charles 
popularly goes by the name of Tours, in reality it surely took
®®Neither the chronicles nor the annals of the day so 
state that Eudes had specifically to agree to anything in re­
turn for Charles' help. They provide, however, only the brief­
est descriptions of these events. Furthermore, considering 
Charles' experience in ruling, the remark of Chamard (Revue des 
Questions Historiques, XX^, 36-37) seems a propos : "Ce dernier
[Eudes] eut probablement à subir des conditions qui limitaient 
la pleine indépendance de 1'Aquitaine vis-à-vis du pouvoir 
royal." The only statement relevant to the topic appears in 
the Annales Mettenses Priores, a. 732, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., 
p. 271 "Eudo dux cernens se superatum et ad defendendam, 
patriam suam contra Carolum se viribus esse destitutum, gentem 
perfidam Sarracenorum ad auxiliandum sibi invitât." Thus, 
Charles did, at least, require Eudes to take an oath as a sub­
ject from him.
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place closer to the city of P o i t i e r s . O n e  chronicle, in 
describing the Frankish leader, eulogized his talents as a 
military leader, and well it might, in consideration of his 
enviable record of success in such affairs.^2 Success he once 
again had in 732 against Abdurrahman. In both Gallic Gascony 
and Aquitaine, the Saracenic cause almost withered away as 
a result of Martel's victory. For Eudes, the battle brought 
tranquillity to the remaining years of his life (he died in 
735), a rare commodity in his troubled career.63
63-See the recent comments of Robert Latouche, Caesar 
to Charlemagne, p. 316. The importance of the Battle of Tours 
is undeniable in the history of western Europe. Separating 
fact from diverse statements of generalities concerning it is 
another matter, however. Due to the sparse comments passed 
down in contemporary records, scholarship lacks particular in­
formation for which it yearns. Several articles exist, though, 
which do provide trustworthy statements on the basis of the 
available information. In this category refer to: M. G. J. L.
Lecointre, "La Bataille de Poitiers entre Charles Martel et 
les Sarrasins: L'histoire et la Legende; Origine de celle-ci,"
Bulletin de la Société des Antiquaires de l'Ouest, 3rd series, 
VÏI f 632-42; Ë. Mercier, "La Bataille de Poitiers et
les Vraies Causes de Recul de l'Invasion Arabe," Revue His­
torique , VII (1878), 1-8; and L. Levillain and C. Samaran,
"Sur le Lieu et la,Date de la Bataille de Poitiers en 732," 
Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes, XCIX (1938), 243-67.
62isidori Pacensis Chronicon, 59, P.L., p. 1271:
" . . .  viro ab ineunte aetate belligero, et rei militaris ex­
perte . . . . "
63If validity exists in the charge that Austrasian 
authors deprecate Eudes to the edification of Charles (see fn. 
56), it stems from a statement in the Continuations of the 
Chronicle of Fredegar (108, p. 175): "Eudo namque dux cernens
se superatum atque derisum, gentem perfidam Saracinorum ad 
auxilium contra Carlum principem et gentem Francorum excitavit. 
Also, see the interesting remarks of Breysig (Jahrbucher des
116
How should Eudes be evaluated in light of his accom­
plishments? In the face of much adversity, Eudes managed to 
perpetuate the integrity of his duchy and, by merely remain­
ing in power, deserves considerable praise. Specifically, 
however, he maintained the prerogatives of his duchy in sever­
al important areas: (1) he prevented the Saracens from reduc­
ing Aquitaine to the status of an appanage to Moorish Spain;
(2) he held fast to the geographical limits of the duchy;
(3) he sustained heredity rights of succession within his fam­
ily so that his son succeeded him; and (4) he preserved the 
independent stance of Aquitaine to the extent that no mention 
of the duchy appears in Martel's division and appropriation
of his realm among his heirs. This was no mean feat, particu­
larly in consideration of his formidable opponents, but it 
does not substantiate the claims of some who exaggerate his 
a b i l i t i e s . 64 Clearly, the Austrasian Franks twice overpowered
frankischen Reiches: Die Zeit Karl Martells, 714-741, pp.
68-69) concerning the Arab retreat from Poitiers: *^ie Araber
aber eilten fliichtend nach Spanien zuruck. Sie nahmen nicht 
den nachsten Weg, namlich den, welchen sie gekommen waren, 
sondem wendeten sich nach dem ostlichen Aquitenien, durch 
welches von Poitiers nach Bourges und Limoges alte Romerstra- 
sen fuhrten."
G^Devic and Vaissete, Histoire Générale de Languedoc, 
I, p. 800: "Quoique nous ne prétendrons pas justifier toutes
ses actions, on voit cependant, par ce que ces historiens ont 
laissé échapper & par quelques autres monumens du temps, que 
ce duc fut un très-grand prince, & il nous parortroit sans 
doute encore plus grand, s'il avoit eu le mime bonheur que 
Charles Martel & autant de panégyristes."
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him, being first unable to deliver a decisive blow because 
of a Saxon insurrection and then because of the perplexing 
events of the year 732.
In another sense, perhaps Martel's victory at Tours 
helped to create an equilibrium between an emerging Francia 
and the Aquitanian duchy. Decentralizing feudal tendencies 
could well have weakened both political entities, leaving each 
unable to defeat the other. In addition, the duchy perplexed 
the Austrasians because a large element of migrated Franks 
had made common cause with the local Aquitanian nobles. They 
did so because of the fact that they possessed a common out­
look. Furthermore, these transplanted Franks usurped the rem­
nant of Merovingian authority in the province and thus created 
a private power of their own, of which the mayors disapproved, 
but which had at least a semblance of legality. On two fur­
ther counts Aquitanian separatism alarmed the mayors: (1) the
duchy served as a haven for refugees who escaped to the south, 
and (2) Austrasian enemies had good prospects of obtaining 
military support from the duke, as in the case of Chilperic II 
and Ragenfroy. Indeed, from 718 to 735, a pattern emerged in 
Frankish-Aquitanian relations. This consisted of a rebellious 
duke requiring constant Frankish surveillance in a largely un­
successful attempt to ensure his obedience. Moreover, the 
quest for the duke's obedience presented the Carolingiens with 
a problem having neither a solution nor a termination.
CHAPTER IV 
AQUITAINE AND THE AUSTRASIAN REVIVAL
After the death of Eudes in 735, Charles Martel, as 
Mayor of the Palace, capitalized on both his experience and 
his strengthened position in Francia to depreciate the sepa­
ratist position of Aquitaine. A military renascence in north­
ern Gaul made it quite impractical for a successful challenge 
to be launched from a provincial area such as Aquitaine.^
The aggressive, independent stance of the duchy did not slack­
en, however, because of strong opposition from the mayor. 
Indeed, Martel and his successors impressed the Aquitanians 
as interlopers who had usurped and negated the rule of the 
legitimate Merovingian house. With actually no better quali­
fications themselves, the ducal family found itself hampered
^Lynn White, Jr. (Medieval Technology and Social 
Change [Oxford, 1962], pp. 3-13, 137-138) well expresses the 
prevailing historiographical view concerning Martel's contri­
bution to the Merovingian military. This interpretation, 
which contends that Martel revolutionized medieval warfare, 
is not without its critics. Indeed, Bernard S. Bachrach 
(Merovingian Military Organization, 481-751, pp. 99-126) ar- 
gues that the mayor's methods were quite in keeping with the 
standards of the time and do not represent a direct departure 
from previous practice. By measure of his success, however, 
it must be granted that Martel utilized his leadership abili­
ties, his armies, and his resources more effectively than any 
of his immediate predecessors. In this sense his life's work 
has to be judged whether or not "revolutionary" at least a 




in maintaining the defensive capabilities of the province with­
out Eudes.
While it is true that various regional problems per­
petually diverted the mayor's attention before 735, rendering 
him unable to concentrate his resources or efforts on any one 
area for a sustained period of time, his stature and reputation 
thereafter allowed him to bring his forces singularly to bear 
on trouble spots. Hence, in the remaining years of Martel's 
mayoralty, the competitiveness issuing from Aquitaine lost much 
momentum, owing to the increased pressure that the mayor ap­
plied in his attempt to break a wayward Frankish aristocracy 
leading a separatist duchy. No longer, as under the leadership 
of Eudes, did the two states contest on a relatively equal 
plane, characterized by Aquitanian alliances with the Saracens 
or by their invasions deep into Frankish territory. Instead, 
struggles were confined to an area mainly south of the Loire 
River, and the Mayor of the Palace assumed the initiative.
Other matters in the south engaged Frankish attentions. 
As early as the sixth century the Austrasians under Childebert 
had met the Lombards of northern Italy in battle. The Pyrenees 
took on new significance with the appearance of the Muslim; 
so did the Alps concern the mayors, because of an active papacy 
increasingly communicating with Martel in particular. The 
Lombards stood as the natural obstacle to papal peninsular 
aspirations, and the ensuing difficulties between the temporal
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and ecclesiastical powers in Italy aggravated the Franks. In 
fact, as the relationship between Austrasia and Rome warmed, 
the thought of Lombard conquests to the south horrified Frank­
ish sensibilities.2 Therefore, the Franks desired to maintain 
access routes to the Mediterranean and to Rome, in order to 
keep better abreast of domestic Italian affairs. This, Aqui­
taine could strategically provide.
As the Islamic threat subsided in the last years of 
Martel's life, other developments served to heighten the pres­
tige of the mayor in Frankish politics. In 737, the Merovin­
gian king, Theodoric IV, died leaving no one to succeed him.
An obscure f i g u r e ,  ̂ this faineant king was completely dominated 
by Martel to the extent that upon his passing the mayor felt 
no compunction in the matter of leaving the throne vacant. 
Martel's exalted position now prompted him to operate outside
^Robert Holtzmann, Die Italienpolitik der Merowinger 
und des Konigs Peppin (Darmstadt, 1962), p. 36: "Das kann nur
damais, im Jahre 740, geschehen sein, und man darf es nach all 
dem als durchaus wahrscheinlich bezeichnen, dass Karl Martell 
zu einer diplomatischen Vermittlung gegriffen hat, um die 
Langobarden zu einem Verzicht auf ihre romischen Eroberungsplane 
zu bringen. Eine Einnahme Roms durch die Langobarden lag ja 
in keiner Weise im Intéressé der Franken, und ware sie gelungen, 
so hatte schon Karl Martel zu einer bewaffneten Intervention 
schreiten mussen."
3Only a few brief references commemorate the accession 
of Theodoric IV or Theudericus (Liber Historiae Francorum, 53, 
M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 328 and Chronicarum quae Dicuntur 
Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, 107, M.G.H., SS. rer. 
Merov., p. 174) . This attests to the dwindling concern of the 
annalists over the Merovingian house.
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the façade of Merovingian scrutiny, a situation that lingered 
for the next six years. At that time, his sons, who did not 
initially enjoy such unquestioned authority, had once again 
to elevate another phantom monarch (Childeric III) in order to 
govern in a legitimate context as mayors. Just as the father 
had done, one of Martel's sons later cast aside the king when 
the foundations of his power permitted him to do so.*
The year 735 stands as an ominous date in Aquitanian 
history, but it was a prosperous time for the extension of 
Frankish power. In that year, the one in which Duke Eudes 
died, Martel concluded that the time had come for him to compel 
the Aquitanians to bend to his will.^ Death had severed the 
personal bonds which brought the duke and his subjects together. 
Because these bonds, as elsewhere in western Europe, were not 
strictly h e r i t a b l e , & much confusion always accompanied the
Pepin III and his brother Carloman succeeded Martel 
as Mayors of the Palace in 741. By 747, however, the latter 
had decided to enter a monastery at Rome, hence leaving Pepin 
in a position of sole authority. Therefore, only one son re­
mained in power in 751 when the Merovingian king, Childeric 
III, suffered deposition. The Merovingians completely pass 
from view thereafter.
^Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Con­
tinuationes , 109, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., pp. 175-176: "In
illis quippe diebus Eodo dux mortuus est. Haec audiens prae- 
fatus princeps Carlus, inito consilio procerum suorum, denuo 
Ligere fluvio transiit, usque Geronnam vel urbem Burdigalensem 
vel Castro Blavia veniens, occupavit illamque regionem coepit 
hac subiugavit cum urbibus ac suburbans castrorum. Victor cum 
pace remeavit, opitulante Christo rege regum et domino dominorum. 
Amen."
®0n the heritable aspects of a relationship between a
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transition from one leader to another. In the last years of 
Eudes* life, from 732 to 735, Franco-Aquitanian relations had 
slumbered amidst a recognition of the status quo. The pre­
occupations of Charles in Burgundia as well as Frisia^ (733 
and 734 respectively) left him little time to campaign in the 
south after his involvement there in 732. By 735, though, 
after having resolved his difficulties elsewhere, Martel decid­
ed to capitalize upon both the chaos that immediately followed 
the death of old Duke Eudes and the inexperience of his sons 
who now assumed their father's mantle. To this end, he con­
vened his council and received its approval of an aggressive 
policy.® Crossing the southernmost boundary of Francia, the
vassal and a lord, see Ganshof, Feudalism, p. 101. Also, Marc 
Bloch (Feudal Society, trans. L. A. Manyon [2 vols.; Chicago, 
1966], I, p. 148) outlines the pervasiveness of the personal 
relationship in the society of the Merovingian period.
7Annales Mettenses Priores, a. 733 and 734, M.G.H.,
SS. rer. Germ., p. 27.
Û It is problematical whether or not the sons of Eudes 
had yet denied the suzerainty of Martel or even slighted him. 
Theodore Breysig (Jahrbucher des frankischen Reiches: Die
Zeit Karl Martells, 714-741, pp. 75-76) suggests, however, 
that this was the case: '^obald die Rachricht vom Tode des
aquitanischen Herzogs zu dem Majordomus gelangte, hielt er mit 
seinen Vornehmen einen Rath, in welchem die Eroberung Aquitani- 
ens beschossen wurde; wahrscheinlich haben die Sohne Eudos 
dieselbe fast unabhangige Stellung, wie sie ihr Vater gehabt, 
beansprucht oder haben gar die Anerkennung dieser geringen 
Abhangigkeit, die Tribute und Geschenke, die auseren Zeichen 
dieses Verbaltnisses, verweigert." Breysig assumes, therefore, 
that Martel's invasion represented a justifiable Frankish retali­
ation rather than an imperialistic offensive. Two facts seem 
to discount this interpretation: (1) Martel's earlier concern
over requiring an oath of allegiance from Eudes in 732 (see
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Loire, he pressed on to the Garonne before any opposition 
materialized. Although the details surrounding the new duke's 
(Hunald, Eudes' son and successor) resistance are extremely 
vague,9 it is known that Martel campaigned in the area around 
Bordeaux and then moved upon the Aquitanian stronghold of 
Blavia (present-day Blayen on the Gironde). After the mayor 
had subjugated the outlying territory, Hunald apparently decid­
ed that it would be futile to continue in his opposition against 
such a seasoned adversary. Thus, he concluded hostilities by 
capitulating to Martel's demands.
Hunald's advent attracts attention once again to the 
ethnographic significance of ducal nomenclature in Aquitaine.
The two eldest sons of Eudes incontestably bore Germanic names. 
Both Hunald and H a t t o n , the second born son, betray this
chapter three, fn. 60) and (2) the subsequent treatment of 
Aquitaine under his successors. In short, the mayor had a 
long-standing interest in Aquitaine that made him appreciate 
its natural wealth and utility as an appanage to his kingdom.
^Ex Adonis Archiepiscopi Viennensis Chronico, Monuments 
Germanise Historica, Scriptores, ed. G. Pertz, IX (Hannover^ 
1829), p. 319: **Mort̂ uô Eudone, contra filios illius arms
corripuit, eosque vehementer afflixit. Sed variante concer­
tât ione, cum ex utrisque partibus plurimi caederentur, tandem 
foedus non diu mansurum ineunt." Also, see below fn. 10.
l^Historians know far less about this Hatton than they 
would like, particularly at this time, 735-736, in his career. 
Contemporary sources maintain a conspicuous silence relative 
to his activities, to the exception of several brief, general 
remarks collectively about Eudes' sons in the Annales Tiliani 
(a. 736), Annales Petaviani (a. 736), and the Annales S. Amandi 
(a. 736). While nearly identical entries (the three appear in
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origin, while a third and fourth possessed the respective 
names of Remistan and Lupus (in the French, Loup). While it 
is possible that the name Remistan is a diminutive of the 
Gallic "Remi,"^^ Lupus, as with Duke Eudes' predecessor's 
name, suggests the Germanic connection. The ducal family 
took German names, with rare exception, and thus further dis­
played the Frankish background of an aristocratic faction 
that migrated into Aquitaine and came to rule over the provin­
cial population.
What sort of agreement did Martel extend to Aquitaine 
in defeat? He left the area in the possession of Hunald but 
required him to take an oath of fidelity in which he remained 
the vassal of the Austrasian mayor and, as well, his two sons 
Pepin and C a r l o m a n . A t  the outset of his tenure as Duke 
of Aquitaine, Hunald, became committed by oath to the Austrasians 
for two generations. In addition, the Franks demanded a brother.
the same volume: Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores,
ed. G. H. Pertz, I (Hannover, 1826], pp. 8-9), the former 
states: "Karolus dimicabat contra filios Eodonum."
^Several Roman authors, including Gaius Julius Caesar, 
refer to a people of northern Gaul as Rerni (Rhêmi). This 
explains the derivation of the name Rheims, the city.
^^Annales Mettenses Priores, a. 735, M.G.H., SS. rer. 
G e m . , p. 28 : *Eodo dux mortuus est. Quod cum audiret invictus
princeps Carolus, adunato exercitu Ligerem fluvium transiit, 
usque ad Garonnam et urbem Burdigalensem et castra Blavia 
occupavit. Illamque regionem cepit et subiugavit cum urbibus 
ac suburbanis eorum. Ducatumque ilium solita pietate Hunaldo 
filio Eodonis dedit, qui sibi et filiis suis Pippino et 
Carolomanno fidem promisit."
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Hatton, of Duke Hunald be surrendered for imprisonment, pre­
sumably as a hostage for the good conduct of the province and 
its leader.
According to the Annales Mettenses Priores, Duke 
Hunald thereafter owed Martel his fidelity (i.e., fides), a 
common term used to express ties of responsibility in feudal 
society. The lack of specific information pertaining to early 
feudal commitments in Aquitaine obscures the bases upon which 
this arrangement and others were made. Did land and military 
service stand as the common denominators which bound Martel 
and Hunald together in a working relationship? Perhaps it 
appears too early in the development of feudal society to re­
ceive the attention that it does in succeeding years. Later, 
during the stress of the campaign of the 760's between Pepin 
and Duke Waifar, a fleeting reference to land appears in the 
same context to describe the basis of another tie.^^ The ab­
sence of similar, earlier analyses tends to suggest, however, 
that the mayors and dukes had only loose commitments to one 
another and likewise did the Aquitanian aristocracy only loose­
ly owe allegiance to the duke. In particular, the latter
13Annales Nazariani, a. 736, M.G.H., SS., p. 27; "Hatto 
ligatus est."
l^See below, chapter five, fn. 51. Herein the continu- 
ator of Fredegar notes that King Pepin bestowed on the renegade 
Remistan the fortress and half the district of Bourges as far 
as the Cher so that the latter could resist his former duke and 
nephew, Waifar.
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arrangement weakened the power structure in the province, but 
in so doing it appealed to the Aquitanian nobles, who undoubted­
ly preferred a local (weak) ducal government to a Carolingian 
regime which was trying and, to a degree, succeeding in har­
nessing the Frankish aristocracy. On the other hand, when the 
surging Austrasians threatened Aquitaine, this more than any 
other factor united the reluctant nobles under the duke's ban­
ner. Hence, it appears that an external threat more often 
than not mobilized the Aquitanian aristocracy, which in turn 
explains (1) why the duke so often provoked the Carolingiens 
in later years and (2) why the duke so rarely took the initia­
tive militarily against them (particularly in the cases of 
Dukes Hunald and Waifar).
The consequences of Hunald's pledge of 735 go beyond 
his career in Aquitanian a f f a i r s . T h e  resurgent Franks used 
this oath as the basis of their claims on Aquitaine for the 
next forty years. As a result, they felt free to wield a 
heavy hand in reprimanding Aquitaine for her insubordination. 
Furthermore, the Franks accordingly regarded any disobedience
l^M. Rabanis (Les Merovingians d'Aquitaine: Essai
Historique et Critique sur la Charte d^Alaon [Paris, 18561, 
p. 71) correctly summarizes the mood of the Frankish policy 
toward Aquitaine: "Depuis la bataille de Tours jusqu'à
1'époque adoptée pour la mort de Eudes (735) ce fut bien autre 
chose: l'ambition des Ostrasiens se démasqua, et leurs pre­
tentions sur les provinces d 'outre-Loire furent publiquement 
avouées."
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from the south as an act of felony rather than of r e b e l l i o n .
As for Aquitaine, the mayor undoubtedly overawed the new duke 
at the beginning of his career. In light of his brief tenure 
and headlong ways, it appears that Hunald could never escape 
the thought that Martel had dishonored him and his line through 
the events of 735. Beyond all else, the victory of Charles 
in Aquitaine put into sharp relief his elevated station. The 
fact that the records of the settlement omitted all mention of 
the Merovingian king underscored the degree of ascendency that 
Charles Martel had achieved. Indeed, he enjoyed a unique posi­
tion of authority by 736, not only in Francia and Aquitaine 
but in all of western Europe.
For a record of the post-735 relations between the 
two areas, dependence upon predominately Austrasian authors 
is necessary. Consequently, no literary sympathy goes out to 
Aquitaine and its duke throughout these years, and the image
^^Chamard, Revue des Questions Historiques, XXXV, 37: 
"Ce serment, prêté non seulement au vainqueur, mais à ses fils 
Pépin et Carloman, fut la source de toutes les prétentions 
carolingiennes sur l'Aquitaine et de tous les malheurs dont 
ce malheureux pays fut la victime pendant plus de quaranze ans. 
Toute tentative d'indépendance de la part des fils et du petit- 
fils d'Eudes fut désormais, aux yeux des Carolingiens, un acte 
de félonie plus encore que de rebellion." Chamard not only  ̂
views the matter in this perspective but Jean-François Blade 
("Fin du Premier Duche d'Aquitaine," ^nales de la Faculté 
des lettres de Bordeaux, XIV [1892], 151-152) fully agrees 
with this interpretation. Also, see the discussion of Bladé 
relative to the part that Hatton played in these proceedings 
(pp. 152-153).
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17projected oT the province's cause is one of disdain.
Aquitaine attempted to assert its independence as best it 
could, while Francia strove to maintain its supremacy, which 
dated back to the days of Clovis. By the time that Martel's 
heirs, Pepin and Carloman, became involved in the controversy 
in 741, both sides had a legacy of accumulated partisan inter­
ests which they accordingly attempted to advance. In particular, 
Pepin and Carloman could not allow their paternal heritage to
diminish, while the perplexed Hunald had witnessed the délimita-
1 8tion of his duchy's prerogatives by a waxing power.
Shortly before his death Charles Martel must have sus­
pected that his pacification of Aquitaine was only illusory.
In order to keep himself better informed on the developments in
l?Reference here is made to the Continuations of 
Fredegar's Chronicle and that of the Annales Mettenses Priores. 
For a concise statement of the attitude inherent in the latter 
relative to this discussion see Richard E. Sullivan (Review 
of Aufstieg und Herrschaft der Karlinger in der Darstellung 
der sogenannten Annales Mettenses priores: E m  Beitrag zur
Geschichte der politischen Ideen im Reiche Karls des Grossen, 
by Irene HaselbachT American Historical Review, LXXVI [1971], 
pp. 1144-1145) who remarks : * The work [i.e.. Annales Mettenses]
seeks to legitimize the rise of the Carolingiens on the basis 
of a mixture of concepts derived from ancient Germanic, Frankish 
and Christian sources: The Geblutshei1iqkeit of the Caro­
lingian family, the divine favor extended to individual rulers 
whose conduct was pleasing to God, the Carolingiens as the 
elect of the Frankish gens and especially its nobles, and the 
establishment of Frankish overlordship of other peoples."
^®This perspective, although in part tinged with moral 
analysis, is essentially that of E, A. Freeman (Western Europe 
in the Eighth Century and Onward, pp. 73-74) who shows con- 
siderably more interest in the history of Aquitaine through­
out these years (735-744) than any account in English.
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that quarter, he sent (circa 740) an envoy, Lantfred, the 
Abbot of St. Denis, to the court of Duke H u n a l d . 19 Perhaps 
Martel had even come around to the point of considering a 
renewal of hostilities against the duke. From the surviving 
accounts, nothing substantial is known concerning the role 
that the mayor envisaged for Lantfred. Duke Hunald, however, 
viewed the abbot as little more than a spy and shortly after 
his arrival imprisoned him, a direct insult to the Austrasi­
ans which would affect relations for the next three and a half 
y e a r s . 20 Regardless of this turn of events, other forces
19e Translationibus et Miraculis Sancti Germani, ed.
G. Waitz, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores, XV, pars 
I (Hannover, 1887), p. 5: Etenim cum ducentis circiter vel
eo amplius annis in porticu ecclesiae beati Vincentii Martyris 
sanctum eius corpus iacuisset humatum, anno vicesimo tertio 
quo Carolus, Pippini senioris filius, regni Francorum tenebat 
monarchicim, venerabilis vir Lantfredus praefati Sancti Vincentii 
monasterii pater, divini Spiritus incitamento succensus, quali- 
ter tanto patrono deberet augeri veneratio, tacita coepit mente 
tractare, atque ut eius felicia membra ob frequentiam populi 
infra ipsius aulam ecclesiae transferri potuissent, devote 
non distitit corde rimari. Sed quoniam piis semper conatibus 
inpedimenta mundi se obiciunt, praedictus abbas a supra scripto 
principe legationis causa in Aquitaniam mittitur. Interea 
Carolus moritur. Isdem vero abbas ab Aquitaniae patricio quasi 
explorator tribus semis annis invitus tenetur. Tandem substi­
tute in regnum Pippino iuniore reddita pace, Lantfredus absolvi- 
tur. Qui reversas, annis fere duodecim in restaurationem 
monasterii, quod eo absente dissipatum fuerat, occupatur."
^®French and German historians of the nineteenth cen­
tury deal with Lantfred's mission from divergent points of view. 
Two French accounts of this episode (Devic and Vaissete, His­
toire Gdnërale de Languedoc, I, pp. 809-810 and Blade, Annales 
de la Faculté des lettres de Bordeaux, XIV, 155) state that 
the cibbot went to Aquitaine merely to inform on the duke, which 
in truth probably summarizes rather well his preconceived duties. 
On the other hand, a German author, T. Breysig (Jahrbucher des
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were then at work to alter the framework of Frankish state­
craft.
As early as 739, Martel's health began to fail, and 
even as he sent Lantfred into Aquitaine, his thoughts turned 
to a division of his realm among his heirs. He called for an 
assembly of nobles to ratify the partitioning of Francia to 
his three sons by two women. To the eldest of the three, 
Carloman, went Austrasia, Alamannia, and Thuringia; to the 
second son, Pepin, went Neustria, Burgundia, and Provincia; 
and to an illegitimate, third son, Grifo, born of the Bavarian 
princess Swanahilda, went parts of both Neustria and Aus­
trasia. 21
Generally speaking, that part of Francia north of the 
Rhine including its dependencies belonged to Carloman, while 
the southeastern sector of Francia fell to Pepin. Most pecul­
iarly, however, no mention of Aquitaine was made in the settle-
frankischen Reiches; Die Zeit Karl Martells, 714-741, p. 100) 
dwells on the fact that new developments arose in Aquitaine 
due to Lantfred*s capture and incarceration, making it impos­
sible for the Austrasians to deal with the Romans. Thus, the 
latter ignores the provocation that prompted Hunald to act on 
this occasion against his northern overlords,
21chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Con­
tinuationes , 110, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 179 and Annales 
Mettenses Priores, a. 741, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 30. The 
former observes: "Igitur memoratus princeps, consilio obti-
matum suorum expetito, filiis suis régna dividit. Idcirco 
primogenito suo Carlomanno nomine Auster, Suavia, que nunc 
Alamannia dicetur, atque Toringia sublimavit; alterius vero 
secundo filio iuniore Pippino nomine Burgundiam, Neuster et 
Provintiam praemisit."
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ment, nor, for that matter, of Bavaria. Considering Martel's 
recent efforts in Aquitaine, this seems strange. The omission 
recognized, however, the modus vivendi between the two areas 
that the mayor had not yet been able to alter completely to 
his f a v o r . 2 2  in consideration of domestic affairs (an era of 
transition from one leader to the other) in Francia, nothing 
indicates for certain that the mayor had the power to subjugate 
the duchy even if he had had such in mind. Events proved that 
for the new, youthful mayors, solidifying their power at home 
contained enough burdens itself, besides embarking on any 
imperialistic scheme designed to dominate completely Aquitaine 
rather than chastising the province. It was a far more com­
fortable and practical policy to allow a line of parvenu dukes 
to retain what control they had over the area than to attempt to 
assert there the prerogatives of parvenu mayors. For geo­
graphical holdings, Aquitaine consisted at the time of a vast 
expanse of territory of which the Loire, the ocean, the Garonne,
22serthelot (Histoire Générale, I, 282) puts the matter 
nicely by saying: "S'il n'est pas fait mention de la Bavière
et de l'Aquitaine, c'est qu'elles ont encore leurs ducs.
Charles mourut cette mêüie année a Kiersy." With a similar 
viewpoint, T. Breysig (Jahrbucher des frankischen Reiches;
Die Zeit Karl Martells, 714-741, p. 101) notes: "Aquitanien
und Bayern werden in der Vertheilung nicht aufgezahlt; offen- 
bar waren also dieser beiden Lander nur Rebenreiche des frank­
ischen Reiches unter eigenen Herzogen, die nur die Oberhoheit 
des merovingischen Herrschers oder seines Vertreters anerkann- 
ten. "
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and Septimania served as the perimeter
The Aquitanians must have received the news of Charles 
Martel's death in 741 quite happily, as though nature had 
finally delivered them from an oppressor. It also must have 
occurred to them that whoever was to follow him could not 
possibly exact their obedience as he had done. Subsequent 
events certainly belie this sentiment, at least on the part of 
their duke. It was then, on the occasion of Martel's death, 
that Hunald imprisoned Abbot Lantfred. Not satisfied, he next 
proceeded to lead his people in open rebellion against the 
F r a n k s , t h e  first of the border states to so react to the
23oevic and Vaissete, Histoire Générale de Languedoc,
I, p. 810; "L'Aquitaine étoit renfermée entre la Loire,
1'Ocean & la Garonne, & s'étendoit jusques aux frontières 
de la Septimanie ou Gothie." No inclusive history devoted 
solely to Aquitaine has been published covering these years 
but rather a series of discussions debating isolated segments 
of its political and social development. Quite typical in 
this respect is the work of French scholars dealing with the 
extent of its territorial limits and the degree of suzerainty 
of the Aquitanian duke. Jean-François Bladé (Annales de la 
Faculté des lettres de Bordeaux, XIV, 154) maintains: "Le
duc Hunald possédait, en effet, l^A<roitaine, avec droit de 
suprématie sur la Vasconie cispyréneenne." On the other hand, 
Jean de Jaurgain (La Vasconie, I, p. 55) contends: "M. Bladé 
^et, à plusieurs reprises, 1'opinion que les ducs d ’Aquitaine 
avaient les ducs de Vasconie sous leur autorité; mais cela 
est absolument inadmissible, car, pas plus sous les Mérovin­
giens que sous les Carlovingiens, on ne vit jamais un duc 
relever d'un autre duc. Waifre était si bien seul duc d'Aqui­
taine et de Vasconie, comme son père et son aïeul, ...."
^^Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici 
Continuationes, 111, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 180: "In­
terea rebellantibus Wascones in regione Aquitania cum Chunoaldo 
duce, filio Eudone quondam, . . . ."
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news of the mayor's death.
Upon their assumption of power, Carloman and Pepin had 
another matter of greater significance with which to deal. 
Historians today do not know what sparked the incident, but 
the two older sons of Martel moved against their younger half- 
brother , Grifo, and his mother. In short order, Grifo was 
captured and imprisoned, and his mother was sent to the con­
vent of Chelles.^^ The incident had served as a grave contre­
temps for the mayors. Not only had Grifo a considerable fol­
lowing among the nobility, but his illegitimacy was reminiscent 
of Martel's. The rebellion could well have catapulted Grifo 
to ascendancy just as logically as the post-714 strife launched 
the successful career of Charles Martel. As in the earlier 
instance, the same forces, astute leadership and predominant 
military force, joined against Grifo to dash his hopes. Sig­
nificantly, however, the Frankish aristocracy did not support 
en bloc the claims of Pepin and Carloman, hence giving validity 
to the fact that schismatic forces fractured Austrasian unity 
and therefore seriously weakened the mayors' domestic power.
Quick on the heels of the success against Grifo, Aqui­
taine once again felt the might of the Austrasians. It is
^^Annales Mettenses Priores, a. 741, M.G.H., SS. rer. 
Germ., pp. 32-33: "Carolomannus vero et Pippinus eos sub-
seguentes castrum obsident. Cernens autem Gripo, quod minime 
potuisset evadere, in fiduciam fratrum suorum venit. Quern 
Carolomannus accipiens in Nova-Castella custodiendum trans- 
misit. Sonihildi vero Calam monasterium dederunt."
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true that Carloman and Pepin had little choice other than to 
make an object lesson of the duchy in order to prevent upris­
ings elsewhere. The brothers combined their forces and crossed 
over the Loire into Aquitaine near the city of Orleans, Devas­
tating the countryside, they marched to Bourges and burned the 
outskirts without completely humbling the city.^^ This display 
convinced Duke Hunald that his forces, perhaps even his ability, 
lacked the strength to contend with the youthful mayors, and 
he turned in flight.Undeterred, the Franks then attacked 
the stronghold of Loches, razing it and taking the inhabitants 
captive. Before leaving Aquitaine to extinguish another
Z^The fullest account of this invasion appears in the 
Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, 
111, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 180.
0*7 / /'‘'Devic and Vaissete (Histoire Generale de Languedoc,
I, p. 812) clearly leave the impression that Duke Hunald took 
an unsuccessful stand against the Franks: "Le duc d'Aquitaine,
pour arrêter leurs progrès, se mit en campagne & marcha a leur 
rencontre; mais ces princes l'ayant attaque le mirent bientôt 
en fuite. Ils le poursuivirent si vivement que, pour se mettre 
a l'abri de leurs armes, il fut oblige de passer la Garonne & 
de se réfugier en Gascogne." The only source that corroborates 
both this and the latter observation appears in the Annalium 
Fuldensium Pars Prima, a, 742, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, 
Scriptores, ed. G. Pertz, I (Hannover, 1826), p. 345: "Karloman-
nus et Pippinus Hunaltum, Aquitaniae ducem, imperio suo resisten- 
tem, bello superatum ad Wascones fugere compellunt: simul et
Alamannos duce Thiotbaldo rebellare temptantes mira celeritate 
comprimant." Open to doubt is whether or not the Franks pursued 
Hunald into Gascony as the Annales Petaviani (a. 742, M.G.H.,
SS., p. 11) indicates: "Carolomannus perrexit in Wasconiam."
It seems logical that this particular annalist wrote in a 
figurative sense rather than the literal, associating Aquitaine 
and Gascony as one in the same. Pepin and Carloman probably 
did not campaign that far south in 742.
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rebellion in Alamannia, they stopped at Vieux-Poitiers to divide 
the kingdom of the Franks between themselves. Evidently, this 
emendation of their father's division became necessary because 
of the defeat meted out to Grifo and his m o t h e r . 28
What had Carloman and Pepin accomplished by their march 
through Aquitaine? Their demonstration of power certainly 
did not alter the contempt of Duke Hunald toward the Franks 
nor lessen his vindictive instincts. Indeed, the status of 
the mayor in Francia as essentially primus inter pares and 
semi-feudal particularism encouraged the aristocracy continu­
ally to challenge the right of succession of each heir. Thus, 
a tendency developed in the provincial areas to see a change 
of rulers as the signal for a general revolt, particularly so 
before the establishment of personal bonds linking the outlying 
aristocracy to the new mayor. In this context, Aquitaine still 
maintained her semi-independent stance under her chastened 
though unrepentant leader, who yet had the freedom to strike 
back against the mayors when the occasion permitted. To ascribe 
a haughty independence to Hunald and his duchy in late 742, as
28çhronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Con­
tinuationes, 111, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 180: " . . .  Car-
lomannus atque Pippinus germani principes, congregate exercito, 
Liger alveum Aurilianis urbem transeunt, Romanos proterunt, 
usque Beturgas urbem accedunt, suburbana ipsius igne conburent, 
Chunoaldo duce persequentes fugant, cuncta vastantes, Lucca cas­
trum dirigunt atque funditus subvertunt, custodes illius castri 
capiunt; etenim victores existant. Praedam sibi dividentes, 
habitatores eiusdem loci secum captivos duxerunt."
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29some have done, seems to be carrying the case too far.
Hunald had been humbled once under Martel and the successes 
of the father were in time ably perpetuated by the sons.
Indeed, after momentarily setting their own house in order 
(i.e., the matter of Grifo and Swanahilda), the next task 
of utmost importance for the mayors to perform consisted of 
a thoroughgoing demonstration of their leadership capabilities. 
Besides the difficulties in Aquitaine and Alamannia, problems 
arose elsewhere that allowed the exercise of their talents.
The events of 741 and 742 all seemed to culminate 
in the ignition of a widespread rebellion against the two 
young mayors in 743. The death of their father, domestic 
problems within the Caroling family, and a series of regional 
revolts all combined to breed a more serious crisis to the 
Austrasians than had confronted the house since Martel's 
accession to power. With the earlier disturbances as an 
impulse, the Saxons, Alamanni, and the Slavs all joined 
together under the direction of the Bavarians to contest
a . Freeman (Western Europe in the Eighth Century, 
p. 62) developes this argument in his writing. It appears 
far more logical to attribute a self-reliant position to 
Aquitaine twenty-one years previous when Eudes met with his 
great success against the Muslims at the Battle of Toulouse. 
Even then, Martel was laboring to wear the province down 
in a struggle of attrition so that her independent attitude 
would become more malleable. In fact, one auther (T. Hodgkin, 
Italy and Her Invaders, VII, p. 59) judges this in the end to 
be one of the great accomplishments of Martel's mayoralty.
137
Frankish leadership.^® Under these circumstances, Duke Hunald 
elected to collaborate with the Bavarians against Carloman 
and Pepin in a rather curious way. Chronologically, however, 
other concerns preceded this involvement.
Before mobilizing their army to encounter the allies, 
the Frankish leaders restored the enfeebled Merovingian 
line by crowning Childeric This act indicated the straits
^®The concern of E. A. Freeman over Aquitanian affairs 
throughout this period is well-taken but on occasion misleading.
For an excellent case in point see his fn. 1 (Western Europe 
in the Eighth Century), p. 56. Here, Professor Freeman 
observes (1) that Slavic participation in the Bavarian War 
cannot be relied on because of the confused remarks of annal­
ists, citing Annalium Lobiensium Fragmentum, a. 742, Monumenta 
Germaniae Historica, Scriptores, ed. G. Pertz, II (Hannover,
1892), p. 194; *^Karlomannus et Pippinus Odilonem . . .  et 
Tietbaldum . . . Saxones quoque et Slaves commisse prelio super 
fluvium Lech superant." However, instead see Annales Lobien- 
ses, a. 742, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores, ed. G. 
Waitz, XIII (Hannover, 1881), p. 227, where the ellipses are 
omitted and the full text of the Annales Lobienses appears: 
"Karlomannus et Pippinus Odilonem 'dücëni Baiuvariorum et Tiet­
baldum ducem Alemannorum, qui in adiutorium eius venerat,
Saxones quoque et Sclavos commisse praelio super fluvium Lech 
superant." Herein (volume XIII), the vital phrase is ". . . 
qui in adiutorium eius venerat . . . ." Also, Freeman notes (2) 
that they (Slavs) "appear only in the Annales Lobienses." On 
both counts. Freeman is in error. The Annales Mettenses Priores 
(a. 743, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 33) refers to the Slavs and 
clarifies the part they played in the proceedings: "Baioarii
quoque ex alia parte contra eos exercitum adunaverunt conduct- 
osque in adiutorium Saxones et Alamannos et Sclavos secum 
habuerunt." G, Waitz discusses (volume XIII, p. 224) the discovery 
of the fuller codex of the Annales Lobienses and its subsequent 
reappearance in the Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Also, Pro­
fessor Freeman's book appeared in 1904; he died in 1892. Since 
volume XIII of the Scriptores series was published in 1881, he 
would have had access to it in the preparation of Western Europe 
in the Eighth Century.
^ 1H. Hahn (Jahrbucher des frankishchen Reichs, 741-752
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to which the mayors had come. They ensured by this move the 
time-honored legitimacy of their position and then proceeded 
to meet their foes.
More than any previous campaign of Carloman and Pepin, 
the Bavarian War of 743 presented a situation of manifold impli­
cations for the belligerents. Frankish domestic difficulties 
affected the participants and served to intensify hostilities. 
Hiltrudis, the sister of the two Austrasian leaders, fled 
Francia against the wishes of her brothers and obtained both 
refuge and, eventually, matrimony from Duke Odilo of Bavaria.
The fact that Martel's concubine, Swanahilda, had originally 
come from Bavaria suggests the source of the connection between 
Hiltrudis and Duke Odilo. Much conjecture necessarily surrounds 
this marriage alliance, for the same reason that obscurities 
often hound Aquitanian a f f a i r s . A  full discussion of the
["JahrbUcher der deutschen Geschichte"; Berlin, 1863], pp. 41, 
164) discusses the lineage and obscurity of this last Mero­
vingian king.
32Not only does confusion exist relative to the marriage 
but also with the status of Swanahilda. The index of the 
Annales Mettenses Priores (p. 117) lists her as a concubine of 
Martel instead of his wife, while that of the Chronicle of 
Fredegar refers to her as the wife of Martel. Secondly, the 
confusion is often compounded in regard to Hiltrudis and her 
relationship to Swanahilda. On the latter, the present author 
is inclined to agree with the remarks of Blade (Annales de la 
Faculté des lettres de Bordeaux, XIV, 155) who concludes: 
"Sonnichilde, veuve de ce Maire du Palais, s'était déclarée 
pour Odilon, et lui avait, malgré l'opposition de Pépin et de 
Carloman, donné pour femme sa fille Hiltrude." Few contem­
porary sources enlarge upon the background of Hiltrudis,
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rebellions against the Austrasians would not always edify the
exploits of the "glorious brothers," as one annalist calls
them.^^ Moreover, in a similar vein, this same apologist,
explaining this particular uprising, noted that Odilo rebelled
in reaction to the generosity of the Franks and because of the
overconfidence fostered by his own p r o s p e r i t y . ^4
The united front presented against the Franks failed.
Carloman and Pepin advanced into the field, met the enemy in
battle, and, collectively defeating them, brought Duke Odilo
35of Bavaria into submission. Although the details of this
preferring to ignore her and the part she played in the period 
immediately preceding the war. The Annales Mettenses Priores 
(a. 743, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 33), interestingly enough, 
comments on her as the "filiam Caroli" without reference as to 
who her mother was. Hiltrudis is assigned similar origins by 
Engelbert Muhlbacher (Deutsche Geschichte unter den Karolingern 
[Stuttgart, 1959], p. 47) without expressly identifying her 
as Swanahilda's daughter: " . . .  gegen ihren Willen hatte er
ihre auf Anstiften Swanahilds entflohene Schwester Hiltrud 
geehelicht." Whatever the case, her sympathies lay with the 
Bavarian cause throughout.
^^Annales Mettenses Priores, a. 743, M.G.H., SS. rer. 
Germ., p. 33: "Qua de causa compulsi sunt gloriosi germani
exercitum contra ipsum ducere."
34lbid.: "Ogdilo dux Bawariorum, qui Hiltrudem filiam
Caroli ad se fugientem in coniugium sibi copulaverat contra 
voluntatem Pippini et Carolomanni, ipsum etiam ducatum suum, 
quod largiente olim Carolo principe habuerat, a dominatione 
Francorum se subtrahere nitebatur."
^^Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici 
Continuationes, 112, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 180: "Inde
reversi, anno secundo regni eorum cognatus eorum Odilo dux 
Bagoariorum contra ipsos rebellionem excitât. Conpulsi sunt 
generalem cum Francis in Bagoaria admoveri exercito; venien- 
tesque super fluvium qui dicitur Lech, sederunt super ripam
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specific engagement are for the most part superfluous to a 
discussion of Franco-Aquitanian relations, the fact that Duke 
Hunald joined an offensive north of the Loire in cooperation 
with the rebellion of Odilo is of importance.
While the Bavarians and their allies were being hard 
pressed elsewhere, the Aquitanians under Hunald bridged the 
Loire and marched up to the city of Chartres, One annalist 
reported that this was done at the suggestion of Duke Odilo, 
with messengers relaying information from one side to the 
other.36 Obviously the rebels intended to create a diversion 
to which the Franks would respond and therefore fragment their 
Bavarian attack. Unfortunately, no mention appears of the 
effect or repercussion of Hunald's raid on Chartres. That 
which is known merely indicates that the Aquitanians delivered 
their blow with a strong band of men and destroyed the town 
by fire, and special attention was often given to the ruin
fluminis uterque exercitus, hinc inde se mutuo videntes, usque 
ad quindecim diebus. Qui tantundem provocati inrisionibus 
gentes illius, indignatione commoti, periculo se dederunt per 
loca deserta et palustria, ubi mons transiunde nullatenus 
adherat. Nocteque inruentes, divisis exercitibus, eos inpro- 
vivos occupaverunt; commissoque proelio, praedictus dux Odilo, 
ceso exercitu suo, vix cum paucis turpiter ultra Igne fluvium 
fugiendo evasit. His triumphis peractis, non sine dispendio 
multorum, tamen feliciter victores ad propria remeaverunt."
36Annales Mettenses Priores, a. 743, M.G.H., SS. rer. 
Germ., p. 35i "Haec autem fecit per suggestionem Otilonis 
ducis, qui per internuntios fedus inierunt, ut unusquisque 
eorum irruentibus Francis ferre alteri alter subsidium debuis- 
sent.”
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of the Church of the Holy Mother Mary.^^
The lack of additional information whets the curiosity 
of scholars. While Hunald had a powerful force under his com­
mand, which even Austrasian accounts acknowledge, why greater 
advantage did not accrue to the rebels remains a mystery. One 
wonders whether or not Hunald *s timidity overtook him in his 
hour of success. Did he remember the might of the mayors, or 
did he simply have a limited objective that, upon completion, 
required him to return home? It would appear that the cause 
of the rebellion would have been served better if this initial 
success had been further pursued. Additional investigation, 
however, sheds no light in the direction of the factors moti­
vating Duke Hunald.
With success in Bavaria, the mayors did not forget the 
insult of Duke Hunald. In the campaign of the following year, 
they once again turned their attentions to the south. Dividing
3?The Chronicle of Fredegar does not discuss the attack 
of Duke Hunald on the city of Chartres. The Annales Mettenses 
Priores (a. 743, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 35) treats the 
affair at far greater length than any other account: "Haec
autem dum apud Bawarios agerentur, Hunaldus dux Aquitaniae 
Ligerim transiens, cum manu valida ad Carnotis urbem perveniens, 
ipsa civitate diruta, igne eam cremavit cum ecclesia episcopali, 
quae in honorem sanctae Dei genitricis Mariae consecrata fuerat." 
A complete dependence upon this Annal for information on the raid 
is unnecessary. Other contemporary works recount the details, 
although with less emphasis. For example, the Chronicon 
Vedastinum, a. 743, Monumenta Germanise Historica, Scriptores, 
ed. G. Waitz, XIII (Hannover, 1881), p. 702: "Haec dum ageren­
tur Hunaldus, cuius iam mentionem fecimus, Ligerim transivit, 
Carnatis urbem igne concremavit."
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their forces,^8 Carloman and Pepin first pacified the discontent 
in their respective kingdoms before uniting to tend to Aqui­
taine. Then, crossing over the Loire with a sizeable cunay, 
they pitched camp in Aquitanian territory. The extent of their 
preparations so overawed Duke Hunald that he declined the oppor­
tunity of meeting the mayors in the field. Instead, he decided 
to attempt the maintenance of his position and kingdom by sub­
mitting to the Franks. He succeeded in this but only at con­
siderable cost to himself.
At what price did he achieve his objective? He released 
his captive of several years standing. Abbot L a n t f r e d , ^ ^  and 
negotiated a treaty with the mayors. Hereby Hunald took an 
oath of fidelity and promised thereafter to obey explicitly 
every wish of the Austrasian leaders. He also handed over hos­
tages and assured his masters that all of his resources remained 
at their d i s p o s a l . * 8  Probably only by such extreme measures
88çhronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Con­
tinuationes , 113, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., pp. 180-181.
See above fn. 19.
^®Two different accounts elaborate on what took place 
as a result of this invasion. The shorter, Chronicarum quae 
Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes (114, M.GJHTT 
SS. rer. Merov., p. 181), says: '*ïnde reversi praecelsi germani,
sequente anno provocati coturno Wasconorum, iterum usque ad 
Ligerem fluvium pariter adunati venerunt. Quod videntes Vas- 
cones, praeoccupaverunt, pacem patentes et voluntatem Pippini 
in omnibus exequentes, muneratum eum, a finibus suis ut rideret, 
precibus obtinuerunt.” The other, Annales Mettenses Priores 
(a. 744, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., pp. 35-36), with its praise
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could he keep his status intact and, as well, the integrity 
of Aquitaine. By his timely intercession, he spared further 
misery from descending upon his duchy, as so often had occurred 
when the Franks invaded. He averted a battle of proportions 
that would surely have been disastrous, and he warded off the 
customary harrying of the countryside that monotonously accom­
panied almost all Frankish invasions. By his appeasement, 
however, Hunald demonstrated as well the basic weakness of his 
proto-feudal position. He dared not even to engage the Aus­
trasians; he abased himself in a primitive manner and sought 
the mercy of the invader. Far from being the master of a 
united, nationalist state, the duke merely endured the crisis 
while experiencing the leniency of the Carolingiens. In the 
latter respect, the mayors conversely grasped the significance 
of the tenuous nature of semi-feudal allegiances, thereby tol­
erating Hunald's provocations. Indeed, the mayors lived with 
a similar brand of particularism in Francia and no doubt as­
pired toward a reconciliation with a local Frankish duke in 
Aquitaine.
An era of improved Franco-Aquitanian relations under
for the Austrasian mayors, notes: "Pippinus et Carolomannus
non immemores iniuriarum Hunaldi perfidi ducis et vastationis, 
quam illis [in] Baioariam dimicantibus perpetravit, colleco 
exercitu Ligerem transeunt et castra in finibus Aquitaniae 
ponunt. Videns autem Hunaldus, quod eis resistere non valeret, 
omnem voluntatem eorum se facere sacramentis et obsidibus datis 
spopondit ipsumque cum omnibus quae habebat invictorum prin- 
cipum servitio se mancipavit."
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Hunald never came. Shortly after the crisis of 744, the duke 
relinquished his post following a famous domestic incident 
involving his own family. Late that same year, Hunald lured 
his brother, Hatton, with whom he did not get along, away 
from the city of Poitiers to his court. Once he gained control
over him, he broke his pledge of safe conduct and inflicted a
barbarous injury on him: Hunald blinded Hatton and then put
him in captivity.*1 Within the feudal hierarchy, if this act 
would not have incapacitated the duke for leadership, it defi­
nitely would have restrained the respect and obedience shown 
him by the nobility. Whether through guilt or political expe­
diency, Hunald found himself unable to continue as Duke of 
Aquitaine. He had sustained himself in the past throughout 
many tribulations inflicted by the Franks but could not endure 
this family crisis. Accordingly, he retired to the monastery 
on the lie de Re and took the vows of a monk. Before his depar­
ture, he made certain that the duke of his choice would succeed
him. He promoted his son Waifar to the position.
^^Annales Mettenses Priores, a. 744, M.G.H., SS. rer. 
Germ., p. 36: "Eodem quoque anno Hunaldus dux germanum suum
nomine Atonem per falsa sacramenta decipiens de Pictavis ad 
se venire iussit, cui statim oculos eruit, et sub custodia re- 
trusit. Nec multo post idem Hunaldus corona capitis deposits 
et monachi voto promisse in monasterium quod Radis insula 
situm est intravit filiumque suum Waifarium in principatu 
reliquit."
^^Also, the Chronicon Vedastinum (a. 744, M.G.H., SS., 
p. 702) similarly reports this event, although in a more abbre­
viated fashion than the Annales Mettenses Priores: "Hunaldus
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Although this final incident in Hunald's ducal career 
is concisely reported, the motivation for his assault on Hatton 
receives no attention. It may be that Hatton sympathized, or 
even collaborated with, the Austrasians and thus earned Hunald's 
enmity.*3
Perhaps more improbable, though interesting to entertain, 
is the thought that Hunald wished to secure the succession of 
his line in the position of ascendancy in Aquitaine. Being 
desirous of an early retirement, he disposed of the possibility 
of an ambitious brother with Frankish support supplanting his 
son by rendering Hatton unfit for leadership. The reality of 
a threat from this side of the house did indeed exist. Evidence 
to substantiate this resides in the fact that Hatton's heirs, 
through his eldest son Lupus, became the independent dukes of 
Gascony.44 Whether the one situation or the other prevailed
Attonem suum decipiens germanum, ad se venire fecit, eumque 
caecum reddens, sub custodia retrusit; et nec multo post tempo- 
ris, coma dempta sibi capitis, monachile habitum sumpsit, 
Waifarium, ex se genitum, principatum relinquens regni.”
43Bladé, Annales de la Faculté des lettres de Bordeaux, 
XIV, 157: "Peut-être son frère Hatton s ‘était*il laissé
séduire par les promesses de Pépin et de Carloman."
44üevic and Vaissete, Histoire Générale de Languedoc,
I, p. 815: "Les historiens ne font plus mention d*Hatton,
ce qui nous donne lieu de conjecturer qu'il mourut bientôt 
après, & peut-être du supplice que son frère lui avoit fait 
souffrir. Il laissa plusieurs enfans de Vandrade, son épouse, 
dont nous avons parle ailleurs. L'aine, qui s'appeloit Loup, 
fut dans la suite duc de Gascogne, & donna en mariage a Waifre 
sa fille unique, nommée Adèle, ce qui prouve la réunion de 
ces deux branches de la maison d'Aquitaine."
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to instigate Hunald's cruelty, no one knows.
By the time that Hunald abdicated in 744, the Franks 
had managed to entrench solidly what Charles Martel had 
left behind for his heirs. The mayors had consistently and 
spectacularly demonstrated their ability to crush military 
insurrections, thereby subverting the more ambitious separatist 
aspirations of Duke Hunald. The collapse of the Bavarian 
venture above all else must have disillusioned the Aquitanian 
duke. Moreover, in the following year (744) , his submission 
without battle to the mayors suggests that Hunald had come around 
to the point of absolutely fearing the Franks. Perhaps even 
earlier at Chartres, he had quaked at the thought of further 
depredations against them. On the other hand, the young mayors 
had learned their father's lessons well. The keystone to their 
policy consisted of the expert isolation and systematic removal 
of discontent. As for the separatist future of the duchy, it 
looked bleak in the context of Duke Hunald's heritage. Here, 
however, prospects for the future ultimately hinged on the 
foresight and the character of Hunald's son, the new Duke Waifar. 
In this, the Aquitanians were not to be disappointed, either 
in the inventiveness or the resourcefulness of the new duke in 
the face of superior Frankish odds.
CHAPTER V
THE ASSERTION OF CAROLINGIAN 
SUZERAINTY OVER AQUITAINE
Pepin III had already proved his leadership abilities 
at the time of the political demise of Duke Hunald in 744. 
Although he was quite young, the prospects of his skillful 
management of the Frankish state, and in turn the extension 
of his suzerainty over Aquitaine, were apparent. In this re­
spect, Aquitaine had not much to which it could look forward. 
Nevertheless, as with Hunald, an aggressiveness, and even 
haughtiness, emerged in the character of his successor, Duke 
Waifar. It eventually embroiled Francia and the duchy in hos­
tilities. Initially, however, Waifar trod warily in his admin­
istrative role while dealing with the Franks. Assiduously 
avoiding any affront, he gradually shifted his stance to the 
extent that by the following decade the duke openly scorned 
his Frankish overlord, who now claimed a kingly title.^ With 
the passage of yet another decade, the relationship further
^Consult the account of Ludwig Oelsner (Jahrbiicher 
des frankischen Reiches unter Konig Pippin ["Jahrbiicher der 
deutschen Geschichte"; Leipzig, 1871], pp. 1-41) concerning 
the events leading up to the coronation (751) of Pepin III 
as King of the Franks and the corresponding ramifications of this act.
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degenerated into a seemingly endless war of attrition that 
sapped the attentions and energy of both participants.
Upon succeeding to power in 744, however, Waifar 
first escaped the rigors of war that had formerly drained 
the resources of his father. The condition of Austrasian 
leadership then confronting Waifar diverged considerably from 
that which opposed Duke Hunald. Earlier, a mature mayor, 
capitalizing on better ties with the Austrasian aristocracy, 
thwarted Hunald, whereas the engrossed Pepin spent the 740's 
trying to re-establish these nonheritable links at home prior 
to enforcing his will abroad. It is difficult, if not impos­
sible, to say what altered the Aquitanian duke's domestic cir­
cumstance to embolden him vis-à-vis the Carolingiens. Since 
the authors of eighth century chronicles and annals were pre­
occupied with discussions of Austrasian warfare, Waifar's 
early pacific policy evades their attentions. Tranquillity 
and relative obscurity enveloped the duchy throughout this era. 
Perhaps more significantly, a series of internal changes^ to 
the north, which consolidated Pepin's position in the 750's, 
probably explains more adequately Waifar's growing belligerence 
During this peaceful era, it is possible that Waifar even 
minted coins for circulation in his duchy.3 Whether or not
^See below (pp. 153-154) for the à propos discussion 
of these changes.
3A measure of his prosperity, it is nonetheless doubt­
ful whether or not Waifar issued coins. An article by Adrien
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he did this, the Franks permitted a laissez aller for the pro­
vincials south of the Loire without intervening in their affairs 
until provoked to do so in the early 760's. Much of this can 
be explained by the cautious nature of Waifar at his accession 
and also by the weakness of Pepin, who struggled to assemble 
the elements of power in a semi-feudal state.
The relationship between Waifar and Pepin began to take 
on new dimensions within four years (748) after the duke came 
to power. The records of the chronology for the events that 
explain the war occasionally leave something to be desired. It 
is known that Pepin exercised considerable patience in dealing 
with Waifar. On two occasions, the Austrasian resorted to the 
use of embassies, not troops, in reprimanding the duke. The 
year 748 marked the beginning of difficulties that prompted the 
first of these embassies to venture into the duchy. A trouble­
some family matter then arose in Francia that completely dis­
regarded the limits of territorial boundaries. The incident
de Longpërier ("Deniers de Waifre, Duc d'Aquitaine," Revue Numis­
matique, Series B, III [1858], 331) advances the notion that he 
did: "Or, sur l'une de ces deux monnaies d'argent on lit très-
distinctement WFARIVS autour d'un grand A." Another scholar, 
Jean-Franqois Blade (Annales de la Faculté des lettres de Bor­
deaux , XIV, 172-173), after discussing the matter with qualified 
numismatists, casts doubt as to the possibility of this. Carry­
ing the case further, yet another, François Chamard (Revue des 
Questions Historiques, XXXV, 40), accepts the findings of Long- 
p^rier by remarking: "Ce fut vraisemblablement pendant ce temps
que des monnaies furent frappées è son nom, avec la marque de 
l'atelier de Melle en Poitou." Quite possibly, this riddle can 
never be solved.
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concerned Grifo, Pepin's brother, who had greatly perturbed 
the mayor at the time of Charles Martel's death in 741. Per­
haps the pangs of Pepin's conscience, after he deprived Grifo 
of his inheritance, prompted him to deal more leniently with 
the princely brother's disobedience than would customarily 
have been the case.^ Indeed, Pepin even went beyond the ex­
pediency of toleration and extended to his dispossessed brother 
a grant of land in 7 4 8 The arrangement worked badly because 
the indignant Grifo completely rejected the measured hospital­
ity of Pepin, obviously not wishing to subordinate himself to 
this benefactor, nor to incur any favors from him. No sooner 
had Grifo been installed at Le Mans, the capital of his do­
main— which included twelve comitatus— than he rebelled, leav­
ing all behind, and made for Aquitaine. There, after having 
scorned those above him, says the Annales of Metz, he obtained 
asylum through the kindness of Duke Waifar, described by this 
same annalist as the "perfidious leader of the Aquitanians."®
^Louis Halphen, Charlemagne et 1'Empire Carolingien 
(Paris, 1949), p. 51: "Le cas de Grifon n'etaxt sans doute
pas unique ...."
^This arrangement might be termed a "governorship."
For the details, see Annales Regni Francorum, a. 748, M.G.H., 
SS. rer. Germ.) p. 8: "Grifonem vero partibus Niustriae misit
et dedit ei XII comitatos. Inde iterum Grifo fugiens Wasconiam 
petiit et ad Waifarium ducem Aquitaniorum pervenit."
®Annales Mettenses Priores, a. 749, M.G.H., SS. rer. 
Germ., p. 42: "Nam Griponi Cinomannicam urbem cum XII comita-
tlbus dedit. Quibus ille solito more despectis, Wasconieim
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It is difficult to know precisely when Grifo defected to the 
side of the Aquitanian duke. One annalist placed this in his 
entry for 748, while another noted it in the following year.? 
Whatever the case, he remained there for several years, while 
Pepin grew increasingly disgusted over the creation of this 
new hotbed of discontent.
In reaction, the mayor, anointed king in 751, took the 
necessary steps to dissolve the union by serving the duke no­
tice. Pepin dispatched legates into Aquitaine ordering Waifar 
to relinquish Grifo into his hands. The Metz annalist recorded 
this as having occurred in 750.® In light of the relationship
petiit et ad Wagfarium ducem perfidum Aquitaniorum pervenit." 
Pepin's generosity to Grifo is all the more noteworthy in con­
sideration of the fact that he had just foiled an attempt of 
his belligerent brother to establish an independent state in 
Bavaria where the old Duke Odilo had recently died. Lanfridus, 
the leader of the Alamanni, had thrown in with Grifo, thereby 
necessitating a confrontation between Pepin and the newly formed 
coalition. The mayor defeated the rebels, elevated Tassilo to 
his deceased father's position as Duke of Bavaria, and then 
forgivingly established Grifo in Neustria with his new posses­
sions.
7See above fns. 5 and 6. Chamard (Revue des Questions 
Historiques, XXXV, 39) puts Grifo's flight in yet another year, 
750: "Pepin avait un frère, nomme Griffon, qui, après avoir
essayé de se créer un Etat indépendant en Bavière, avait reçu 
de son frère le gouvernement de la ville du Mans et de douze 
autres comtés circonvoisins. Ne pouvant supporter cette sé­
questration. Griffon s'était enfui en Aquitaine (750)."
®Annales Mettenses Priores, a. 750, M.G.H., SS. rer. 
Germ., p . 42': "Unde rumor potentiae eius et timor virtutis
transiit in universes terras, Direxit autem legatos suos ad 
Waifarium, ut sibi fratrem suum ad se fugientem redderet. Quod 
ille pravo inito consilio facere contempsit." The author of 
the Annales Regni Francorum neglects to say anything about thé
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between the Franks and Aquitanian dukes over the past fifty 
years, Waifar issued to the emissaries an altogether predict­
able response. He refused. (The same annalist took note of 
the coronation of Pepin prior to the dispatch of the Austrasian 
legates to Aquitaine. This hints at the possibility of Waifar*s 
displeasure at Pepin's adoption of a monarchical title. Cer­
tainly the mayor, ceremoniously replacing the Merovingian king, 
must have adversely affected many Frankish aristocrats, above 
all the entourage of Grifo.) Waifar's refusal amounted to a 
repudiation of his fidelity to Pepin. The new king had applied 
the pressure, and Grifo felt compelled to flee Aquitaine the 
following year in order not to jeopardize any further Waifar*s 
standing with the Franks.̂  He had already accomplished this.
mission of these legates to Duke Waifar's court. For a most 
interesting interpretation of Grifo's role in the scheme of 
Prankish politics, see Walter Mohr (Die Karolingische Reich- 
sidee [Munster, Westfalen, 1962], p. 15) who connects him with 
the faction led by Carloman: "Eine Vereinigung der Anhanger
Karlmanns mit denen Grifos dürfte gedroht haben, weshalb Pippin, 
urn dem entgegenzuwirken, Grifo fur sich zu gewinnen suchte. 
Dieses Experiment schlug fehl. Als dann schliesslich Grifo 
aus dem Frankenreiche fluchtet, unternimmt Pippin den entschei- 
denden Schritt. Er wendet sich jetzt um Unterstutzung seiner 
Herrschaft an den Papst, wodurch gleichzeitig die Anhanger 
Karlmanns und Grifos in ihren Bestrebungen lahmgelegt werden 
konnten."
^The unfortunate story of Grifo came to an end for 
Aquitanian affairs and otherwise, once he crossed beyond the 
borders of the province. With a band of followers, he departed 
for the security of the Lombard king's court but never completed 
the journey. He perished in an ambuscade set by Theodewinus, 
the Count of Vienne. This, the death of Grifo, the Annales 
Regni Francorum (a. 753, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 10) relates;
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however, at least in the eyes of Pepin.
In addition to the incident concerning Grifo, several 
other things occurred which intensified the anxieties of both 
sides at about this same time. For one, Pepin advanced into 
Septimania in 752 with his army. Besieging the old Gothic 
city of Narbonne, he managed eventually to gain its posses­
sion and the submission of the Saracenic leader, Suleiman.^®
Duke Waifar must surely have believed that he was the victim 
of a planned offensive meant to hem him in on all sides. Fur­
thermore, in the following year. Pope Stephen visited Francia, 
thus heralding the creation of a Franco-Papal alliance that 
further isolated Duke Waifar within his own domain.H A closer 
relationship with Rome appealed to Pepin and he consistently, 
though p r u d e n t l y , worked in that direction; thus, he bequeathed
"Et dum reversus est de ipso itinere, nuntiatum est ei, quod 
Grifo, qui in Wasconiam fugitus est, germanus eius, occisus 
fuisset." More details appear concerning this event in the 
Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes 
(118, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 183), which notes that the 
engagement took place near the present-day city of Saint-Jean- 
de-Maurienne above the river Arche.
J-OAnnales Mettenses Priores, a. 752, M.G.H., SS. rer.
Germ., pp. 43-44.
l^The Annales Regni Francorum (a. 753, M.G.H., SS. rer. 
Germ., p. 10) significantly relates the occasion of Pope Stephen's 
visit: "Eodemque anno Stephanus papa venit in Franciam, adiuto-
rium et solatium quaerendo pro iustitiis sancti Petri; . . . ."
Boltzmann, Die Italienpolitik der Merowinger und des 
Koniqs Pippin, p. 39. Concerning the prudence which Pepin dis­
played in his dealings with Rome, particularly as his caution
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to his son, Charles, a policy that he had forged. In short, 
to Waifar it seemed that Pepin, king of the Franks, extended 
the tentacles of his power in an ever more inclusive fashion 
to strangle Aquitaine and separate it from sources of possible 
future support.
In retaliation, or perhaps through his ambitious de­
sires to spread his own influence into Septimania, Duke Waifar 
struck against the city of Narbonne. Although the degree of 
his success and the date of the enterprise are uncertain, the 
duke attacked after the successful campaign of the Franks into 
the same area. In so doing, Waifar further plunged himself 
into even deeper trouble with Pepin.
During the course of the Narbonnese raids, Waifar had 
committed a serious infringement upon Pepin's prerogatives.
The disgruntled king charged him with the execution of certain 
Goths to whom he had given his protection. To gain indemnity 
(on this occasion a Wergild payment), the Frankish king once 
again sent into Aquitaine legates who demanded satisfaction for 
an offense. Besides this particular concern, however, the king 
voiced his disapproval of the duke in several other matters as
so involved a third party, the Lombards, see David H. Miller, 
"Papal-Lombard Relations during the Pontificate of Pope Paul I; 
The Attainment of an Equilibrium of Power in Italy, 756-767," 
Catholic Historical Review, LV (1969), 368-376.
^^chronicon Moissiacense, M.G.H., SS., p. 294; "Wai­
far ius, princeps Aquitaniae, Narbonam depraedat."
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well. Later events proved the occasion to be a prelude to war. 
Among the other grievances, Waifar had harbored certain refugees 
(specified as the king's men) from Francia that Pepin wanted 
returned. The continuator of Fredegar's chronicle told of these 
transactions at considerable length, placing them in his entry 
for the year 760.^^ The aggregate of several incidents (i.e., 
the case of these refugees, the rebellion of Grifo, and the re­
action to Pepin's coronation) points to the conclusion that 
Pepin contended with a core of dissidents at home and abroad 
who weakened and diffused his power. Quite in keeping with this 
semi-feudal age, these Frankish malcontents sympathized with 
the separatist objectives of Duke Waifar, and their situation 
illustrated a fundamental shortcoming of contemporary Frankish 
statecraft. Pepin only tentatively held the allegiance of his 
nobility, and he lacked an adequate revenue whereby he could 
enforce his will by other means. In the latter regard, the 
Austrasians had encroached by necessity for many years upon the 
property of the Church in order to secure needed funds for the 
purpose of rewarding persons instrumental in the fulfillment of
Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici 
Continuationes, 124, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 124, p. 186:
. . . mittere non deberet et Gotos praedicto rege, quod 
dudum Waiofarius contra legis ordine occiserat, et solvere 
deberet et homines suos, quod de regno Francorum ad ipso Waio- 
fario principe confugium fecerant, reddere deberet."
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their p o l i c i e s . A s  the trend of events increasingly alienated 
the king and the duke. Church property once again attracted ut­
most concern, reminiscent of the era of Frankish migration into 
the province during the preceding century.
Over the years, the Frankish Church had accumulated 
south of the Loire River much land from which it derived revenue. 
Duke Waifar disliked the transference of this wealth out of 
Aquitaine into Francia, and he stopped the p r a c t i c e . Consider­
ing the structure of Carolingien feudalism and its base of sup­
port, Waifar had struck the king in a spot that threatened the 
heart of his military establishment. This incensed Pepin, but 
the full implications of the duke's embargo are realized only 
when they are related to the king's recent policies.
Twice during the decade of the 750's Pepin had ventured
Both Alfons Dopsch (The Economic and Social Founda­
tions of European Civilization, p. 281) and F. L. Ganshof 
(The Carolinqlans and the Frankish Monarchy, p. 95) discuss 
the economic pressures that stimulated Carolingien involvement 
with ecclesiastical property.
^^Ibid.: " . . .  praedictus rex Pippinus legationem
ad Waiofario Aquitanico principe mittens, petens ei per legatos 
suos, ut res ecclesiarum de regno ipsius, qui in Aquitania 
sitas erant, redderet, et sub immunitates nomine, sicut ab 
antea fuerant, conservâtes esse deberent; et indices hac 
exactores supra predictas res ecclesiarum, quod a longo tempore 
factum non fuerat, . . . ." A second account (Annales Regni 
Francorum, a. 760, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 18) also gives 
the Austrasian side of the story, however, somewhat more brief­
ly: "Tunc Pippinus rex, cernens Waifarium ducem Aquitaniorum
minime consentira iustitias ecclesiarum partibus, quae erant 
in Francia, consilium fecit cum Francis, ut iter ageret supra- 
dictas iustitias quaerendo in Aquitania."
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into Italy to assist the papacy against the Lombards. He suc­
ceeded in exalting the cause of the Church in Italy, but in 
the process he had to neglect affairs elsewhere. Consequently, 
this allowed Duke Waifar to do much as he pleased in Aquitaine 
and probably more than he would have normally done in restrict­
ing the movement of Church revenue out of his duchy. Moreover, 
Pepin's recent entente with Rome simply magnified the gravity 
of Waifar*s offense against the Frankish Church. The whole 
affair embarrassed the king, for if he could not prevent eccle­
siastical matters from becoming a cause célèbre in his kingdom, 
how effectively could he carry out the task of protecting Rome's 
interests against her enemies beyond the borders of Francia?
With this additional problem weighing upon his patience, 
Pepin thus instructed his legates of 760 to demand from Waifar 
the restoration of the time-hallowed rights of the Frankish 
Church in Aquitaine.1? In essence, the Frankish legates had 
delivered an ultimatum to the duke. As such, it was admirably 
timed, for Pepin was then relatively free to turn his military 
resources upon Aquitaine. If this were his original intention, 
Waifar's reply did not disappoint him. The duke rejected every 
one of the demands that the king placed upon him.^®
17Only the Continuations of Fredegar's Chronicle (124, 
M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 186) mentions the legates which 
Pepin sent to Duke Waifar.
i^chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici 
Continuationes, 124, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 186: "Haec
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The prejudice of contemporary Austrasian authors con­
cerning the tyranny of Waifar in Aquitaine is not to be taken 
seriously. Some Septimanians actually preferred his rule to 
that of P e p i n . B u t  Pepin's patience had a limit. He had 
tolerated Aquitanian slights of increasing frequency and se­
verity. The cumulative effect of these insults simply pushed 
him to the point of losing his temper. With the Aquitanians, 
however, a rear guard action remained the only feasible option 
left open to them in thwarting Prankish dominance. The fact 
that the Franks were becoming the major power in western Europe 
gravely concerned the Aquitanians, but it perplexed as well 
the more powerful of the other outlying people, including the 
Bavarians, the Saxons, and the Lombards. Normally, these peo­
ple confronted the Austrasians severally but occasionally they 
did manage to align their efforts. What specific means short 
of rebellion were left open to these people to combat the Franks 
individually? Both Bavaria and Aquitaine offered asylum to 
dissident Austrasian nobles;^® they undermined the king's
omnia Waiofarius, quod praedictus rex per legatos suos ei 
mandaverat, hoc totum facere contempsit."
^^Annalium Fuldensium Pars Prima, a. 759, M.G.H., SS., 
p. 347: "Waipharius dux in Aquitania tirannidem exercens,
pressuras aecclesiarum Dei movet, depraedationes et iniusticias 
multas facit." Quoting from the Marca Hispanica (239) for 
evidence, Blade (Annales de la Faculté dies lettres de Bordeaux, 
XIV, 173) discusses the implications of the preference among 
the Septimanian aristocracy for an Aquitanian overlord rather 
than a Frankish one.
20For Bavarian affairs, see above fn. 6 concerning the
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prerogatives in both provinces; and, whenever possible, they 
generally obstructed his rule in both petty and important af­
fairs. These acts remained the best alternatives by which 
they could destroy respect for Carolingien power internally 
and externally. However, for both people, time was simply run­
ning out as Pepin gradually attained political mastery. By 
the 760's, it must have struck the Aquitanian duke that if he 
did not act at that point, he could not do so at a later, less 
opportune moment.
Initially, however, neither side (Aquitaine and Francia) 
suspected the direction that the conflict would take, nor the 
gravity of the issues at stake. Duke Waifar first impudently 
displayed his independence while Pepin increasingly took offense 
at his haughty ways. During the course of the decade (760's), 
both sides became more embittered as the Frankish objective in 
war changed from reprimanding the Aquitanians to subjugating 
them and then to destroying the dynasty of old Duke E u d e s .  
However, by placing an embargo on the wealth of the Austrasian 
Church, Duke Waifar had piqued the king. Indeed, by so doing, 
he touched the very heart of the Frankish administration of 
Aquitaine. The property of the Austrasian Church in the duchy
case of Grifo and below page 169 for the rebellion of Duke 
Tassilo.
2^Thomas Hodgkin, The Life of Charlemagne (New York, 
1902), p. 106. '
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possessed an extraterritoriality that aided the Carolingiens 
in several important ways. Above all else, it provided the 
Franks with a perpetual entree into the management of the duchy, 
and, conversely, it continually served to detract from the 
autonomous administration of the duke in the affairs of his 
d u c h y . 22 It is also significant to note that upon the termina­
tion of hostilities at the end of the decade, a restoration of 
the former rights of the Austrasian Church in Aquitaine took 
place. Thus, the value of these grants was recognized and not 
allowed to elapse forever as victim to the ravages of w a r . 23
22In many ways this controversy strikingly reminds one 
of the investiture problem as it affected the hierarchy of the 
Roman Catholic Church and the Holy Roman Empire in the eleventh 
century. For an analysis of the importance of the earlier epi­
sode in the eighth century see Engelbert Muhlbacher (Deutsche 
Geschichte unter den Karolingern, p. 81); "Nicht der aqui- 
tanische Herzog, sondern nur der frankische Konig konnte den 
Kirchen die Immunitat verliehen haben. Nur an ein dem Reich 
untergebenes Land konnte die Forderung gestellt werden, sie zu 
achten, in ihrer Achtung lag die Anerkennung der Oberhoheit, in 
ihrer Misachtung die Leugnung derselben. Die Immunitat gab dem 
frankischen Kirchengut in Aquitanien eine exterritoriale Stellung, 
sie zog der Verwaltung des Herzogs, dem Streben nach selb- 
standigkeit eine scharfe Grenze. Im Kirchengut besas aber das 
Reich auch Stuspunkte seiner Herrschaft."
23Ewig, Cahiers de Civilisation Medievale, I, 50:
"Cette restitution semble avoir àté réalisée immédiatement après 
768. Nous en avons les preuves pour les églises de Reims, de 
Trêves et de Verdun, et nous sommes en droit de conclure à 
une restitution générale des biens des églises austrasiennes 
en Aquitaine. Il s'agit bien d'une restitution: car les biens
aquitains des églises citées se rencontrent dans le enclaves 
austrasiennes de 1'époque mérovingienne ; dans le Poitou, le 
Limousin, l'Auvergne, le Rouergue, la Provence austrasienne. .
Les donations nouvelles n'allaient pas aux évêchés, mais plutôt 
aux monastères austrasiens."
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Waifar found a way to insult Pepin at the very begin­
ning of the conflict. Not content to leave the king's demands 
simply unanswered or politely refused, he sent three nobles of 
his court to rebuff Pepin personally. He used as his emis­
saries Chunibert, Count of Bourges; Bladinus, Count of Auvergne; 
and Bishop Bertelannus of Bourges. The names of these men be­
token their Germanic, Frankish origins. Thus Waifar scorned 
the Austrasian with a flourish that left him quite indignant.
It therefore should have come as no surprise to Waifar when 
Pepin invaded Aquitaine later that same year. Interestingly 
enough, the duke took no steps to counter the invasion, and, 
after viewing the maneuvers of the king, he quickly came to 
heel and dispatched messengers, Otbertus and Dadinus, to the 
Franks, promising in particular the restoration of the rights
o cof the Church. To acquire Waifar*s submission so readily, 
Pepin had crossed the Loire into the district of Berry and
^^Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici 
Continuationes, 125, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., pp. 186-187:
"Dum haec ageretur, Waiofarius, inito iniquo consilio, contra 
Pippino rege Francorum insidias parat; exercitum suum cum Uni- 
berto comite Bitorivo et Bladino comite Arvernico, qui dudum 
ante anno superiors ad praedicto rege Pippino cum Bertelanno 
episcopo Bitorice civitatis missus fuerat et animum regis ad 
iracundiam nimium provocasset, . . . ."
^^Annales Regni Francorum, a. 760, M.G.H., SS. rer. 
Germ., p. 18: "Et pervenit usque in locum, qui dicitur Tedoad.
Et cum haec vidisset Waifarius, misit missos suos, Otbertum et 
Dadinum, et dedit obsides Adalgarium et Eitherium regi Pippino, 
ut omnia rederet, quicquid supradictus rex quaerebat in causis 
ecclesiasticis."
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thoroughly devastated it up to Auvergne. In addition to Waifar*s 
concessions concerning the rights of the Frankish Church in Aqui­
taine, he also relinquished hostages and gave oaths to the king, 
who returned to Francia without suffering any c a s u a l t i e s . ^6 For 
having defied Pepin in such a blustery fashion, the duke's per­
formance is astonishing, but he eventually reacted when the odds 
for delivering a blow were more in his favor.
Pepin returned home in 760, thinking that he had resolved 
the Aquitanian problem sufficiently and that he would not have 
to turn his attention in that direction for some time. This is 
reflected in the fact that he held his annual Mayfield for 761 
in the northern part of his kingdom at Duren (between the cities 
of Aachen and Koln), signifying his concern with that locality 
for the coming campaigns of the summer. Even while he was con­
vened in his council (761), word came to Pepin that Waifar had 
broken his promises of the preceding year by crossing over into 
Burgundia, laying waste the whole region of Autun, and destroy­
ing the approaches to Chalon before returning into Aquitaine 
with much b o o t y . ^7 The angry king changed his plans and prepared
^^Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Con­
tinuationes, 124, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 186; "Waiofarius 
princeps Aquitanie per legatos suos pacem supplicans, sacramenta 
vel obsides ibidem donat, et omnes iustitias, quos praefatus rex 
Pippinus per legatos suos ei mandaverat, in placito institute 
facere deberet. Rex Pippinus cum omni exercitu suo inleso re­
versus est ad propria."
27The Annales Regni Francorum (a. 761, M.G.H., SS. rer. 
Germ., p. 18) reports on the interruption of Pepin's council at 
Duren by this bad news: "Dum et supranominatus rex synodum suum
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to retaliate against the duke for his disobedience. For Aqui­
taine, the act amounted to a fatal error. By raiding east 
rather than north, perhaps Waifar believed that the provocation 
would not be great enough to merit the full weight of Pepin's 
wrath. If this was his logic, he erred, for the king disre­
garded his previous planning and took his entire army south 
into Aquitaine.28 The affair proved to Pepin that he could 
never again accept the oaths of the duke at face value. From 
this time forth, he relentlessly pursued Waifar. The succeed­
ing campaign has additional interest in light of the fact that 
the eldest of the king's sons, Charles, participated in the 
foray alongside his father.29
teneret in villa, quae dicitur Dura, nuntiatum est ei, quod 
Waifarius in omnibus mentitus est; . . . The Annales
Mettenses Priores (a. 761, SS. rer. Germ., p. 51),
among others, details the extent of Duke Waifar's devastations: 
"Waifarius autem, inito pravo consilio, exercitum Wasconum in 
fines Burgundiae direxit, qui usque ad Cavallonem urbem totam 
illam partem Burgundiae vastaverunt."
28chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici 
Continuationes, 125, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 187: ‘'Cum
haec Pippino rege nuntiatum fuisset, quod Waiofarius maximam 
partem regni sui vastasset et sacramenta, quod ei dederat, 
fefellisset, nimium in ira commotus, iubet omnes Francos, ut 
hostiliter, placito institute, ad Ligerem venissent." The con- 
tinuator also mentions that Waifar burned down the "villam 
publicam" or royal villa at Mailly before returning home with 
much plunder. This undoubtedly further antagonized Pepin.
Z^Both the Annales S. Amandi (a. 761, M.G.H., SS., p. 
10) and the Annales Pe'taviani (a. 761, M.G.H., SS., p. 11) 
refer to this. The latter remarks: "iterum Pipinus fuit in
Wasconia una cum Karolo : captoque omni pago Alvernico, Burboni 
Castro et Claromonte igne cremavit."
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Hurrying south, the Franks passed through Auxerre in 
route to Nevers, where they crossed the Loire. The first ob­
ject of their fury was the Aquitanian stronghold of Bourbon on 
the Allier River. Successful in the reduction of the place, 
they took captive those of Waifar's men that they could before 
setting it afire. Moving on south into Auvergne, Pepin laid 
waste much of the countryside as he went and next directed his 
attack against the powerful city of C l e r m o n t . H e  thus demon­
strated his intent to destroy the more secure fortifications of 
the Aquitanian duke. Systematically accomplishing this, Pepin 
obviously wanted to deprive Waifar of any sanctuary to which he 
could turn. During the siege of Clermont, which represented 
the climax of Pepin's campaign of 761, a frightful fire broke 
out in which many men, women, and children perished. The annal­
ist of Metz reported that this occurred against the wishes of 
Pepin but at the initiative of his soldiers. Besides the capitu­
lation of the city, the king gained yet another success at Cler­
mont. His men captured and imprisoned Bladinus, the Count of 
Auvergne, who had occasioned Pepin's discontent the previous 
year as the emissary of Waifar. After acquiring further spoils
30chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici 
Continuationes, 125, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 187: "Cumque
in giro castra posuisset, subito a Francis captus atque succen- 
sus est; et homines Waiofario, quod ibidem invenit, secum duxit 
Maximam partem Aquitanie vastans, usque urbem Arvernam cum omni 
exercitu veniens, Claremonte castro captum atque succensum 
bellando cepit, et multitudinem hominum, tarn virorum qucun 
feminarum vel infantum plurimi, in ipso incendio cremaverunt."
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in this region, the Frank moved westward, sowing destruction
as he went. He proceeded as far as the city of Limoges before
31terminating the holocaust to return to Francia, The annalists 
of the day noted that Pepin celebrated both that Christmas and 
the following Easter at Quierzy, north of Paris.
Strategically, King Pepin directed his offensive against 
the central part of Aquitaine, not venturing to strike against 
the western part of the duchy. In fact, he spent the fighting 
season of 761 principally in Auvergne, that of 762 in Berry, 
and 763 in L i m o u s i n . P e p i n  concentrated on the more heavily
^^As is often the case in eighth century Frankish his­
tory, a cross referencing of various sources is necessary in 
order to piece together the relevant facts concerning Pepin's 
campaign of 761. Only the Annales Mettenses Priores (a. 761, 
M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 51) relates the informatTon pertain­
ing to the king's soldiers burning Clermont against his wishes: 
"Peragrataque Aquitania usque Clarum montem castrum pervenit, 
quod non sua voluntate, sed bellatorum vi iniecto concrematum 
est igne." Likewise, the same annalist, with his usual Aus- 
trasian bias, singly proceeds to describe Count Bladinus in a 
derogatory vein: "In quo itinere Blandinus perfidus comes in
presentiam Pippini regis captus est." Also, only in the Annales 
Regni Francorum (a. 761, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 21) does 
comment appear pertaining to the advance of Pepin into the area 
around Limoges: "Rex tamen cuncta, quae extra munitiones in­
venit, ferro et igni devastans, postquam ad Limovicas oppidum 
venit, reversus est et in villa Carisiaco hibernis habitis 
natalem Domini ac pascha celebravit." The annalist of Metz as 
well as the continuator of Fredegar both speak as though Pepin 
broke off his campaign of 761 after the successful investment 
of Clermont.
^^with a lull in the fighting taking place in 764, the 
earlier campaigns of 761, 762, and 763 have been thus outlined. 
Ludovic Drapeyron (Revue des Travaux de 1 'Académie des Sciences 
Morales et Politiques, CVI, 814-818) classifies Pepin's yearly 
movements upon this regional basis but without the succeeding 
connotations.
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fortified cities in Aquitaine, and it appears that the topogra­
phy of the country helped to determine his course of action.
The possibility of Duke Waifar utilizing the rough country of 
the central massif as refuge probably led Pepin to attempt to 
cut the duchy in two by his thrusts into Auvergne and Limousin. 
If this figured into his planning of these three campaigns, the 
king correctly diagnosed the duke's future defensive posture. 
Waifar later used the rough terrain of the country for his own 
protection, but in so doing, he had to turn to the western part 
of the province. Although Pepin could not force the issue in 
these early years, he at least restricted the duke's movements 
into this area.
During the third year's (762) campaign in Aquitaine, 
Pepin directed his onslaught first against the city of Bourges 
in Berry. On this occasion he brought along both of his sons 
to gain experience in the art of war.^^ To take the heavily 
fortified city he had to construct a wall of great strength 
around Bourges so that no one could come into or go out of it.^*
33Annales Petaviani, a. 762, M.G.H., SS., p. 11: "iterum
domnus Pipinus cum dilectis filiis suis Karolo et Karolomanno 
perrexit in Wasconiam, et adquisivit civitatem Bituricas."
34çhronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici 
Continuationes, 126, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 187: "Circum-
sepsit urbem munitionem fortissimam, ita ut nullus egredi ausus 
fuisset aut ingredi potuisset, cum machinis et omni genere 
armorum, circumdedit ea vallo. Multis vulneratis plurisque 
interfectis fractisque muris, cepit urbem et restituit eam 
dicioni sue iure proelii et homines illos, quos Waiofarius ad 
defendendcun ipsam civitatem dimiserat, clementiam sue pietatis 
absolvit; dimissisque reversi sunt ad propria."
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After breaching the walls with his siege engines, he departed 
from the example of the previous year at Clermont by treating 
the inhabitants of Bourges with clemency. His success there 
was completers but time-consuming. After Bourges, he had only 
enough of that season left to strike once more before returning 
to Francia for the winter. Accordingly, he made a lateral
3 6march westward into Poitou and attacked the castle of Thouars, 
located just south of the Loire. Pepin succeeded here as he 
had at Bourges and then journeyed to Gentilly on the Seine to 
celebrate the winter holidays.
In regard to his accomplishments of the year, it may be 
said that Pepin refrained from penetrating very deeply into 
Aquitaine, preferring to operate in the northern part of the 
duchy. At Bourges, however, Pepin captured Count Chunibert; 
consequently, he had in his clutches both of the laymen who had 
participated in the legation from Waifar that insulted him two 
years before. In addition, Pepin now had under his control the 
two strongest Aquitanian fortifications in the north. The com­
bined force of these things roused Waifar out of his lethargy.
^^Annales Guelferbytani, a. 762, Monumenta Germaniae 
Historica, Scriptores, ed. G. H. Pertz, I (Hannover, 1826), 
p. 29: "Franci in Wasconia Bituricam conquesierunt:"
^^Tho Annales Regni Francorum terms the fortification 
at Thouars a "castrum.** Both the entries in the Annales Regni 
Francorum and the Annales Mettenses Priores are quite brief for 
the year 762. Once again, the continuator of Fredegar contains 
the bulk of the information concerning this campaign.
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With the loss of both Bourges and Clermont, the Aqui­
tanian duke himself marched out to break down the walls of the 
remainder of his fortified cities. Evidently wanting to prevent 
them being used against him, he levelled the fortifications of 
Poitiers, Limoges, Saintes, Perigueux, and Angouleme.^^
As for the Franks, King Pepin convened his yearly May­
field at Nevers on the Loire, indicative of his intentions for 
the coming season. He then crossed into Waifar*s duchy and 
began thoroughly harrying the countryside, as if in retribution 
for the duke's recent destruction of Aquitanian fortifications.
In particular, the king ravaged not only the favorite retreats 
of the duke but also the churches and monasteries.^® Not sparing 
the source of the people's livelihood, Pepin also destroyed the
^^Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici 
Continuationes, 129, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 189: "Videns
praedictus Waiofarius princeps Aquitanicus, quod castro Clare­
monte rex bellando ceperat et Bytoricas caput Aquitaniae 
munitissimam urbem cum machinis capuisset, et inpetum eius 
ferre non potuisset: omnes civitates, quas in Aquitania pro-
vintia dictioni sue erant, id est Pectavis, Lemodicas, Sanctonas, 
Petrecors, Equolisma vel reliquis quam plures civitates et 
castella, omnes muros eorum in terra prostravit, quos postea 
praecellus rex Pippinus reparare iubet et homines suos ad ipsas 
civitates custodiendum dimisit."
3®Ibid., 130, p. 189: "Postea, Ligere transacto, Aqui­
tania pergens, usque ad Lemodicas accessit, totam regionem 
illam vastans, villas publicas, quae dictione Waiofario erant, 
totas igne cremare praecepit. Totam regionem illam pene vastatam, 
monasteria multa depopulata, usque Hisandonem veniens, unde 
maxima parte Aquitaniae plurimum vinearum erat, coepit ac vasta- 
vit; unde pene omni Aquitania, tam ecclesias quam monasteria, 
divites et pauperes vina habere consuerunt, omnia vastavit et 
coepit,"
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vineyards in Limousin. The furthest extent reached in his 
southward invasion was Cahors on the Lot River. With his 763 
expedition he thus surpassed in distance all his previous trips 
south.39
Two events of considerable importance occurred during 
the 763 campaign, of which the chronology is obscured. Some 
time after the advance on Cahors, an ally of King Pepin, his 
nephew Duke Tassilo of Bavaria, deserted him in the midst of 
the campaign.40 Not only did this weaken the offensive of the 
king, but also it constituted a terribly serious crime in the 
eyes of the Franks. Tassilo's defection in time of war (to
39Joseph Calmette (Charlemagne; Sa Vie et son Oeuvre 
[Paris, 1945], p. 34) writes: "Dans la quatrième campagne,
Gaifier est poursuivi jusque sous les murs de Ca^ors.
A ce moment, le sort de l'Aquitaine parait tranché."
40The importance of this desertion overshadowed all 
other events of the year. Consequently, both the Annales 
Mettenses Priores (763) and the Annales Regni Francorum (763) 
elaborate upon this at the very beginning of their entries for 
that year. In consideration of the succeeding events (i.e., 
Waifar's subsequent attack upon Pepin's army), Tassilo must 
have deserted the king shortly after the Franks reached Cahors, 
thus leaving Pepin more vulnerable than ever for his return 
trip. Strangely enough, the Continuations of Fredegar omits 
mentioning this important affair. The Annales Regni Francorum 
(a. 763, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., pp. 20-22), however, imparts 
a feeling of bitterness that the Franks associated with 
Tassilo's desertion: "Ibique Tassilo dux Baioariorum post-
posuit sacramenta et omnia, quae promiserat, et per malum in- 
genium se inde seduxit, omnia benefacta, quae Pippinus rex 
avunculus cius ei fecit, postposuit; per ingenia fraudulenta 
se subtrahendo Baioariam petiit et nusquam amplius faciem 
supradicti regis videre voluit." During the rest of his life, 
the Bavarian duke never managed to escape the taint which he 
had brought down upon his own head.
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the Franks the crime of harisliz) undoubtedly bolstered the 
nerve of Duke Waifar as much as it certainly shook the confi­
dence of Pepin and in turn the whole Aquitanian effort. In 
reaction, the Aquitanian duke took heart at this turn of events 
and ventured out to meet Pepin in set battle for the first time 
in the war. It was all to no avail, however, as the Franks 
soundly defeated him and slaughtered most of his army. The 
duke barely managed to escape the field, and the king thereupon 
returned into Francia as the fighting season drew to a close.
Why did Tassilo abandon Pepin's cause at this critical 
moment? Contemporary annalists spoke only of the ingratitude 
of the Bavarian by way of an explanation, but that obviously 
accounts for just the Austrasian point of view. In many re­
spects, the Bavarian and Aquitanian dukes had much in common in 
their mutual opposition to the Frank. Yet by assisting the 
king in his destruction of the power of the Aquitanian duke.
^^Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici 
Continuationes, 130, MZG.H., SS. rer. Merov., pp. 189-190:
"Dum haec ageretur, Waiofarius cum exercito magno et plurima 
Wasconorum qui ultra Geronna coramorantur, quem antiquitus vocati 
sunt Vaceti, super praedicto rege veniens; set statim solito 
more omnes Wascones terga verterunt, plurimi ibidem a Francis 
interfecti sunt. Hec cernens rex, persequi eum iubet, et usque 
ad noctem eum persequens, vix Waiofarius cum paucis qui reman- 
serant fugiendo evasit. In eo proelio Bladinus comis Arvernorum, 
quem praedictus rex ceperat, postea ad Waiofarium confugium 
fecerat, in eo proelio interfectus est. Rex Pippinus, obpitu- 
lante Deo, victor extitit." Note the fact that Count Bladinus, 
who had recently escaped Frankish captivity, perished in the 
battle. Also, only this account tells of this sally on the part 
of Waifar.
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Tassilo simply cut away at the foundations of his own power. 
An earlier generation had witnessed an alliance between both 
dukes against the Franks. The scale and success of Pepin's 
763 campaign reminded Tassilo of the common problem that con­
fronted both duchies. Although his desertion momentarily 
crippled the Frankish effort, it did little ultimately to 
serve the cause of either Bavaria or Aquitaine.
Pepin spent the following winter in his villa at 
Longlare in what is today Luxembourg. The nature of the par­
ticularly harsh winter that followed prevented him, as well 
as everyone else, from gaining any respite from the labors of 
the preceding s u m m e r . T h e  rigors of the experience did not 
necessarily detain him from campaigning in the summer of 764, 
but he nevertheless desisted from his perennial expeditions 
into Aquitaine of the preceding four years. Convening his 
placitum of 764 in Worms, he thus indicated his regional con­
cern over the recent treachery of the Bavarian duke. Indeed, 
Tassilo's perfidy completely distracted him from any military
42çhronicon Moissiacense, a. 762, M.G.H., SS., p. 294: 
"gelu magnum Gallias, Illyricum et Thraciam deprimit, et multae 
arbores olivarum et ficulnearum decoctae gelu aruerunt; sed 
et germen messium aruit; et supervenienti anno praedictas 
regiones gravius depressit fames, ita ut multi homines penuria 
panis périrent." The entries in this chronicle are not con­
sistently made on the basis of years. Austrasian annalists 
indicate that Europe actually experienced this in the year 763.
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action at all that year.^^ Moreover, in 765, he further de­
layed mobilizing his army against either foe but contented 
himself in preparing for an ambitious project for the year 
766. As for Tassilo, he fortunately went his own way without 
ever having to meet Pepin in battle. Accordingly, he became 
increasingly independent so that Pepin's son and successor, 
Charles, had eventually to attend to him. His defection deep­
ly affected Pepin, however, and besides having endangered the 
king's position, he significantly added to Pepin's anxieties.
The dilatory attitude of the Franks toward their ene­
mies through 764 and 765 prompted consternation among those 
who favored their cause. In fact, in several quarters the 
time appeared ripe to take advantage of the recent turn of 
events to scheme against Pepin. In particular, the repose of 
the Franks augmented the production of rumors to discredit and
Annales qui Dicuntur Einhardi, a, 764, Monumenta 
Germaniae Historica, Scriptores rerum Germanicarum, VI, ed.
G. H. Pertz, recog, F. Kurze (Hannover, 1895), p. 23: "Rex
Pippinus distracto in diversa animo propter duo bella, Aqui- 
tanicum iam olim susceptum et Baioaricum propter Tassilonis 
ducis defectionem suscipiendum, populi sui generalem conventum 
habuit in Wormacia civitate," Perhaps the specter of a two 
front war nagged at the conscience of Pepin. Taking the field 
against one or the other of these antagonists just might have 
provided the stimulus for this eventuality.
4*Thomas Hodgkin's (Italy and Her Invaders, 744-774, 
VII, p. 270-271) observation concerning the pressures that the 
Aquitanian wars inflicted on Pepin comes to mind in this regard 
The struggle " . . .  occupied Pippin's whole energies for the 
remaining nine years of his life, which evidently brought him 
sometimes into serious danger, and which by its toils and 
anxieties probably shortened his days."
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emphasize the deterioration of their power at Rome, where 
anxious observers took careful note of the Aquitanian struggle. 
Even before the year 763 came to an end. Pope Paul had written 
to Pepin rather vaguely informing him of the activity of their 
common enemies in this respect.*5 The Pope expressed his great 
concern over Pepin's welfare in light of his fortunes of late 
and assured him that their mutual prosperity was inextricably 
bound together.46 The matter, however, did not end there.
The following year (764) another papal letter to the Franks 
ensued, proclaiming that current reports were suggesting that 
Pepin lacked the power to assist Rome even if he desired to do 
so.47
To whom did the Pope refer as "our enemies" in his let­
ters to Pepin? He surely meant the Lombards and the Byzantines
45çodex Carolinus, Ep. XXVII, ed. W. Gundlach, Monumenta 
Germaniae Historica, Epp. Ill (Berlin, 1892), p. 531: ". . . quid
erga vos ageretur vel qualiter in itinere, quo profecti estis, 
peregistis, nimis anxietatis fervore desiderii nostri affectio 
in hoc ipsud addiscendum sedule provocatur, presertim dum et a 
nostris vestrisque inimicis adversa nobis de ipsis partibus 
adnuntiantur."
46ibid.: "Pro quo quaesumus, ut certos nos, sicut desi-
deramus, per vestros nuntios de vestra prosperitate et laetitia 
reddere iubeatis, quoniam vestra salus nostra est prospérités et 
vestra exaltatio nostrum procul dubio est gaudium et inmensa 
Securitas."
4?ibid., Ep. XXIX, p. 534: "Sed et hoc in ipsis vestris
relationum apicibus continebatur: per vestros vobis fuisse
nuntiatum legatos, quod a quibusdam malignis et mendatium pro- 
ferentibus in istis partibus devulgatum esset, quia, si aliqua 
nobis nécessitas eveniret, nullum nobis auxilium prebere valuis- 
setis."
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who might utilize Frankish discomfort for their own ends. 
Although he applied the plural rather than the singular usage, 
he did not specifically name any antagonists in his corres­
pondence of 764 and 765. In a subsequent letter, however, he 
departed from this pattern and mentioned Tassilo, the Bavarian 
duke, as having communicated with him, seeking papal inter- 
cession in order to placate Pepin's anger. This inquiry, 
while nothing came of it, arrived sometime after the crisis 
had subsided. In the interval, Pepin prepared to invalidate 
these rumors by his exploits in the field rather than by verbal 
exchanges.
In 766 the king summoned the whole Frankish host to 
his annual Mayfield at Orleans on the Loire.*9 Preparing to 
enter Aquitaine after a respite of two years, Pepin enjoyed on 
this occasion a peculiar twist of events. With this season of 
fighting, an advantage began to shift to his favor. Even be­
fore he had entered the field in 766, an uncle by the name of 
Remistan on Duke Waifar*s fraternal side deserted the Aquitanian 
cause and threw in with the Austrasians. Consequently, when
Codex Carolinus, Ep. XXXVI, pp. 545-546.
^^Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici 
Continuationes, 131, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 190: "Evoluto
igitur anno, commoto omni exercito Francorum vel plurimum na- 
tiones, quod in regno suo commorabantur, usque ad Aurilianis 
veniens, ibi placitum suum campo Madio, quod ipse primus pro 
campo Martio pro utilitate Francorum instituit, tenens, multa 
munera a Francis vel proceris suis ditatus est."
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the Franks crossed the Loire, they numbered among their host 
this new ally whom Pepin rewarded with numerous gifts in order 
to make an example of his munificence.50
Upon entering Aquitaine with his army, Pepin employed 
himself in reconstructing the fortifications that the duke had 
earlier razed. Most important in this respect, he rebuilt the 
fortress known as Argenton on the Creuse River and then entrusted 
its keeping to the renegade R e m i s t a n . B e y o n d  this, he spent 
his time in devastating the duchy. Marching all the way south
^®Both the Annales Mettenses Priores (a. 765, M.G.H.,
SS. rer. Germ., p. 53) and the Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Frede­
garii Scholastici Continuationes (128, M.G.H., SS. rer. MerovT, 
p. 189) mention this episode while the Annales Regni Francorum 
slights the topic. The former observes: "Remistanius vero
avunculus Waifarii ad regem Pippinum confugium fecit, quem pius 
Pippinus honorifice suscipiens multis muneribus ditavit." In 
both the above instances where Remistan is introduced, he is 
referred to as the "avunculus Waifarii." Rather than being the 
duke's maternal uncle, he actually was the son of Eudes (see 
the continuator, 133, p. 191), hence Waifar's father's brother 
(i.e., patruus). Also, note Ludovic Drapeyron's (Revue des 
Travaux de l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, CV,
280) concluding remarks relative to this defection which now 
reversed the embarrassment of the Franks (Tassilo) to the Aqui- 
tanians in the loss of Remistan: "La defection de Tassillon,
due de Bavière, ne saurait être raisonnablement comparée à celle 
de Rémistan, qui appartenait et à la famille et au duché même 
de Waiffre."
^^Annales S. Amandi, a. 766, M.G.H., SS., p. 10: "Pip­
pinus fuit in Wasconia, et fecit Argentum." The only reference 
to this gift of Pepin's to Remistan appears in the Chronicarum 
quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes (129, M.G.H., 
SS. rer. Merov., p. 189): "Rex Pippinus castro cui nomen est
Argentonus in pago Bytorivo a fundamento miro opere in pristino 
statu reparare iussit; comites suos ibidem ad custodiendum mit­
tens, ipso castro Remistanio ad Waiofario resistendum cum medi- 
etatem pago Bytorivo usque ad Care concessit."
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to the city of Agen on the Garonne, he returned by travelling 
through Perigueux and Angouleme laden with booty. While he 
had mastered almost all of the duchy, he gained further satis­
faction in receiving the voluntary subservience of many Gas­
cons and Aquitanians.^2 Quite possibly, those who submitted 
to Pepin on this occasion were Aquitanian aristocrats of Frank­
ish extraction who had originally come into the province as 
guardians of Merovingian power and then usurped these rights.
The cases of Remistan and that of the emissary Chunibert (infra, 
p. 188) indicate that some within the higher echelons of Frank­
ish society already questioned the prudence of continuing the 
rebellion. Pepin then proceeded back into Francia, wintered at 
Samoussy, and observed the Easter holidays at G e n t i l l y . 53
With the coming of 767, Pepin decided to bring this 
well-nigh interminable conflict in Aquitaine to a close by vig­
orously pressing the issue. Breaking off his conquest of second­
ary objectives, he began to pursue his immediate quarry, Duke 
Waifar. The location of his Mayfield for that year attests to 
the progress of his efforts. He convened his Franks for the
52por the details of his 766 harrying of Aquitaine, see 
Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes 
(131, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 190) which also substantiates 
the present remark; "Videntes tam Wascones quam maiores natu 
Aquitanie, necessitate conpulsi, plurimi ad eum venerunt, sacra­
menta ad eum ibidem donant, dictionis sue faciunt.”
5^Annales Regni Francorum, a. 766, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., 
p. 24: "Et celebravit natalem Domini in Salmontiagum villam et
pascha in Gentiliaco."
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first time in their spring assemblage in Aquitaine at Bourges 
and even went so far as to entrust the safety of his wife to 
that city during the fighting season.
Once again journeying south to the Garonne, Pepin ac­
quired many fortifications during the march. While his campaign 
of the previous year brought him conquests in the southwest, 
he now traversed the southeastern part of the duchy and took 
in tow the castles of Ally, Turenne, and Peyrusse.^^ But in 
his main purpose he failed; Duke Waifar managed to elude his 
would-be captors. Thus, the Austrasian annalist observed that 
the king contented himself in the seizure of many rocks and 
caves (viz., hiding places) in his unsuccessful pursuit
5^To insure her comfort during his absence, he construct­
ed a residence there to which he later returned for the winter 
months. Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Con­
tinuationes, 132, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 190: " . . .  cum
regina sua Bertradane iam fiducialiter Ligere transite, ad 
Bitoricas accessit; palacium sibi edificare iubet. Iterum campo 
Madio, sicut mos erat, ibidem tenere iubet; initoque consilio 
cum proceris suis, prefata regina Bertradane cum reliquis Francis 
hac comitibus fidelibus suis in praedictas Betoricas dimisit."
As this year commemorates his first Aquitanian Mayfield, like­
wise he refrained from going north for the winter. This fur­
ther indicated his impatience to see the war through as quickly 
as possible.
Annales Mettenses Priores, a. 767, M.G.H., SS. rer. 
Germ., pp. 5̂ 4-55: "In quo itinere multas minitiones adquisivit,
castrum videlicet Scoralium, Thorinnam et Petrociam et alias 
quam plurimas firmitates."
SGçhronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Con­
tinuationes , 132, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., pp. 190-191: "Ipse
praedictusrex cum reliquis Francis et obtimatis suis perse- 
quendum Waiofarium perrexit. Cumque praedictus rex ipsum Waio­
farium persequente non repperiret, —  iam tempus hiems erat, —
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Pepin had to suffer one last setback before accomplish­
ing his purpose. After exulting in the defection of Remistan 
to the Frankish side, the king learned that this same Aqui­
tanian had broken his oath of fealty to him and returned to be­
come, once again, Duke Waifar's man.^^ So ardently did Remi­
stan now take up the duke's cause that all the districts of 
Berry and Limoges fell into complete disarray at his coming.
His attacks, efficiently and thoroughly lodged, even discouraged 
the peasants from working in the fields and vineyards.^® As 
with Tassilo, however, Remistan later paid a heavy price to the 
Franks for his perfidy.
cum omni exercito ad Betoricas, ubi praefata regina Bertradane 
dimiserat, reversus est." Concerning Pepin's conquest of rocks 
and caves, see Annales Regni Francorum, a. 767, M.G.H., SS. 
rer. Germ., pp. 24-26: "Et inde iter peragens usque ad Garonnam
pervenit, multas roccas et speluncas conquisivit, castrum 
Scoraliam, Torinnam, Petrociam et reversus est Bituricam."
^^Why did Remistan venture back to the duke's banner at 
such an inopportune moment? A French historian, François 
Chamard (Revue des Questions Historiques, XXXV, 44) assures 
his readers: "Remistan, 1'oncle de 1'infortuné prince d'Aqui­
taine, le traître à son pays, à son sang, a ses propres intérêts, 
sentit le remords monter a son coeur en voyant la situation 
désespérée et 1'héroïque courage de son neveu. Il s'échappa 
de la cour du vainqueur, et alla se jeter dans les bras du vaincu."
^®Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici 
Continuationes, 133, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 191: "Super-
scriptos Remistanius contra praedicto rege et Francos seu cus­
todies, quas ipse rex in ipsis civitates dimiserat, nimium 
infestus accessit et Bitorivo seu et Limoticino, quod ipse rex 
adquisierat, praedando nimium vastavit, ita ut nullus colonus 
terre ad laborandum tam agrrs quam vineis scolere non audebant."
179
While resting at Bourges before resuming the pursuit
of Remistan and Waifar, Pepin learned of the death of Pope
Paul.^® Undeterred by this news, the king called forth his
army from their winter quarters in Burgundy quite early in 768.
Not waiting either for Easter or his yearly Mayfield to signal
the beginning of his campaign, he went into the field that very
February. For the king, the matter of Remistan constituted
the first order of business. He assigned to four of his nobles
the task of executing a trap which he had planned for the
Aquitanian. Detailing a force to them, he therefore divided
his army. Taking the main part himself, Pepin then went off
to catch Duke Waifar after sending the Queen to Orleans, a
60safer spot in which to wait.
With the advent of the 768 campaign, Aquitanian resis­
tance began to disintegrate under the pressure of the Franks. 
The energetic offensive of Pepin quickly netted him numerous
^^Annales Nazariani, a. 767, M.G.H., SS., p. 31: "Paulus
papa obiitT’*
GOçhronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Con­
tinuationes, 134, M.G.H., SS. rer Merov., p. 191: "Evoluto
igitur eo anno, cum in Betoricas resederet, mediante Fedroario, 
omnem exercitum suum, quem in Burgundia ad hyemandum miserat, 
ad se venire praecepit; initoque consilio, contra Remistagnum 
insidias parat. Hermenaldo, Beringario, Childerado et Uniberto 
comite Bitorivo cum reliquis comitibus et leodibus suis ad 
ipsum Remistanium capiendum clam mittens, predictus rex Pip­
pinus cum omni exercitu Francorum iterum ad persequendum Waio­
farium ire distinavit." Among those whom the king entrusted 
with this task was Count Chunibert of Bourges, who, in contrast 
to the instance of Remistan, became Pepin's man and faithfully 
served him.
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prisoners that spring from within the ducal house itself. The 
nobles who had been sent out to snare Remistan accomplished 
their task and accordingly notified Pepin, who was travelling 
south at the time, of their feat. Upon reaching the city of 
Saintes, the king experienced yet further success by the acqui­
sition of all the duke's immediate family (mother, sisters, 
and nieces) with the exception of his wife.^l As for Remistan, 
the normally tolerant king departed from his customary leniency 
and ordered the man hanged. Taking Remistan to the city of 
Bourges, Counts Chunibert and Gislarius executed him before 
the inhabitants so that everyone could note the e x a m p l e .
(Count Chunibert's career duplicated that of Remistan. Having 
earlier deserted the service of Waifar for that of Pepin, it
^^Annales qui Dicuntur Einhardi, a. 768, M.G.H., SS. 
rer. Germ., p. 27; "Rex Pippinus, cum primum ad bellum geren- 
dum tempus congruum esse videret, evocato undique exercitu, ad 
Santonicam civitatem contendit. Captoque in itinere Rimistaino, 
cum ad urbem praedictam venisset, mater et soror et neptes 
Waifarii ducis ad conspectum eius adductae sunt. Quas cum pie 
susceptas servari iussisset, ad Garonnam fluvium proficiscitur, 
ubi ei Erowicus cum alia praedicti ducis sorore occurrit in 
loco, qui Montes vocatur, seque et illam regi tradidit." No 
mention appears in either chronicles or annals relating to 
Waifar's wife during the last year of the duke's life (768).
If more information were known about her perhaps the succession 
question, as it later puzzles those who attempt to unravel 
it, would be less perplexing.
^^Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici 
Continuationes, 134, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 191: "Igitur
suprascripti comites, qui ad Remistagnum capiendum missi 
fuerant, per divino iudicio et fidem regis capiunt et legatum 
ad praesentiam regis cum uxore sua adduxerunt. Quem statim 
rex Uniberto et Gislario comite Betoricas civitate ipso 
Remistagnum in patibulo eum suspendi iussit.”
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could be that the king wanted to impress the count with 
Remistan*s example in order to prevent a recurrence of this 
kind of treachery.) Meanwhile, Pepin hastened on to the 
Garonne after his principal objective, the duke.
In the southern part of the duchy, Pepin received 
oaths of allegiance and hostages from the Gascons. Since the 
Easter holidays were impending, the king interrupted his 
campaign to journey to Queen Bertrada, who now resided at 
Sels (Chantoceaux). After dealing there with Saracenic ambassa­
dors, who had presented themselves so inopportunely, Pepin 
ventured forth against Waifar for the second time that season. 
Now the queen accompanied him as far as Saintes while he went 
ahead to Perigord, where the duke reputedly l u r k e d . ^3 Dividing 
his forces into four columns, he scanned the Foret de Ver in 
the district of Perigueux in quest of Waifar, who now drifted 
from place to place in the manner of a hunted animal. The 
king was denied the final honor of having captured the duke 
himself. Several members of Waifar's entourage took matters 
into their own hands and assassinated him. Allegedly, however, 
Pepin had connived in this to gain his end. As for the results.
^^Annales Mettenses Priores, a. 768, M.G.H., SS. rer. 
Germ., p. 55: "Inde quoque victor revertens pascha dominicum
celebravit in castro quod dicitur Sels. Indeque promote 
exercitu, assumens secum Bertradam reginam, iterum ad Sanctonis 
civitatem pervenit. In qua reginam cum reliqua familia sua 
dimittens, ad Petrogoricam perrexit."
182
Aquitaine desisted in her rebellion and bent to his will, so 
the chronicler said, "as in the days of old."®^
For Pepin the war with Waifar personally amounted to 
a Pyrrhic victory, as the Aquitanian wars generally did in a 
far larger sense for the Frankish nation. Physically, the 
toll that the separatist struggle demanded broke his health 
and surely contributed to his premature death. Ostensibly, 
the king had won a victory, but events soon proved both the 
illusive nature of this and the ingrained persistence of 
particularism in Aquitanian feudal society. Upon his return 
to his family at Saintes, Pepin tarried there and then fell 
ill. Sensing the gravity of his sickness, he travelled back 
into Francia by way of Tours and died at St. Denis on Septem­
ber 24, 768.^5
^^Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici 
Continuationes, 135, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 192: "Dum
hec ageretur, —  ut adserunt, cosilia regis factum fuisset, —  
Waiofarius princeps Aquitanie a suis interfectus est. Prae- 
fatus rex Pippinus, iam totam Aquitaniam adquesitam, —  omnes 
ad eum venientes dictionis sue, sicut antiquitus fuerat, faci­
unt, —  cum magno triumpho et victoria Sanctonis, ubi Bertrada 
regina resedebat, veniens."
^^Annales Regni Francorum, a. 768, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., 
p. 27: "Cumque ibi aliquantum temporis moraretur, aegritudine
decubuit; in ipsa tamen valitudine Turonos delatus apud sancti 
Martini memoriam oravit. Inde cum ad Parisios venisset, VIII.
Kal. Oct. diem obiit. Cuius corpus in basilica beati Dionysii 
martyris humatum est." Also see the Annalium Fuldensium Pars 
Prima (a. 768, M.G.H., SS., p. 348) where simultaneous comment 
is made on Pepin's final accomplishment in Aquitaine : "Pippinus,
interfecto Waiphario et omni Aquitania subacta rediens, apud 
Parisios 8. Kalendas Octob. diem obiit, anno aetatis 54. filiique 
eius Karolus et Karlomannus infulas regni suscipiunt." For the
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For the Aquitanians, the truly phenomenal aspect of 
their opposition to Pepin was the longevity of the struggle. 
Even though at an extreme disadvantage, Waifar perpetuated 
the unequal separatist contest longer than could reasonably 
have been expected of him. Only engaging the Frank once in 
open battle, he particularly excelled at intrigue and con­
spiracy, but in the end he succumbed to the Austrasian superi­
ority.
Did the degree of Pepin's success surpass that of his 
father against Duke Hunald? The answer to this question must 
be in the affirmative in all respects. Most illustrative of 
this fact. King Pepin apportioned his newly conquered province 
among his two heirs, his sons Charles and Carloman. This par­
ticular fate the duchy had not suffered in many generations. 
Aquitaine did, however, absorb the blow against its quest for 
independence and, though militarily defeated, it refused to 
conform to Austrasian standards. Indeed, the duchy maintained 
a rebellious spirit that continued to strive for autonomy.
The might of Charles rendered success here impractical, but 
nonetheless the intractability of Aquitanian separatism sur­
vived to plague the northern Franks on later occasions.
itinerary of Pepin throughout this fateful year, consult the 
chart of Ludwig Oelsner, Jahrbucher des frankischen Reiches 
unter Konig Pippin, p. 410.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The most impressive aspect of Aquitanian separatism 
concerns the unflagging effort of the province to rid itself 
of Austrasian overlordship. The might of Frankish militarism 
could neither extinguish nor alter the Aquitanian separatist 
mentality. In fact, after the extensive and prolonged devas­
tation of the duchy by Pepin, another rebellion arose in the 
year after his death. This ill-fated revolt represented a 
testing of the leadership prowess of Pepin's successors,
Charles and Carloman. In several respects this Aquitanian 
insurrection, led by a certain Hunald, affected the mainstream 
of Frankish statecraft. Although the lineage of this Hunald 
remains confused,^ he revived the spirit of Waifar's resistance
^The precise identity of this Hunald perplexes those 
who study the revolt of 769. The point principally in ques­
tion relates to whether Charles' antagonist (769) and that of 
his father (deposed in 744) were one and the same or two sep­
arate personages. Scholars have divided their sentiments fair­
ly evenly on the matter. Thomas Hodgkin (Italy and Her Inva­
ders, VII, p. 305) and Jean de Jaurgain (La Vasconie, I, pp. 
2-3) both agree that these two dukes have separate identities. 
On the other hand, François Chamard (Revue des Questions His­
toriques, XXXV, 47) and Abel-Simson (Sigurd Abel and Bernhard 
Simson, Jahrbucher des frankischen Reiches unter Karl dem 
Grossen I "Jahrbucher der Deutschen Geschichte** ; Leipzig, 1888] , 
I, p. 43) think otherwise. The latter are convinced that 
Hunald fled his monastic surroundings on the île de Ré in order 
to assume the role of leadership vacated by Waifar upon his
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and required the immediate attention of the new kings upon 
their assumption of office. Being the eldest, Charles took 
the initiative in tending to Hunald and asked Carloman to meet 
him at Duasdives (ad fluvium Dive) before the invasion of Aqui­
taine. Carloman came but soon turned against Charles and re­
turned into Francia, leaving him, unassisted, to subdue Hunald. 
Whether the responsibility for Aquitaine lay jointly or individ­
ually with the brothers (a point on which the sources conflict), 
the independent course that Carloman pursued certainly marked 
him out in Carolingian society as having failed his brother in 
time of need.2 Thus, a breach opened between the brothers, 
the effects of which were soon felt in other affairs.
The 769 uprising proved a short-lived affair. After 
the experience of the past nine years, Aquitaine lacked the 
strength to resist Charles; consequently, Hunald quickly had 
to flee into Gascony to gain refuge at the court of Duke Lupus. 
At the threat of a Frankish advance into that quarter as well, 
the Gascon duke surrendered Hunald to Charles. This capitula­
tion ruled out the possibility of further rebellion in Aqui­
taine. In actuality, Hunald's opposition itself was ephemeral. 
The incident served, however, as a sequel to the efforts of
death. The present author inclines toward this interpretation.
^In many respects, this affair is analogous to that of 
Tassilo's desertion of Pepin during an earlier Frankish cam­
paign in Aquitaine.
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Waifar and crowned the military accomplishments of the Franks 
in the duchy.
With the success of Frankish arms in Aquitaine, pro­
vision had to be made for the establishment of laws under the 
auspices of the victor. Pepin attended to this at the very 
end of his life.^ Although Pepin attempted to account for the 
duchy in these respects (in both jurisprudence and the mili­
tary) , the incompatibility of the Aguitanians later forced 
Charles to establish the kingdom of Aquitaine in 778. To the 
Austrasians, the time had arrived to pursue a new policy. 
Aquitanian separatism had initially arisen in the province 
during Merovingian times under a migrant Frankish aristocracy 
seeking to create its own proto-feudal base of power indepen­
dent of outside supervision. Usurping Merovingian prerogatives, 
these Frankish aristocrats had repeatedly defied the northern 
overlord, particularly after the mayors converted their mini­
sterial status to one of domination. With past experience as 
a guide, the Carolingiens considered it far better to have a 
trustworthy Aquitanian government headed by a member of their 
own family. Consec[uently, Charles sent his four year old son.
^See this short, but instructive code devised by Pepin: 
Capitulare 18, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Leges, Sectio II, 
I, ed. A. Boretius (Hannover, 1883), pp. 42-43. With twelve 
provisions, five of these concern the affairs of the Church 
and its property while the remaining ones deal with such matters 
as the respective jurisdiction of law codes, the rights of 
travelers, the poor, and the return of the property of the dis­
possessed.
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Louis (the Pious), into the duchy in 781 to be reared as an 
Aquitanian under Austrasian guardianship. To the king, this 
plan circumvented the prospects of gambling on the loyalty 
of a duke charged with Carolingian responsibilities who might 
then betray him for personal gain.
As the Carolingian state began to crumble at the end 
of the next century amid dynastic disputes, the duchy utilized 
Frankish preoccupations to win independence. At this point 
in Frankish affairs, Aquitaine once again led the way among 
the provinces in her unfilial devotion to the Austrasians and 
achieved the consummation of her separatist ambitions.
In the years from Eudes to Waifar the Aguitanians waged 
their separatist struggle with varying success. While they 
unflinchingly pursued their objective of complete independence, 
their success correlated exactly with the fortunes of the 
Frankish state. In fact, the degree of autonomy that Aquitaine 
appreciated at any given moment throughout these years served 
as a barometer for the condition of the Carolingian state. 
Moreover, as the Franks successively began to thrive under 
Charles Martel and his heirs, the outlook for the particularist 
movement south of the Loire worsened. The Carolingiens, with 
the exception of Martel, moved into the duchy only upon the 
provocation of the duke. Significantly, the increased atten­
tion that Aquitaine received coincided exactly with the coming 
of the Saracen to Spain. In addition, the warming of Franco-
188
Papal relations also gave new importance to the strategic posi­
tion of the duchy during this same period. For the ducal house, 
Eudes* conflict with Martel set the example for the aspirations 
of both parties. The duke advanced the prerogatives of his po­
sition exceedingly well throughout the early years of his ten­
ure in office, only to have his power curtailed late in life. 
While the latter situation occurred at the hands of Martel, who 
outlived the duke, both Hunald and Waifar respectively labored 
under the Nemesis of this particular duke's example. Eudes* 
successors periodically experienced considerable freedom of 
movement, as this duke had, as well as having to oppose armies 
of occupation. Thus, the advance of the Franks into Aquitaine 
fluctuated from moments of extreme activity and hostility to 
those of almost indifference. However, as Frankish annals 
describe the constant fighting that the Austrasians endured, 
either among themselves or with the dependent kingdoms, one 
suspects that preoccupation rather than indifference distracted 
their efforts. Intent on solving a myriad of problems, the 
Carolingiens found that the needs of their barbarized, feudal 
state enfeebled and diverted their resources. Moreover, simi­
lar problems of a particularist era prevented the Aquitanian 
duke from capitalizing on Austrasian difficulties. Indeed, 
nothing indicates that Aquitaine culturally or intellectually 
excelled to the extent of surpassing the rest of western Europe 
as French nationalist historians of earlier generations fondly
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profess. If this had been so, Aquitanian scholars would have 
assumed a leading role in the cultural renaissance under 
Charles and Louis the Pious. Such was not the case. This, as 
much as anything else, refutes the caricature of a more highly 
developed, Romanized duchy valiantly struggling to resist Ger­
manic, Austrasian forces who possessed the skill to wage war 
and not much else.
During the course of their struggles the Aquitanian 
dukes joined with others, whenever possible, to strike back 
against the Frankish overlord. Hence, Eudes joined with Munuza 
and later, Hunald with the Bavarians. In the case of the latter 
union, both duchies had a common plight that readily attracts 
attention. Both areas were oriented toward the agricultural, 
which in turn gave them a provincial pride that fostered an 
independent political position. Beyond this, a noticeable dif­
ference existed insofar as Frankish priorities went. The 
Carolingiens intermarried from time to time with the Bavarian 
ducal family, but not with the Aquitanian. A closer tie con­
nected them with the Bavarians and gave their dealings an in­
timacy that required an immediate and, perhaps on occasion, a 
more thoughtful approach. Little advantage would fall to the 
Austrasians in marrying with the Aquitanian ducal family, how­
ever. The dukes lacked hereditary rights to power, as did the 
Carolings themselves, while the Bavarian house was ancient and 
legitimate. Interestingly enough, both the Bavarians and the
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Aquitanians shared a common fate under the most powerful of 
the Carolingiens in the extermination of their ducal houses. 
As the first to experience this, Aquitaine received indepen­
dent consideration. Consequently, for this most persistent 
of administrative and feudal problems, the Carolingiens ap­
plied a remedy that would suffice throughout the reign of 
their most illustrious king. No longer would the Austrasians 
tolerate provincial usurpation among the Aquitanian aristoc­
racy; instead, they entrusted leadership to a prince of their 
own line apprenticed to the people themselves.
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